Tenn. Code Ann. » Tenn. Code / Title 40 / Chapter 2
Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (2026)

Felonies

✓ current as of May 2026
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Amended by 2023 Tenn. Acts, ch. 22, s 1, eff. 7/1/2023.

Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 363, s 1, eff. 7/1/2021.

Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 499, s 5, eff. 7/1/2019.

Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 410, s 1, eff. 7/1/2019.

Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 499, Secs.s 6, s 7, s 8eff. 7/1/2019.

Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 268, s 4, eff. 7/1/2019.

Amended by 2016 Tenn. Acts, ch. 1032, s 1, eff. 7/1/2016.

Amended by 2016 Tenn. Acts, ch. 958, s 1, eff. 7/1/2016.

Amended by 2015 Tenn. Acts, ch. 310, s 1, eff. 7/1/2015.

Amended by 2014 Tenn. Acts, ch. 836, Secs.s 1, s 2eff. 4/29/2014.

Amended by 2013 Tenn. Acts, ch. 416, s 1, eff. 7/1/2013.

Code 1932, §§ 11481-11483; Acts 1977, ch. 62, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), §§ 40-201 -- 40-203; Acts 1985, ch. 478, § 21; 1990, ch. 980, §17; 1997 , ch. 214, §§1, 2; 1998, ch. 962, § 1; 2006, ch. 927, §1; 2007 , ch. 594, §5; 2012 , ch. 1027, § 1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 67 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1983–2022 · leading case: State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1996).
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State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1996). · cites it 42× “Both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the amendment to Section 40-2-101 was a retrospective change in the law that unquestionably operated to the disadvantage of defendants.”
Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1994). · cites it 13× “Acts 1094, now codified as Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (d). The statute, by its terms, did not indicate if the extended period of limitation was to be applied to offenses occurring before the effective date of the statute — July 1, 1985 — whose applicable period of limitations…”
State of Tennessee v. Allen Doane, 393 S.W.3d 721 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011). · cites it 14× “” The State further responds that section 40-2-101(g) does apply to this case and that the Defendant’s prosecution was timely commenced under section 40-2-101 (g). In response to the State’s argument, the Defendant contends that because the statute of limitations is a…”
State v. Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). · cites it 12× “T.C.A. § 40-2-101(a) (Supp.1988). In 1985 the statute governing the time constraints on the prosecution of felony offenses was amended.”
State v. Henry, 834 S.W.2d 273 (Tenn. 1992). · cites it 10× “Section 40-2-101 was amended in 1985 to provide that certain sexual offenses against children must be “commenced no later than the date the child attains the age of majority or within four (4) years next after the commission of the offense, whichever occurs later.”
State v. Seagraves, 837 S.W.2d 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). · cites it 7× “§ 40-202 (1975), later codified as Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (b) (1982), provided in part: Prosecutions for any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary when the punishment is expressly limited to five (5) years or less, shall be commenced within two (2) years…”
State v. Wood, 924 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. 1996). · cites it 4× “See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (a) (1990): "A person may be prosecuted, tried and punished for an offense punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary during life, at any time after the offense is committed.”
State v. Nielsen, 44 S.W.3d 496 (Tenn. 2001). · cites it 5× “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (a) (1997 & Supp.”
State of Tennessee v. Perry A. March, 293 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “at 5 (stating, in an analysis of the materiality of a variance, that “the appellant can rely upon this [appellate] record in the event that future proceedings are brought against him for the same offense”), and in any event, further prosecution of this theft is barred by the…”
State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). · cites it 4× “Since time is not an essence of the offense and time will not bar the commencement of prosecution of this offense (T.C.A. § 40-2-101), the time of the commission of the offense averred in the indictment is not material, and proof is not confined to the time charged.”
State v. Lawson, 291 S.W.3d 864 (Tenn. 2009). · cites it 2× “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (b)(4) (2003) (“Prosecution for a felony offense shall begin within .”
Morgan v. State, 847 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). · cites it 10× “1958) supported a finding that the 1985 amendment to Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2-101 operated as a savings statute with respect to the prosecution of these offenses.”
Show all 67 citing cases →
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(A) — 1 case
State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1996). “Both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the amendment to Section 40-2-101 was a retrospective change in the law that unquestionably operated to the disadvantage of defendants.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(a) — 12 cases
State of Tennessee v. Perry A. March, 293 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). “at 5 (stating, in an analysis of the materiality of a variance, that “the appellant can rely upon this [appellate] record in the event that future proceedings are brought against him for the same offense”), and in any event, further prosecution of this theft is barred by the…”
State v. Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “T.C.A. § 40-2-101(a) (Supp.1988). In 1985 the statute governing the time constraints on the prosecution of felony offenses was amended.”
Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1994). “Acts 1094, now codified as Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (d). The statute, by its terms, did not indicate if the extended period of limitation was to be applied to offenses occurring before the effective date of the statute — July 1, 1985 — whose applicable period of limitations…”
State v. Henry, 834 S.W.2d 273 (Tenn. 1992). “Section 40-2-101 was amended in 1985 to provide that certain sexual offenses against children must be “commenced no later than the date the child attains the age of majority or within four (4) years next after the commission of the offense, whichever occurs later.”
State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1996). “Both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the amendment to Section 40-2-101 was a retrospective change in the law that unquestionably operated to the disadvantage of defendants.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(b) — 5 cases
State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1996). “Both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the amendment to Section 40-2-101 was a retrospective change in the law that unquestionably operated to the disadvantage of defendants.”
