Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (2026)
Duress
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) Duress is a defense to prosecution where the person or a third person is threatened with harm that is present, imminent, impending and of such a nature to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death, serious bodily injury, or grave sexual abuse if the act is not done. The threatened harm must be continuous throughout the time the act is being committed, and must be one from which the person cannot withdraw in safety. Further, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm must clearly outweigh the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness.
- (b) This defense is unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly becomes involved in a situation in which it was probable that the person would be subjected to compulsion.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 83, s 3, eff. 4/7/2021.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 66
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1994–2025 · leading case: State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349 (Tenn. 2007).
State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349 (Tenn. 2007). “” See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (1997). Since it is not an affirmative defense, a defendant need not prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence in order to merit a jury instruction.”
State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788 (Tenn. 2010). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-504(a) (1997). The Sentencing Commission Comments to this provision add that “[t]his rare defense is present when a defendant commits an offense because another person threatens death or serious injury if the offense is not committed” and that “[t]he…”
State v. Green, 995 S.W.2d 591 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “In addition, there must be no reasonable opportunity to escape the compulsion without committing an offense.”
State v. Ostein, 293 S.W.3d 519 (Tenn. 2009). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (2003). 9 . Based on Ostein's possession of a key to the apartment, the State may also intend to prove that Ostein had control over the premises.”
State v. Davenport, 973 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-504. The Sentencing Commission Comments to this section advise that the duress defense requires that the offense must be committed because another person threatens death or serious bodily injury if the offense is not committed.”
State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “On June 4, 1993, the appellant filed a notice stating that he intended to rely on the defense of duress under the provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-504. The appellant intended to prove at trial that he was in fear of his life in the Lauderdale County Jail, and that is why he…”
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 2012). “1096 (1981) (superseded by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 [2010]); Pugliese v.”
State of Tennessee v. Javon Webster, 81 S.W.3d 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). “See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 . A defendant who commits a crime under the threat of death or serious bodily injury is entitled to raise that issue before a jury.”
State v. Green, 915 S.W.2d 827 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “T.C.A. 39-11-504 (1989). The compulsion must be immediate and imminently present and of such nature to produce a well-founded fear of death or serious bodily harm.”
Marquis D. Hendricks v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (emphasis added).”
Kevin D. Buford v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2025). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (a). - 17 - * * * In the present case, this Court accredits [trial counsel’s] post-conviction testimony that he strategically chose to pursue the position that [Petitioner] was unduly influenced by his father.”
Hendricks v. Lindamood (E.D. Tenn. 2019). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (a). Duress is not a defense to conduct when the defendant “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” places himself in a situation where it is probable that he would be subjected to compulsion.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504(a) — 13 cases
State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349 (Tenn. 2007). “” See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (1997). Since it is not an affirmative defense, a defendant need not prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence in order to merit a jury instruction.”
State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788 (Tenn. 2010). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-504(a) (1997). The Sentencing Commission Comments to this provision add that “[t]his rare defense is present when a defendant commits an offense because another person threatens death or serious injury if the offense is not committed” and that “[t]he…”
Kevin D. Buford v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2025). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (a). - 17 - * * * In the present case, this Court accredits [trial counsel’s] post-conviction testimony that he strategically chose to pursue the position that [Petitioner] was unduly influenced by his father.”
Marquis D. Hendricks v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (emphasis added).”
Cedric Mims v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504(b) — 3 cases
State v. Cowart (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
Michael Blackburn v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).
State v. Antonio Morrow (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.