Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (2026)
Decree for support of spouse
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) In any action for divorce, legal separation or separate maintenance, the court may award alimony to be paid by one spouse to or for the benefit of the other, or out of either spouse's property, according to the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties. The court may fix some definite amount or amounts to be paid in monthly, semimonthly or weekly installments, or otherwise, as the circumstances may warrant. Such award, if not paid, may be enforced by any appropriate process of the court having jurisdiction including levy of execution. Further, the order or decree shall remain in the court's jurisdiction and control, and, upon application of either party, the court may award an increase or decrease or other modification of the award based upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances; provided, that the award is subject to modification by the court based on the type of alimony awarded, the terms of the court's decree or the terms of the parties' agreement.
- (b) The court may, in its discretion, at any time pending the final hearing, upon motion and after notice and hearing, make any order that may be proper to compel a spouse to pay any sums necessary for the support and maintenance of the other spouse, to enable such spouse to prosecute or defend the suit of the parties and to make other orders as it deems appropriate. Further, the court may award such sum as may be necessary to enable a spouse to pay the expenses of job training and education. In making any order under this subsection (b), the court shall consider the financial needs of each spouse and the financial ability of each spouse to meet those needs and to prosecute or defend the suit.
- (c)
- (1) Spouses have traditionally strengthened the family unit through private arrangements whereby one (1) spouse focuses on nurturing the personal side of the marriage, including the care and nurturing of the children, while the other spouse focuses primarily on building the economic strength of the family unit. This arrangement often results in economic detriment to the spouse who subordinated such spouse's own personal career for the benefit of the marriage. It is the public policy of this state to encourage and support marriage, and to encourage family arrangements that provide for the rearing of healthy and productive children who will become healthy and productive citizens of our state.
- (2) The general assembly finds that the contributions to the marriage as homemaker or parent are of equal dignity and importance as economic contributions to the marriage. Further, where one (1) spouse suffers economic detriment for the benefit of the marriage, the general assembly finds that the economically disadvantaged spouse's standard of living after the divorce should be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
- (d)
- (1) The court may award rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, also known as periodic alimony, transitional alimony, or alimony in solido, also known as lump sum alimony or a combination of these, as provided in this subsection (d).
- (2) It is the intent of the general assembly that a spouse, who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse, be rehabilitated, whenever possible, by the granting of an order for payment of rehabilitative alimony. To be rehabilitated means to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the economically disadvantaged spouse's standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
- (3) Where there is relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible, in consideration of all relevant factors, including those set out in subsection (i), the court may grant an order for payment of support and maintenance on a long-term basis or until death or remarriage of the recipient, except as otherwise provided in subdivision (f)(2)(B).
- (4) An award of alimony in futuro may be made, either in addition to an award of rehabilitative alimony, where a spouse may be only partially rehabilitated, or instead of an award of rehabilitative alimony, where rehabilitation is not feasible. Transitional alimony is awarded when the court finds that rehabilitation is not necessary, but the economically disadvantaged spouse needs assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of a divorce, legal separation or other proceeding where spousal support may be awarded, such as a petition for an order of protection.
- (5) Alimony in solido may be awarded in lieu of or in addition to any other alimony award, in order to provide support, including attorney fees, where appropriate.
- (e)
- (1) Rehabilitative alimony is a separate class of spousal support, as distinguished from alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, and transitional alimony. To be rehabilitated means to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the economically disadvantaged spouse's standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
- (2) An award of rehabilitative alimony shall remain in the court's control for the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances. For rehabilitative alimony to be extended beyond the term initially established by the court, or to be increased in amount, or both, the recipient of the rehabilitative alimony shall have the burden of proving that all reasonable efforts at rehabilitation have been made and have been unsuccessful.
- (3) Rehabilitative alimony shall terminate upon the death of the recipient. Rehabilitative alimony shall also terminate upon the death of the payor, unless otherwise specifically stated.
- (f)
- (1) Alimony in futuro, also known as periodic alimony, is a payment of support and maintenance on a long term basis or until death or remarriage of the recipient. Such alimony may be awarded when the court finds that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible, meaning that the disadvantaged spouse is unable to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the spouse's standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties.
- (2)
- (A) An award of alimony in futuro shall remain in the court's control for the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances.
- (B) In all cases where a person is receiving alimony in futuro and the alimony recipient lives with a third person, a rebuttable presumption is raised that:
- (i) The third person is contributing to the support of the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of support previously awarded, and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse; or
- (ii) The third person is receiving support from the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse.
