Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (2026)
Commission created - Role
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) On July 1, 2011, the post-conviction defender oversight commission is created. This part also creates the office of post-conviction defender to provide for the representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state who is unable to secure counsel due to indigence, and that legal proceedings to challenge that conviction and sentence may be commenced in a timely manner and so as to assure the people of this state that the judgments of its courts may be regarded with the finality to which they are entitled in the interests of justice. The operation of the post-conviction defender oversight commission and office of post-conviction defender shall be consistent with professional standards and shall not compromise independent professional judgment or create a professional or institutional conflict of interest, appearance of impropriety, breach of attorney-client confidence or secret or other violation of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct or the Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct.
- (b) The post-conviction defender oversight commission shall be strictly administrative in nature and shall oversee budget, staffing and caseload concerns. In order to avoid possible conflicts, relating to cases assigned to the post-conviction defender's office, no member of the commission shall advise, consult or otherwise directly assist the post-conviction defender or the post-conviction defender's staff in providing legal representation in such cases.
Acts 1995, ch. 510, § 1; T.C.A. § 40-30-302; Acts 2003 , ch. 112, § 2; 2011 , ch. 414, § 5.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 411
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1990–2025 · leading case: Ricky Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587 (Tenn. 2003).
Ricky Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587 (Tenn. 2003). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (a) (1997). Moreover, the Act “contemplates the filing of only one (1) petition for post-conviction relief.”
Leonard Edward Smith v. State of Tennessee, 357 S.W.3d 322 (Tenn. 2011). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (a) (1996). The Act also expressly provided that each claim would be limited to a judgment or judgments entered in a single trial or pro *356 ceeding; in this regard, the Act stated that “[i]f the petitioner desires to obtain relief from judgments…”
Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). “1995), superseded by Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-202). The petitioners in Seals argued that circumstances beyond their control, ie.”
John Paul Seals v. State of Tennessee, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000). “It is not to be tolled for any reason except those enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (b). The statute specifically states that the no savings provision is applicable.”
Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. 1999). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (1997 Repl.). This statute was adopted in 1995 and replaced the three-year statute of limitations which is applicable in this appeal.”
State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459 (Tenn. 2001). “As the State points out, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (a) declares that the one-year statutory period is an element of the right to file a post-conviction petition and that it is not an affirmative defense that must be asserted by the State.”
State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. 1999). “In fact, the General Assembly has used such clear language in the post-conviction relief context where a petition must be filed “within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken.”
Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999). “Furthermore, the one-year statute of limitations for actions under the Post-Conviction Act, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a) (1997), indicates that the General Assembly did not contemplate that post-conviction relief would be available in this circumstance.”
Crawford v. State, 151 S.W.3d 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). “Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202 sets out when a petitioner may petition for post-conviction relief.”
Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d 267 (Tenn. 2002). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a) (1997). Because Sample's petition was filed before the effective date of the present act, it is governed by the Post Conviction Procedure Act then in effect.”
Gibson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “§ 40-30-202, the instant petition for post-conviction relief was filed prematurely and should have been dismissed accordingly.”
State v. McKnight, 51 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2001). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a). In this case, the trial court’s judgment of conviction was entered on May 15, 1997; consequently, it became final 30 days later on June 15, 1997.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a) — 109 cases
John Paul Seals v. State of Tennessee, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000). “It is not to be tolled for any reason except those enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (b). The statute specifically states that the no savings provision is applicable.”
Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). “1995), superseded by Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-202). The petitioners in Seals argued that circumstances beyond their control, ie.”
Leonard Edward Smith v. State of Tennessee, 357 S.W.3d 322 (Tenn. 2011). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (a) (1996). The Act also expressly provided that each claim would be limited to a judgment or judgments entered in a single trial or pro *356 ceeding; in this regard, the Act stated that “[i]f the petitioner desires to obtain relief from judgments…”
Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d 267 (Tenn. 2002). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a) (1997). Because Sample's petition was filed before the effective date of the present act, it is governed by the Post Conviction Procedure Act then in effect.”
State v. McKnight, 51 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2001). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a). In this case, the trial court’s judgment of conviction was entered on May 15, 1997; consequently, it became final 30 days later on June 15, 1997.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b) — 65 cases
Leonard Edward Smith v. State of Tennessee, 357 S.W.3d 322 (Tenn. 2011). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (a) (1996). The Act also expressly provided that each claim would be limited to a judgment or judgments entered in a single trial or pro *356 ceeding; in this regard, the Act stated that “[i]f the petitioner desires to obtain relief from judgments…”
Ricky Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587 (Tenn. 2003). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (a) (1997). Moreover, the Act “contemplates the filing of only one (1) petition for post-conviction relief.”
Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999). “Furthermore, the one-year statute of limitations for actions under the Post-Conviction Act, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a) (1997), indicates that the General Assembly did not contemplate that post-conviction relief would be available in this circumstance.”
Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1997).
Crawford v. State, 151 S.W.3d 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). “Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202 sets out when a petitioner may petition for post-conviction relief.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b)(1) — 6 cases
State v. John Willie Partee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
State v. Michael Davis (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
State v. Kenneth Culp (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
Rachel Didena Summers v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008).
Gregory Morrow v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b)(1995) — 1 case
Jason Jermaine Dobbins v. State (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b)(2) — 5 cases
State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. 1999). “In fact, the General Assembly has used such clear language in the post-conviction relief context where a petition must be filed “within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken.”
James Robert Whitworth v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
Quincy L. Goodine v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).
James E. Swiggett v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
Rodney Tipton v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b)(l) — 2 cases
Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1997).
Hill v. State, 111 S.W.3d 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(c) — 48 cases
Ricky Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587 (Tenn. 2003). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (a) (1997). Moreover, the Act “contemplates the filing of only one (1) petition for post-conviction relief.”
Young v. State, 101 S.W.3d 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
Fletcher v. State, 951 S.W.2d 378 (Tenn. 1997).
Gibson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). “§ 40-30-202, the instant petition for post-conviction relief was filed prematurely and should have been dismissed accordingly.”
Crawford v. State, 151 S.W.3d 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). “Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202 sets out when a petitioner may petition for post-conviction relief.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(e) — 2 cases
Blair v. State, 969 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
Lawson v. State (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
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