Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (2026)
Chapter definitions
✓ current as of May 2026
As used in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:
- (1) "Anticipated life." The anticipated life of a product shall be determined by the expiration date placed on the product by the manufacturer when required by law but shall not commence until the date the product was first purchased for use or consumption;
- (2) "Defective condition" means a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and consumption;
- (3) "Employer" means any person exercising legal supervisory control or guidance of users or consumers of products;
- (4) "Manufacturer" means the designer, fabricator, producer, compounder, processor or assembler of any product or its component parts;
- (5) "Product" means any tangible object or goods produced;
- (6) "Product liability action" for purposes of this chapter includes all actions brought for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, testing, service, warning, instruction, marketing, packaging or labeling of any product. "Product liability action" includes, but is not limited to, all actions based upon the following theories: strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of warranty, express or implied; breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent, or innocent; misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure, whether negligent, or innocent; or under any other substantive legal theory in tort or contract whatsoever;
- (7) "Seller" includes a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and means any individual or entity engaged in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for resale, or for use or consumption. "Seller" also includes a lessor or bailor engaged in the business of leasing or bailment of a product; and
- (8) "Unreasonably dangerous" means that a product is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics, or that the product because of its dangerous condition would not be put on the market by a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller, assuming that the manufacturer or seller knew of its dangerous condition.
Acts 1978, ch. 703, § 2; T.C.A., § 23-3702; modified.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 169
cases (39 in the last 5 years), 1984–2026 · leading case: Michael Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., d/b/a Beaman Dodge Chrysler Jeep, 356 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2011).
Michael Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., d/b/a Beaman Dodge Chrysler Jeep, 356 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2011). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 . 4 On June 1, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court authorized the sale of Chrysler’s assets to New CarCo Acquisition LLC.”
Evelyn Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 686 (Tenn. 2011). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (3). It is also supported by comment l to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) stating that ‘User’ includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplanes, as well…”
Leatherwood v. Wadley, 121 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “The complaint alleges that Moore is strictly hable for the injuries suffered by plaintiff pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-28-102 as the manufacturer of the racing vehicle which he was driving.”
Lea Ann Tatham v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 734 (Tenn. 2015). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (6). Specifically, section 29-28-105 of the Act states: (a) A manufacturer or seller of a product shall not be liable for any injury to a person or property caused by the product unless the product is determined to be in a defective condition or…”
Jeremy Flax v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521 (Tenn. 2008). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (6) (2000). Accordingly, the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with the traditional failure to warn claim, and DCC has not appealed the trial court’s ruling on that issue.”
Maness v. Boston Sci., 751 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Tenn. 2010). “” T.C.A. § 29-28-102(2). In addition, a product is “unreasonably dangerous” if it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics, or that…”
Sarah Speed v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2013). “Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the relevant language in the TPLA is essentially the same as the language of the KPLA discussed in Smith. Both statutes define a “product liability action” to include all harm caused by a product regardless of the legal theory advanced.”
Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2001). “Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: In a products liability action under Tennessee law, may the plaintiff use the “consumer expectation test” to prove that his seatbelt/restraint system was unreasonably dangerous because it failed to conform to the safety standards expected by an…”
Shoemake v. Omniquip Int'l Inc., 152 S.W.3d 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “T.C.A. § 29-28-102(2) (2000) defines defective condition as “a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and consumption.”
Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1421 (E.D. Tenn. 1991). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-28-102(2). That the Fry Daddy conformed to Silver’s normal or anticipated use is supported by her regular and satisfactory use of the product for some six to seven years.”
Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2005). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (2). The plaintiff also must trace his or her injury to the defect.”
Ladd Ex Rel. Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). “” 10 Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-28-102(5). We must still determine whether the term “product” refers only to a specific model or brand or whether it may refer more generally to similar types of goods.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(1) — 3 cases
Spence v. Miles Labs., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Tenn. 1992).
Wahl v. Gen. Elec. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 937 (M.D. Tenn. 2013).