- (3) An award for alimony in futuro shall terminate automatically and unconditionally upon the death or remarriage of the recipient. The recipient shall notify the obligor immediately upon the recipient's remarriage. Failure of the recipient to timely give notice of the remarriage shall allow the obligor to recover all amounts paid as alimony in futuro to the recipient after the recipient's marriage. Alimony in futuro shall also terminate upon the death of the payor, unless otherwise specifically stated.
- (g)
- (1) Transitional alimony means a sum of money payable by one (1) party to, or on behalf of, the other party for a determinate period of time. Transitional alimony is awarded when the court finds that rehabilitation is not necessary, but the economically disadvantaged spouse needs assistance to adjust to the economic consequences of a divorce, legal separation or other proceeding where spousal support may be awarded, such as a petition for an order of protection.
- (2) Transitional alimony shall be nonmodifiable unless:
- (A) The parties otherwise agree in an agreement incorporated into the initial decree of divorce or legal separation, or order of protection;
- (B) The court otherwise orders in the initial decree of divorce, legal separation or order of protection; or
- (C) The alimony recipient lives with a third person, in which case a rebuttable presumption is raised that:
- (i) The third person is contributing to the support of the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of support previously awarded, and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse; or
- (ii) The third person is receiving support from the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse.
- (3) Transitional alimony shall terminate upon the death of the recipient. Transitional alimony shall also terminate upon the death of the payor, unless otherwise specifically stated in the decree.
- (4) The court may provide, at the time of entry of the order to pay transitional alimony, that the transitional alimony shall terminate upon the occurrence of other conditions, including, but not limited to, the remarriage of the party receiving transitional alimony.
- (h)
- (1)
- (A) Alimony in solido, also known as lump sum alimony, is a form of long-term support, the total amount of which is calculable on the date the decree is entered, but which is not designated as transitional alimony. Alimony in solido may be paid in installments if the payments are ordered over a definite period of time and the sum of the alimony to be paid is ascertainable when awarded. The purpose of this form of alimony is to provide financial support to a spouse, to enable the court to equitably divide and distribute marital property, or both.
- (B) Alimony in solido may be awarded for attorney fees and expenses incurred in connection with the proceedings through the date of the final hearing and any proceedings brought pursuant to Rule 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. When determining whether attorney fees and expenses should be awarded as alimony in solido, the court shall consider the following:
- (i) The factors enumerated in subsection (i);
- (ii) The total amount of attorney fees and expenses incurred and the total amount of attorney fees and expenses paid by each party in connection with the proceedings;
- (iii) Whether the attorney fees and expenses requested are reasonable under the factors set forth in Rule 1.5 of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct; and
- (iv) Whether the attorney fees and expenses were necessary.
- (2) A final award of alimony in solido is not modifiable, except by agreement of the parties only.
- (3) Alimony in solido is not terminable upon the death or remarriage of the recipient or the payor.
- (1)
- (i) In determining whether the granting of an order for payment of support and maintenance to a party is appropriate, and in determining the nature, amount, length of term, and manner of payment, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
- (1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial resources of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retirement plans and all other sources;
- (2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and the necessity of a party to secure further education and training to improve such party's earnings capacity to a reasonable level;
- (3) The duration of the marriage;
- (4) The age and mental condition of each party;
- (5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;
- (6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek employment outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage;
- (7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and intangible;
- (8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in § 36-4-121;
- (9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
- (10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party;
- (11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and
- (12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.
- (j) Where the lump sum amount of retirement or pension benefits or of balances in an individual retirement account, §§ 401(k), 403(b), 457 (26 U.S.C. §§ 401(k), 403(b) and 457), respectively, or any other tax qualified account has been considered by the trial court, and determined to be marital property to be divided, the distributions of such lump sum amounts necessary to complete the division of property, whether distributed in a single payment or by periodic payments, shall not be considered income for the purpose of determining a spouse or ex-spouse's right to receive alimony or child support, but the income generated by the investment of such lump sum awards shall be considered income for such purpose.
- (k) The court may direct a party to pay the premiums for insurance insuring the health care costs of the other party, in whole or in part, for such duration as the court deems appropriate.
- (l) To secure the obligation of one party to pay alimony to or for the benefit of the other party, the court may direct a party to designate the other party as the beneficiary of, and to pay the premiums required to maintain, any existing policies insuring the life of a party, or to purchase and pay the premiums required to maintain such new or additional life insurance designating the other party the beneficiary of the insurance, or a combination of these, as the court deems appropriate.
