Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106 (2026)
Multiple offender
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) A multiple offender is a defendant who has received:
- (1) A minimum of two (2) but not more than four (4) prior felony convictions within the conviction class, a higher class, or within the next two (2) lower felony classes, where applicable; or
- (2) One (1) Class A prior felony conviction if the defendant's conviction offense is a Class A or B felony.
- (b) In determining the number of prior convictions a defendant has received:
- (1) "Prior conviction" means a conviction for an offense occurring prior to the commission of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced;
- (2) All prior felony convictions, including those occurring prior to November 1, 1989, are included;
- (3)
- (A) A finding or adjudication that a defendant committed an act as a juvenile that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult and that resulted in a transfer of the juvenile to criminal court pursuant to § 37-1-134, or similar statutes of other states or jurisdictions, shall not be considered as a prior conviction for the purposes of this section unless the juvenile was convicted of a felony in a criminal court;
- (B) Notwithstanding subdivision (b)(3)(A), a finding or adjudication that a defendant committed an act as a juvenile that would constitute a Class A or Class B felony if committed by an adult shall be considered as a prior conviction for the purposes of this section, regardless of whether the juvenile was transferred to criminal court pursuant to § 37-1-134, or similar statutes of other states or jurisdictions;
- (4) Except for convictions for which the statutory elements include serious bodily injury, bodily injury, threatened serious bodily injury or threatened bodily injury to the victim or victims, or convictions for the offense of aggravated burglary under § 39-13-1003, convictions for multiple felonies committed within the same twenty-four-hour period constitute one (1) conviction for the purpose of determining prior convictions; and
- (5) Prior convictions include convictions under the laws of any other state, government or country that, if committed in this state, would have constituted an offense cognizable by the laws of this state. In the event that a felony from a jurisdiction other than Tennessee is not a named felony in this state, the elements of the offense shall be used by the Tennessee court to determine what classification the offense is given.
- (c) A defendant who is found by the court beyond a reasonable doubt to be a multiple offender shall receive a sentence within Range II.
- (d) The finding that a defendant is or is not a multiple offender is appealable by either party.
Amended by 2021 Tenn. Acts, ch. 545, s 10, eff. 7/1/2021.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 6; 2005, ch. 353, § 2; 2009 , ch. 603, § 1; 2010 , ch. 861, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 319
cases (31 in the last 5 years), 1983–2026 · leading case: State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106 (a)(l) & (2).”
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011). “§ 40-35-106(a), his agreement to be sentenced as a Range II offender does not create a jurisdictional problem because Range II sentences for Class B felonies are available under the Sentencing Act, id.”
State v. Horton, 880 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “The trial court found the defendant to be a Range II, multiple offender, pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-106(a)(1), because he had been convicted on October 5, 1989, of both receiving stolen property worth over two hundred dollars and aggravated assault.”
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee, 313 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2010). “§ 40-35-106; a persistent Range III offender, id.”
State v. Dulsworth, 781 S.W.2d 277 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “T.C.A. § 40-35-106 (Supp.1988). He argues that he has not been convicted of the requisite number of felonies because a guilty plea, which resulted in one of the convictions proven by the State, is constitutionally infirm.”
State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). “§§ 40-35-106 to-108. 9 . See id. §§ 40-35-110, -111.”
State v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “Provided, the definition of a persistent offender under § 40-35-106 shall not be construed as altering the definition of a persistent offender for purposes of imposing consecutive or concurrent sentences as provided by the Tennessee Supreme Court.”
State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1998). “In imposing the appropriate sentence, the trial court should consider the terms of Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-106, make any factual determinations necessary, and specify the applicable sentencing range.”
State v. Poole, 945 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn. 1997). “See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-106 to -109 (1990 & Supp.”
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633 (Tenn. 2018). “Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-106 (a), -107(a), -108(a) (2014).”
Michael Dwayne EDWARDS v. STATE of Tennessee, Wayne Brandon, Warden, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn. 2008). “See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106 & 107. The consequence was a sentence beyond legislative authority.”
Mitchell v. Campbell, 88 S.W.3d 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “Mitchell claims that the Department’s decision to classify him as a multiple rapist renders his sentence invalid and is inconsistent with Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-106 (2000). The trial court properly declined to consider Mr.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(1) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Dyron Norm Yokley (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).
State of Tennessee v. Walter Lee Hicks, Jr. (Tenn. Crim. App. 2014).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(1)(B) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Johnny David Key (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(3) — 1 case
State v. Williams, 675 S.W.2d 499 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(4) — 2 cases
Rodney Turner v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022).
State of Tennessee v. Pharez N. Price (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(6) — 1 case
State v. Blackhurst, 70 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(6)(A) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Dewayne Theus (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(A)(1) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Marable II (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024).
State of Tennessee v. Aaron Duchesne (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(B) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. William Alexander Beasley, IV (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(a) — 29 cases
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011). “§ 40-35-106(a), his agreement to be sentenced as a Range II offender does not create a jurisdictional problem because Range II sentences for Class B felonies are available under the Sentencing Act, id.”
State v. Blouvett, 904 S.W.2d 111 (Tenn. 1995).
State v. Davis, 757 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
Sills v. State, 884 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
State of Tennessee v. Cuben Lagrone (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(a)(1) — 48 cases
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Dwayne Welcome, 280 S.W.3d 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
State v. Dulsworth, 781 S.W.2d 277 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “T.C.A. § 40-35-106 (Supp.1988). He argues that he has not been convicted of the requisite number of felonies because a guilty plea, which resulted in one of the convictions proven by the State, is constitutionally infirm.”