Spence v. Miles Labs., Inc., 37 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1994).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(2) — 31 cases
Evelyn Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 686 (Tenn. 2011). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (3). It is also supported by comment l to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) stating that ‘User’ includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplanes, as well…”
Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1421 (E.D. Tenn. 1991). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-28-102(2). That the Fry Daddy conformed to Silver’s normal or anticipated use is supported by her regular and satisfactory use of the product for some six to seven years.”
Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2005). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (2). The plaintiff also must trace his or her injury to the defect.”
Jeremy Flax v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521 (Tenn. 2008). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (6) (2000). Accordingly, the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with the traditional failure to warn claim, and DCC has not appealed the trial court’s ruling on that issue.”
Potter v. Ford Motor Co., 213 S.W.3d 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(3) — 1 case
Evelyn Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 686 (Tenn. 2011). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (3). It is also supported by comment l to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) stating that ‘User’ includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplanes, as well…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(4) — 16 cases
Leatherwood v. Wadley, 121 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “The complaint alleges that Moore is strictly hable for the injuries suffered by plaintiff pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-28-102 as the manufacturer of the racing vehicle which he was driving.”
Maness v. Boston Sci., 751 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Tenn. 2010). “” T.C.A. § 29-28-102(2). In addition, a product is “unreasonably dangerous” if it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics, or that…”
Messer Griesheim Indus., Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 194 S.W.3d 466 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
Davis v. Komatsu Am. Indus. Corp., 42 S.W.3d 34 (Tenn. 2001).
Gaines v. Excel Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 569 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(5) — 3 cases
Ladd Ex Rel. Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). “” 10 Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-28-102(5). We must still determine whether the term “product” refers only to a specific model or brand or whether it may refer more generally to similar types of goods.”
Damron v. Media Gen., Inc., 3 S.W.3d 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
Gayle Penley v. Honda Motor (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(6) — 56 cases
Michael Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., d/b/a Beaman Dodge Chrysler Jeep, 356 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2011). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 . 4 On June 1, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court authorized the sale of Chrysler’s assets to New CarCo Acquisition LLC.”
Evelyn Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 686 (Tenn. 2011). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (3). It is also supported by comment l to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) stating that ‘User’ includes those who are passively enjoying the benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles or airplanes, as well…”
Sarah Speed v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2013). “Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the relevant language in the TPLA is essentially the same as the language of the KPLA discussed in Smith. Both statutes define a “product liability action” to include all harm caused by a product regardless of the legal theory advanced.”
Ladd Ex Rel. Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). “” 10 Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-28-102(5). We must still determine whether the term “product” refers only to a specific model or brand or whether it may refer more generally to similar types of goods.”
Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 799 (W.D. Tenn. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(6)(2000) — 1 case
Aundrey Meals, as Nat. Parent, Guardian, & Next Friend of William Meals v. Ford Motor Co. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(7) — 6 cases
Shoemake v. Omniquip Int'l Inc., 152 S.W.3d 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “T.C.A. § 29-28-102(2) (2000) defines defective condition as “a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and consumption.”
Baker v. Promark Prods. West, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 844 (Tenn. 1985).
Maness v. Boston Sci., 751 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Tenn. 2010). “” T.C.A. § 29-28-102(2). In addition, a product is “unreasonably dangerous” if it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics, or that…”
Rollins v. Cherokee Warehouses, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
Privette v. CSX Transp., Inc., 79 F. App'x 879 (6th Cir. 2003).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(8) — 45 cases
Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2001). “Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: In a products liability action under Tennessee law, may the plaintiff use the “consumer expectation test” to prove that his seatbelt/restraint system was unreasonably dangerous because it failed to conform to the safety standards expected by an…”
Maness v. Boston Sci., 751 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D. Tenn. 2010). “” T.C.A. § 29-28-102(2). In addition, a product is “unreasonably dangerous” if it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics, or that…”
Ray Ex Rel. Holman v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996).
Lee v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (M.D. Tenn. 2009).
Jeremy Flax v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521 (Tenn. 2008). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (6) (2000). Accordingly, the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with the traditional failure to warn claim, and DCC has not appealed the trial court’s ruling on that issue.”
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