- (m) The order or decree of the court may provide that the payments for the support of such spouse shall be paid either to the clerk of the court or directly to the spouse, or, in Title IV-D cases, the order or decree of the court shall provide that payments shall be paid to the central collections and disbursement unit, pursuant to § 36-5-116.
- (n) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties as to support and maintenance of a party.
- (o) Any order of alimony that has been reduced to judgment shall be entitled to be enforced as any other judgment of a court of this state and shall be entitled to full faith and credit in this state and in any other state.
Amended by 2022 Tenn. Acts, ch. 762, s 7, eff. 3/31/2022.
Acts 2005, ch. 287, § 2; 2011 , ch. 119, § 3.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 475
cases (81 in the last 5 years), 1999–2026 · leading case: Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i).…”
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Christina Lee Cain-Swope v. Robert David Swope, 523 S.W.3d 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 . There is a statutory preference for rehabilitative or transitional alimony, Tenn.”
Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2011). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(0(1). Alimony in futuro “is not, however, a guarantee that the recipient spouse will forever be able to enjoy a lifestyle equal to that of the obligor spouse.”
Alexander Stratienko v. Lisa Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (g)(1). Rather, Wife *405 had no income and no reasonable employment opportunities.”
Wiser v. Wiser, 339 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121© 15 “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
Jennifer Lynn Jackman v. Kenneth Robert Jackman, 373 S.W.3d 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (e)(2) (2010). On the other hand, Wife argues that the trial court had not yet closed proof on her ability to be rehabilitated, and therefore did not abuse its discretion by awarding her alimony in futuro.”
Patricia Carlene Mayfield v. Phillip Harold Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108 (Tenn. 2012). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (d)(2) — (3); Gonsewski, 350 S.”
Renee Pembroke (Cooley) v. Christopher Eugene Cooley, 543 S.W.3d 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “3d at 107 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (f)(1)). Alimony in futuro can be awarded ―when the court finds that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible.”
Church v. Church, 346 S.W.3d 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “3d at 12 . In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121 (i) “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
Andrews v. Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “An award of alimony in futuro is appropriate when the trial court finds “that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible.” Id. An award of alimony in futuro concurrent with an award of rehabilitative alimony may be appropriate when the trial…”
Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321 (Tenn. 2007). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (2005); see generally Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(1) — 2 cases
Williams v. Williams, 286 S.W.3d 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
Alexander Stratienko v. Lisa Stratienko, 529 S.W.3d 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). “” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (g)(1). Rather, Wife *405 had no income and no reasonable employment opportunities.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(11) — 1 case
Staci L. Robinson v. Eric S. Robinson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(2) — 1 case
Rebecca Lynn Willenberg v. Mark Edward Willenberg (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(2005) — 1 case
Brenda Kay (Woods) Shooster v. Raymond (Ray) Gerald Shooster (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(I) — 8 cases
Iain Hiscock v. Sue E. Hiscock (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
Joseph Winfred Reeves v. Felicia Kimberly Reeves (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
Ronnie Gale Gill v. Nancy Jane Gill (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
Lisa Faye Roland Camp v. Randy Coleman Camp (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
C. Phillip McDow v. Sara Ciaramitaro McDow (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(a) — 15 cases
Wiser v. Wiser, 339 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121© 15 “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
Church v. Church, 346 S.W.3d 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “3d at 12 . In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121 (i) “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
Jennifer Lynn Jackman v. Kenneth Robert Jackman, 373 S.W.3d 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (e)(2) (2010). On the other hand, Wife argues that the trial court had not yet closed proof on her ability to be rehabilitated, and therefore did not abuse its discretion by awarding her alimony in futuro.”
In Re Westerfield, 403 B.R. 545 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009).
Sabra Elaine Ellis O'Daniel v. Rusty Wade O'Daniel, 419 S.W.3d 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(b) — 2 cases
Sharon Kay Jackson v. Randall D. Jackson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Dale Robert Scherzer v. Melissa Marie Scherzer - Concurring (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(b)(1)(B) — 3 cases
William Hunter Babcock v. Sonnia Elizabeth Babcock (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015).
