Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (2026)
Domestic assault
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) As used in this section, "domestic abuse victim" means any person who falls within the following categories:
- (1) Adults or minors who are current or former spouses;
- (2) Adults or minors who live together or who have lived together;
- (3) Adults or minors who are dating or who have dated or who have or had a sexual relationship, but does not include fraternization between two (2) individuals in a business or social context;
- (4) Adults or minors related by blood or adoption;
- (5) Adults or minors who are related or were formerly related by marriage; or
- (6) Adult or minor children of a person in a relationship that is described in subdivisions (a)(1)-(5).
- (b) A person commits domestic assault who commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101 against a domestic abuse victim.
- (c)
- (1) A first conviction for domestic assault and a second or subsequent conviction for domestic assault committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(2) and (a)(3) is punishable the same as assault under § 39-13-101, and additionally, as provided in subdivisions (c)(2) and (c)(3) and subsections (d) and (e) of this section.
- (2) A second conviction for domestic assault committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(1) is punishable by a fine of not less than three hundred fifty dollars ($350) nor more than three thousand five hundred dollars ($3,500), and by confinement in the county jail or workhouse for not less than thirty (30) consecutive days, nor more than eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days.
- (3) A third or subsequent conviction for domestic assault, under § 39-13-101(a)(1), is a Class E felony. The defendant must be sentenced to mandatory confinement of not less than ninety (90) consecutive days in the county jail or workhouse. The defendant must pay a fine of not less than one thousand one hundred dollars ($1,100) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).
- (4) For purposes of this section, a person who is convicted of a violation of § 39-13-111 committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(1), shall not be subject to the enhanced penalties prescribed in this subsection (c), if ten (10) or more years have elapsed between the date of the present violation and the date of any immediately preceding violation of § 39-13-111, committed in a manner prohibited by § 39-13-101(a)(1), that resulted in a conviction for such offense.
- (5) In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of this section, if, as determined by the court, the defendant possesses the ability to pay a fine in an amount not in excess of two hundred twenty-five dollars ($225), then the court shall impose a fine at the level of the defendant's ability to pay, but not in excess of two hundred twenty-five dollars ($225). The additional fine shall be paid to the clerk of the court imposing sentence, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fine to the general fund. All fines so credited to the general fund shall be subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the exclusive purpose of funding family violence shelters and shelter services. This appropriation shall be in addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to § 67-4-411.
- (6) If a defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty of a domestic violence offense, as defined by this section or in § 40-14-109, the judge shall immediately order that the defendant:
- (A) Terminate physical possession of all firearms in the defendant's possession within forty-eight (48) hours of the conviction by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms; and
- (B)
- (i) Complete an affidavit of firearms dispossession form and return it to the court in which the defendant was convicted when all firearms have been lawfully dispossessed as required by subdivision (c)(6)(A);
- (ii) The defendant may obtain the affidavit of dispossession from the court or court clerk or the defendant may be directed to obtain a copy from the website of the administrative office of the courts.
- (7) In addition to all other fines, fees, costs, and punishments now prescribed by law, the court shall assess each person convicted of domestic assault an electronic monitoring indigency fee of ten dollars ($10.00). All proceeds collected pursuant to this subdivision (c)(7) shall be transmitted to the treasurer for deposit in the electronic monitoring indigency fund, established in § 55-10-419.
- (d) As part of a defendant's alternative sentencing for a violation of this section, the sentencing judge may direct the defendant to complete a drug or alcohol treatment program or available counseling programs that address violence and control issues including, but not limited to, a batterer's intervention program that has been certified by the domestic violence state coordinating council. Completion of a noncertified batterer's intervention program shall only be ordered if no certified program is available in the sentencing county. No batterer's intervention program, certified or noncertified, shall be deemed complete until the full term of the program is complete, and a judge may not require a defendant to attend less than the full term of a program as part of a plea agreement or otherwise. The defendant's knowing failure to complete such an intervention program shall be considered a violation of the defendant's alternative sentence program and the sentencing judge may revoke the defendant's participation in such program and order execution of sentence.
- (e) A person convicted of a violation under this section shall be required to serve at least the minimum sentence day for day. All persons sentenced under this section shall, in addition to service of at least the minimum sentence, be required to serve the difference between the time actually served and the maximum sentence on supervised probation.
- (f) A person convicted of a violation of this section involving strangulation or attempted strangulation shall be punished by a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty (30) days incarceration, which includes participation in programming that is evidence-based for domestic violence.
Amended by 2024 Tenn. Acts, ch. 987,s 2, eff. 7/1/2024.
Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 440, s 1, eff. 7/1/2023.
Amended by 2018 Tenn. Acts, ch. 1046, s 2, eff. 7/1/2018.
Amended by 2018 Tenn. Acts, ch. 596, s 1, eff. 3/23/2018.
Amended by 2017 Tenn. Acts, ch. 127, s 2, eff. 7/1/2017.
Amended by 2016 Tenn. Acts, ch. 906, s 4, eff. 1/1/2017.
Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 693, Secs.s 2, s 3, s 4 eff. 7/1/2014.
Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 693, s 1, eff. 7/1/2014.
Acts 2000, ch. 824, § 1; 2002, ch. 649, § 3; 2008 , ch. 744, § 1; 2009 , ch. 455, § 4; 2010 , ch. 1061, §§ 1, 2; 2012 , ch. 931, § 1; 2012 , ch. 987, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 74
cases (21 in the last 5 years), 2004–2026 · leading case: United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014). “" B In 2001, Castleman was charged in a Tennessee court with having "intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to" the mother of his child, in violation of Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b) (Supp.2002).”
State of Tennessee v. Michael Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224 (Tenn. 2016). “§ 39-13-111(a). 6 . We note that the Defendant, in fact, did /object to the admissibility of testimony regarding' the incident in Mississippi, .”
State v. Sanders, 766 S.E.2d 331 (N.C. 2014). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (b) (2009). Section 39-13-101 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, in turn, establishes that someone commits an “assault” when he or she: “(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (2) Intentionally or knowingly causes…”
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Antonio Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013). “See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-111 (domestic assault), -302 (false imprisonment) (2010).”
United States v. Melgar-Cabrera, 892 F.3d 1053 (10th Cir. 2018). “, his predicate crime for a conviction under § 922(g) ) was a conviction in 2001 for " 'intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to' the mother of his child, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (b) (Supp. 2002).”
State v. Sanders, 753 S.E.2d 713 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (a). An examination of the elements reveals that the North Carolina offense of assault on a female and the Tennessee offense of domestic assault are not substantially similar, especially given that “the rule of lenity requires us to interpret [N.”
United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2021). “24We need not here decide if the crimes at issue in Castleman, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (b) (proscribing assault—defined in relevant part as “[i]ntentionally[ or] knowingly .”
United States v. James Castleman, 695 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 2012). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (b). Under § 39-13-101, a person is guilty of assault if he: (1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (2) Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury; or (3) Intentionally or…”
United States v. Keith Studhorse, II, 883 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2018). “(alterations omitted) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (b)). The Court rejected this contention.”
Hopkins v. Bradley Cnty., 338 S.W.3d 529 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “A Judge issued an arrest warrant for Jeremy Hopkins on December 21, 2006 upon a finding that there was probable cause that Hopkins committed the crime of Domestic Assault in violation of Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-111. 2. At the time of issuing of the arrest warrant the Judge set…”
United States v. Castro-Vazquez, 176 F. Supp. 3d 13 (D.P.R. 2016). “at 1413 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 [b]). Although the “assault” element appeared indivisible on its face, the Court and the parties all agreed that the statute was divisible because it “incorporated by reference” another statute that “defined three types of assault.”
Jose Yanel Sanchez-Perez v. Merrick B. Garland, 100 F.4th 693 (6th Cir. 2024). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (b). Accordingly, we must look to the cross-referenced general assault statute to determine the elements of the relevant crime.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(a) — 8 cases
State of Tennessee v. Michael Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224 (Tenn. 2016). “§ 39-13-111(a). 6 . We note that the Defendant, in fact, did /object to the admissibility of testimony regarding' the incident in Mississippi, .”
State v. Sanders, 753 S.E.2d 713 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (a). An examination of the elements reveals that the North Carolina offense of assault on a female and the Tennessee offense of domestic assault are not substantially similar, especially given that “the rule of lenity requires us to interpret [N.”
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Orlando Glenn (Tenn. Crim. App. 2018).
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Wayne Gilbert (Tenn. Crim. App. 2018).
State of Tennessee v. John Richard Sprouse (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(a)(1) — 5 cases
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas S. Collins (Tenn. Crim. App. 2025).
State of Tennessee v. Walter H. Webb (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
State of Tennessee v. Arvel Joshua Terry (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).
State of Tennessee v. Lanny Wayne Waddell (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
State of Tennessee v. Charles Justin Woosley (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(a)(2) — 3 cases
State v. Sanders, 753 S.E.2d 713 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (a). An examination of the elements reveals that the North Carolina offense of assault on a female and the Tennessee offense of domestic assault are not substantially similar, especially given that “the rule of lenity requires us to interpret [N.”
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Jordan (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Thomas Baker (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(a)(3) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Scott Tucker (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
State of Tennessee v. David Byron Alexander, Jr. (Tenn. Crim. App. 2020).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(a)(4) — 1 case
Anderson (M.D. Tenn. 2025).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b) — 14 cases
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014). “" B In 2001, Castleman was charged in a Tennessee court with having "intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to" the mother of his child, in violation of Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b) (Supp.2002).”
State of Tennessee v. Michael Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224 (Tenn. 2016). “§ 39-13-111(a). 6 . We note that the Defendant, in fact, did /object to the admissibility of testimony regarding' the incident in Mississippi, .”
State v. Sanders, 753 S.E.2d 713 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 (a). An examination of the elements reveals that the North Carolina offense of assault on a female and the Tennessee offense of domestic assault are not substantially similar, especially given that “the rule of lenity requires us to interpret [N.”
State of Tennessee v. Brent Lemane Duncan (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Jordan (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(c)(5) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Antwon Thomas (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
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