State v. Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “T.C.A. § 40-2-101(a) (Supp.1988). In 1985 the statute governing the time constraints on the prosecution of felony offenses was amended.”
State v. Seagraves, 837 S.W.2d 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). “§ 40-202 (1975), later codified as Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (b) (1982), provided in part: Prosecutions for any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary when the punishment is expressly limited to five (5) years or less, shall be commenced within two (2) years…”
State v. Harris, 696 S.W.2d 546 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
State v. Foulks (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(b)(1) — 5 cases
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Lindsey (Tenn. Crim. App. 2020).
David H. Johnson v. Steve Upton, Warden (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022).
State of Tennessee v. Robert Jason Burdick (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).
State of Tennessee v. Twanna Blair (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
State of Tennessee v. Twanna Blair (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(b)(2) — 5 cases
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey A. Sundahl, Alias (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
Ronnie Henry v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2018).
Daniel Buck v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).
Michael Eugene Wallace v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
State of Tennessee v. James L. Hunsaker (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(b)(3) — 4 cases
State v. Nielsen, 44 S.W.3d 496 (Tenn. 2001). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (a) (1997 & Supp.”
State v. Clark, 2 S.W.3d 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
Villegas v. Metro. Gov't, 907 F. Supp. 2d 907 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
State of Tennessee v. Edward G. Jameson (Tenn. Crim. App. 2021).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(b)(4) — 6 cases
State of Tennessee v. Allen Doane, 393 S.W.3d 721 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011). “” The State further responds that section 40-2-101(g) does apply to this case and that the Defendant’s prosecution was timely commenced under section 40-2-101 (g). In response to the State’s argument, the Defendant contends that because the statute of limitations is a…”
State v. Kennedy, 10 S.W.3d 280 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
State of Tennessee v. Perry Avram March, 395 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).
State of Tennessee v. Robert Doll (Tenn. Crim. App. 2020).
Mark Alan Deakins v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(c) — 8 cases
State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1996). “Both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the amendment to Section 40-2-101 was a retrospective change in the law that unquestionably operated to the disadvantage of defendants.”
State v. Davidson, 816 S.W.2d 316 (Tenn. 1991).
State v. Franklin, 714 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. 1986).
State v. Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “T.C.A. § 40-2-101(a) (Supp.1988). In 1985 the statute governing the time constraints on the prosecution of felony offenses was amended.”
Morgan v. State, 847 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). “1958) supported a finding that the 1985 amendment to Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2-101 operated as a savings statute with respect to the prosecution of these offenses.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(c)(1) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey A. Sundahl, Alias (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(d) — 12 cases
State v. Carico, 968 S.W.2d 280 (Tenn. 1998).
State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1996). “Both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the amendment to Section 40-2-101 was a retrospective change in the law that unquestionably operated to the disadvantage of defendants.”
State v. Gray, 917 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. 1996).
Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1994). “Acts 1094, now codified as Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (d). The statute, by its terms, did not indicate if the extended period of limitation was to be applied to offenses occurring before the effective date of the statute — July 1, 1985 — whose applicable period of limitations…”
State v. Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “T.C.A. § 40-2-101(a) (Supp.1988). In 1985 the statute governing the time constraints on the prosecution of felony offenses was amended.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(e) — 6 cases
Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1994). “Acts 1094, now codified as Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101 (d). The statute, by its terms, did not indicate if the extended period of limitation was to be applied to offenses occurring before the effective date of the statute — July 1, 1985 — whose applicable period of limitations…”
State v. Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. 1996). “Both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the amendment to Section 40-2-101 was a retrospective change in the law that unquestionably operated to the disadvantage of defendants.”
State v. Henry, 834 S.W.2d 273 (Tenn. 1992). “Section 40-2-101 was amended in 1985 to provide that certain sexual offenses against children must be “commenced no later than the date the child attains the age of majority or within four (4) years next after the commission of the offense, whichever occurs later.”
Morgan v. State, 847 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). “1958) supported a finding that the 1985 amendment to Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2-101 operated as a savings statute with respect to the prosecution of these offenses.”
State v. Carrier, 822 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(f) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Billy Hill (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(g) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Allen Doane, 393 S.W.3d 721 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011). “” The State further responds that section 40-2-101(g) does apply to this case and that the Defendant’s prosecution was timely commenced under section 40-2-101 (g). In response to the State’s argument, the Defendant contends that because the statute of limitations is a…”
Charles T. Hartley v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(h)(1) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Charles Beaty (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
State of Tennessee v. Edward G. Jameson (Tenn. Crim. App. 2021).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-101(i)(1) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Edward G. Jameson (Tenn. Crim. App. 2021).
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