Harold Lee Harden v. Judy Kay Harden (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
Lisa Bass Collins v. Stephen Butler Collins (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(c)(1) — 5 cases
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Regina D. Wiser v. Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
Alexander A. Rogin v. Joelle L. Rogin (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
Joy Henley McKee v. Jeffrey Elston McKee (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(c)(2) — 6 cases
Sharon Kay Jackson v. Randall D. Jackson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Mimi Hiatt v. Kevin L. Hiatt (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).
Mihir Kishorchandra Patel v. Janki Anil Patel (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
Deborah R. Chase v. Christopher W. Chase (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Regina D. Wiser v. Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d) — 5 cases
Jekot v. Jekot, 232 S.W.3d 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Farnham v. Farnham, 323 S.W.3d 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
Deborah Elaine Murdock v. Joel Montgomery Murdock (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
William James Jekot v. Pennie Christine Jekot (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
Victoria C. Jensen v. Tyler C. Jensen (Tenn. Ct. App. 2024).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(1) — 14 cases
Andrews v. Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “An award of alimony in futuro is appropriate when the trial court finds “that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible.” Id. An award of alimony in futuro concurrent with an award of rehabilitative alimony may be appropriate when the trial…”
Oakes v. Oakes, 235 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Matthew Wheeler Mabie, MD v. Carla Jennings Mabie (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).
Trina A. Henson v. Chris Robert Henson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).
Sonja Broyles Williams v. Stewart Ashley Williams (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2) — 30 cases
Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i).…”
Andrews v. Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “An award of alimony in futuro is appropriate when the trial court finds “that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible.” Id. An award of alimony in futuro concurrent with an award of rehabilitative alimony may be appropriate when the trial…”
Jekot v. Jekot, 232 S.W.3d 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Wiser v. Wiser, 339 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121© 15 “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
Christina Lee Cain-Swope v. Robert David Swope, 523 S.W.3d 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 . There is a statutory preference for rehabilitative or transitional alimony, Tenn.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2)(2005) — 3 cases
Dottie Diana Slaugher v. Henry Slaughter, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
Joanne Ruth Bearb v. Michael Edwin Bearb (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
Lisa Faye Roland Camp v. Randy Coleman Camp (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(3) — 7 cases
Brenda Kay (Woods) Shooster v. Raymond (Ray) Gerald Shooster (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
Johanna L. Gonsewski v. Craig W. Gonsewski (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
Sharon Kay Jackson v. Randall D. Jackson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Phillip Wayne Crocker v. Nancy Jo Reece Crocker (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
Theressa Joanne Booker v. Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(4) — 8 cases
Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i).…”
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Jekot v. Jekot, 232 S.W.3d 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Stephen Todd Mays v. Melissa Gail Mays (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
Brenda Brewer v. Kenny Brewer, Sr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(5) — 6 cases
Dale Robert Scherzer v. Melissa Marie Scherzer - Concurring (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
Bruce Anne Steadman v. Charles Daniel Farmer (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Stephanie Brummett Zarecor v. Glenn Payne Zarecor, Sr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015).
Diana Lynn Van Zandbergen v. Scott W. Van Zandbergen (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023).
Timothy Wade Keyt v. Nanci Suzanne Keyt (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(l) — 1 case
Wiser v. Wiser, 339 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121© 15 “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(e) — 2 cases
Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i).…”
Robert A. Stolze v. Janet F. Stolze (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(e)(1) — 12 cases
Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i).…”
Mimms v. Mimms, 234 S.W.3d 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Jill Smothers Lucchesi v. Eugene Anthony Lucchesi (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
Michelle Henry v. Richard H. Henry (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).
Rosalynn Addis v. Ryan Keith Addis (Tenn. Ct. App. 2025).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(e)(2) — 9 cases
Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i).…”
Mimms v. Mimms, 234 S.W.3d 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Jennifer Lynn Jackman v. Kenneth Robert Jackman, 373 S.W.3d 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (e)(2) (2010). On the other hand, Wife argues that the trial court had not yet closed proof on her ability to be rehabilitated, and therefore did not abuse its discretion by awarding her alimony in futuro.”
Andrea Renea Hopwood v. Corey Daniel Hopwood (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).
Amanda N. Burnett v. Aaron L. Burnett (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(e)(3) — 1 case
Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i).…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(e)(l) — 1 case
Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2011). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(0(1). Alimony in futuro “is not, however, a guarantee that the recipient spouse will forever be able to enjoy a lifestyle equal to that of the obligor spouse.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f) — 9 cases
Sandra Zoe Jeanette Naylor v. William Lee Naylor (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).
Daniel James Finstad v. Jessica Ann Calfee Finstad (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
Michelle Henry v. Richard H. Henry (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).
Kathy Lynn Averitte v. William Ronny Averitte (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
Rex Hubbard v. Helen Louise Hubbard (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1) — 16 cases
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2011). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(0(1). Alimony in futuro “is not, however, a guarantee that the recipient spouse will forever be able to enjoy a lifestyle equal to that of the obligor spouse.”
Jennifer Lynn Jackman v. Kenneth Robert Jackman, 373 S.W.3d 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (e)(2) (2010). On the other hand, Wife argues that the trial court had not yet closed proof on her ability to be rehabilitated, and therefore did not abuse its discretion by awarding her alimony in futuro.”
Sharon Kay Jackson v. Randall D. Jackson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(2) — 1 case
Christopher Eugene Rickman v. Tracy Anna Rickman (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(2)(A) — 6 cases
Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2011). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(0(1). Alimony in futuro “is not, however, a guarantee that the recipient spouse will forever be able to enjoy a lifestyle equal to that of the obligor spouse.”
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Deborah P. Linn v. Mark A. Linn (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021).
Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
Robert Eugene Callaway v. Linda Marie Callaway (Tenn. Ct. App. 2024).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(2)(B) — 12 cases
Deborah Lynn Mathews v. Douglas Clay Mathews (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
Deborah P. Linn v. Mark A. Linn (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021).
Sheryl Haynes v. Terry Haynes (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Ronnie Gale Gill v. Nancy Jane Gill (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
Rita Grace Tidwell Hickman v. Bobby Spencer Hickman (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(2)(B)(ii) — 1 case
Deborah Evans Wilhoit v. Gary Dennis Wilhoit (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(3) — 2 cases
Diana Lynn Van Zandbergen v. Scott W. Van Zandbergen (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023).
Shonda Kay Finchum v. Danny Wayne Finchum (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(l) — 1 case
Lofton v. Lofton, 345 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g) — 3 cases
Ann Marie Gillespie v. Andrew Mark Gillespie (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
Brenda Kay (Woods) Shooster v. Raymond (Ray) Gerald Shooster (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
Karen Nisenbaum v. Michael Nisenbaum (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(1) — 7 cases
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Victoria C. Jensen v. Tyler C. Jensen (Tenn. Ct. App. 2024).
Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
Brenda Kay (Woods) Shooster v. Raymond (Ray) Gerald Shooster (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
Sharon Kay Jackson v. Randall D. Jackson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(1)(2005) — 1 case
Donald Paul Clayton v. Andrea Dawn Clayton (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2) — 7 cases
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Dale Robert Scherzer v. Melissa Marie Scherzer (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
Barbara M. Hicks Vick v. Brandon P. Hicks (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).
Candace Renea Cavness Howard (Beasley) v. Breck Markham Beasley (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).
Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C) — 4 cases
Dale Robert Scherzer v. Melissa Marie Scherzer (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
Barbara M. Hicks Vick v. Brandon P. Hicks (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).
Brittany Hatcher Loewen v. Jeffrey Wade Loewen (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015).
Ashley Renee Reed v. Michael Eugene Reed (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(l) — 1 case
Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h) — 4 cases
Edna Gergel v. James Gergel (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Deborah Elaine Murdock v. Joel Montgomery Murdock (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Amanda N. Burnett v. Aaron L. Burnett (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Ann Marie Gillespie v. Andrew Mark Gillespie (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(1) — 4 cases
Christy Keller Elrod Church v. Darrell Gene Elrod (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
Ahmed Mote Alzamzami v. Arwa Al-Sulaihi (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Brenda Kay (Woods) Shooster v. Raymond (Ray) Gerald Shooster (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
Sharon Kay Jackson v. Randall D. Jackson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(1)(A) — 1 case
Kari Dale Remus v. Brandon Joseph Nunn (Tenn. Ct. App. 2024).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(2) — 2 cases
Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).
Christy Keller Elrod Church v. Darrell Gene Elrod (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(l) — 1 case
Jekot v. Jekot, 362 S.W.3d 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i) — 197 cases
Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “Initial decisions regarding the entitlement to spousal support, as well as the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of all relevant factors, including those identified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (i).…”
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Renee Pembroke (Cooley) v. Christopher Eugene Cooley, 543 S.W.3d 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). “3d at 107 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (f)(1)). Alimony in futuro can be awarded ―when the court finds that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible.”
Patricia Carlene Mayfield v. Phillip Harold Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108 (Tenn. 2012). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (d)(2) — (3); Gonsewski, 350 S.”
Wiser v. Wiser, 339 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121© 15 “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(1) — 8 cases
Richard Alan Ellis v. Donica Ann Woods Ellis (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).
Regina D. Wiser v. Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
Richard Alan Pearson v. Christen Creighton Pearson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
John William Owens v. Meredith Elizabeth Owens (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021).
Iain Hiscock v. Sue E. Hiscock (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(10) — 3 cases
Richard Egan v. Rachael Marie Bailey Egan (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).
Staci L. Robinson v. Eric S. Robinson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Theressa Joanne Booker v. Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(11) — 10 cases
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Kathryn Nicole Brown v. Tyler Matthew Brown, 577 S.W.3d 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
Norris Bettis v. Rebecca Bettis (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).
Norris Bettis v. Rebecca Bettis (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).
Karen Nisenbaum v. Michael Nisenbaum (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(12) — 5 cases
Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “See T.C.A. § 36-5-121 (g)(2) (2005). In contrast, alimony in futuro is paid on a long term basis, generally “until death or remarriage of the recipient.”
Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
Richard Egan v. Rachael Marie Bailey Egan (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).
David Ashley Leonard v. Kimberly Champion Leonard (Tenn. Ct. App. 2024).
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(2) — 4 cases
Church v. Church, 346 S.W.3d 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “3d at 12 . In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121 (i) “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
Tracy Lynn Hallums v. Bruce Alan Hallums (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).
Staci L. Robinson v. Eric S. Robinson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
Theressa Joanne Booker v. Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(2005) — 3 cases
Fickle v. Fickle, 287 S.W.3d 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
Lisa Marie Walls Altman v. Benjamin Altman (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
Saundra Kay (Pace) Mason v. James E. Mason (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(2006) — 1 case
Jan Marie Vaughn v. William Daniel Vaughn (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(3) — 3 cases
Church v. Church, 346 S.W.3d 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “3d at 12 . In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121 (i) “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
Anthony Bernard Mobley v. Priscilla Ann Caffa-Mobley (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
Theressa Joanne Booker v. Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(4) — 1 case
Staci L. Robinson v. Eric S. Robinson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(5) — 1 case
Staci L. Robinson v. Eric S. Robinson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(6) — 2 cases
Robin Claire Pearson Gorman v. Timothy Stewart Gorman (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
Regina D. Wiser v. Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(7) — 5 cases
Desiree M. Beyer v. Erik A. Beyer, 428 S.W.3d 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
Heather Marie Bailey v. Daniel Michael Bailey (Tenn. Ct. App. 2025).
Analiza P. Burnett v. David Mark Burnett (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
Iain Hiscock v. Sue E. Hiscock (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
Robert Eugene Callaway v. Linda Marie Callaway (Tenn. Ct. App. 2024).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(8) — 3 cases
Mark E. Hatley v. Ann E. Hatley (Tenn. Ct. App. 2025).
Richard Egan v. Rachael Marie Bailey Egan (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).
Staci L. Robinson v. Eric S. Robinson (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(9) — 3 cases
Patricia Carlene Mayfield v. Phillip Harold Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108 (Tenn. 2012). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (d)(2) — (3); Gonsewski, 350 S.”
Regina D. Wiser v. Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
Richard Egan v. Rachael Marie Bailey Egan (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(l) — 4 cases
Oakes v. Oakes, 235 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
Wiser v. Wiser, 339 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “In “assessing the appropriate amount of modification, if any, in the obligor’s support payments, the trial court should consider the factors contained in” Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121© 15 “to the extent that they may be relevant to the inquiry.”
Jennifer Lynn Jackman v. Kenneth Robert Jackman, 373 S.W.3d 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121 (e)(2) (2010). On the other hand, Wife argues that the trial court had not yet closed proof on her ability to be rehabilitated, and therefore did not abuse its discretion by awarding her alimony in futuro.”
Marsha Bordes v. Julian Bordes, 358 S.W.3d 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(j) — 1 case
Brenda Kay (Woods) Shooster v. Raymond (Ray) Gerald Shooster (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(k) — 3 cases
Leo Holt v. Alma Jean Holt (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
Lisa Faye Roland Camp v. Randy Coleman Camp (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
Leo Berg v. Julie Ann Rutledge Berg (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(l) — 1 case
Carolyn Ann Talley v. Clinton Eugene Talley (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(o) — 1 case
Jamie Kay Cardle v. Daniel Marcum Cardle (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).
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