State v. Vick, 242 S.W.3d 792 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
State v. Horton, 880 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “The trial court found the defendant to be a Range II, multiple offender, pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-106(a)(1), because he had been convicted on October 5, 1989, of both receiving stolen property worth over two hundred dollars and aggravated assault.”
State v. Minthorn, 925 S.W.2d 234 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(a)(1)(B) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Mulkey (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(a)(2) — 4 cases
State v. Draper, 800 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
State v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “Provided, the definition of a persistent offender under § 40-35-106 shall not be construed as altering the definition of a persistent offender for purposes of imposing consecutive or concurrent sentences as provided by the Tennessee Supreme Court.”
State v. Dulsworth, 781 S.W.2d 277 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “T.C.A. § 40-35-106 (Supp.1988). He argues that he has not been convicted of the requisite number of felonies because a guilty plea, which resulted in one of the convictions proven by the State, is constitutionally infirm.”
State of Tennessee v. William Gossett (Tenn. Crim. App. 2021).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(a)(4) — 1 case
Andrew Cole v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(a)(l) — 11 cases
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011). “§ 40-35-106(a), his agreement to be sentenced as a Range II offender does not create a jurisdictional problem because Range II sentences for Class B felonies are available under the Sentencing Act, id.”
State v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “Provided, the definition of a persistent offender under § 40-35-106 shall not be construed as altering the definition of a persistent offender for purposes of imposing consecutive or concurrent sentences as provided by the Tennessee Supreme Court.”
State v. Brooks, 909 S.W.2d 854 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
State v. Horton, 880 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “The trial court found the defendant to be a Range II, multiple offender, pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-106(a)(1), because he had been convicted on October 5, 1989, of both receiving stolen property worth over two hundred dollars and aggravated assault.”
State v. Russell, 773 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1989).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(b) — 5 cases
State v. Horton, 880 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “The trial court found the defendant to be a Range II, multiple offender, pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-106(a)(1), because he had been convicted on October 5, 1989, of both receiving stolen property worth over two hundred dollars and aggravated assault.”
State v. Clabo, 905 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
State v. Minthorn, 925 S.W.2d 234 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
State of Tennessee v. James A. Mellon (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
Cornelius Richmond v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(b)(1) — 6 cases
State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458 (Tenn. 2002).
State v. Horton, 880 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “The trial court found the defendant to be a Range II, multiple offender, pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-106(a)(1), because he had been convicted on October 5, 1989, of both receiving stolen property worth over two hundred dollars and aggravated assault.”
James M. Meese v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2018).
Antonio L. Fuller v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
State v. Fredrick Sledge (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(b)(2) — 2 cases
State v. Dulsworth, 781 S.W.2d 277 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “T.C.A. § 40-35-106 (Supp.1988). He argues that he has not been convicted of the requisite number of felonies because a guilty plea, which resulted in one of the convictions proven by the State, is constitutionally infirm.”
State of Tennessee v. Ryan Robert Haase (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(b)(3) — 4 cases
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106 (a)(l) & (2).”
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
State of Tennessee v. Cuben Lagrone (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
Kenneth Hayes v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(b)(3)(A) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106 (a)(l) & (2).”
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(b)(3)(B) — 3 cases
State of Tennessee v. Cuben Lagrone (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
State of Tennessee v. William Gossett (Tenn. Crim. App. 2021).
State of Tennessee v. Antoneo Williams (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(b)(4) — 37 cases
State v. Horton, 880 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “The trial court found the defendant to be a Range II, multiple offender, pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-106(a)(1), because he had been convicted on October 5, 1989, of both receiving stolen property worth over two hundred dollars and aggravated assault.”
Mitchell v. Campbell, 88 S.W.3d 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “Mitchell claims that the Department’s decision to classify him as a multiple rapist renders his sentence invalid and is inconsistent with Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-106 (2000). The trial court properly declined to consider Mr.”
State of Tennessee v. Allen Doane, 393 S.W.3d 721 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Scott Barnum (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Dewayne Theus (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(b)(5) — 25 cases
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106 (a)(l) & (2).”
State v. Davis, 825 S.W.2d 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
State v. Vick, 242 S.W.3d 792 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
State v. Brooks, 968 S.W.2d 312 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
State of Tennessee v. Darius Henderson (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(b)(l) — 4 cases
State v. Baker, 751 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “Provided, the definition of a persistent offender under § 40-35-106 shall not be construed as altering the definition of a persistent offender for purposes of imposing consecutive or concurrent sentences as provided by the Tennessee Supreme Court.”
State v. Dulsworth, 781 S.W.2d 277 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “T.C.A. § 40-35-106 (Supp.1988). He argues that he has not been convicted of the requisite number of felonies because a guilty plea, which resulted in one of the convictions proven by the State, is constitutionally infirm.”
State v. Cook, 696 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1985).
State v. Pride, 667 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(c) — 30 cases
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee, 313 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2010). “§ 40-35-106; a persistent Range III offender, id.”
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633 (Tenn. 2018). “Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-106 (a), -107(a), -108(a) (2014).”
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106 (a)(l) & (2).”
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011). “§ 40-35-106(a), his agreement to be sentenced as a Range II offender does not create a jurisdictional problem because Range II sentences for Class B felonies are available under the Sentencing Act, id.”
State v. Buttrey, 756 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(d) — 2 cases
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011). “§ 40-35-106(a), his agreement to be sentenced as a Range II offender does not create a jurisdictional problem because Range II sentences for Class B felonies are available under the Sentencing Act, id.”
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden (Tenn. 2011).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(e) — 1 case
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011). “§ 40-35-106(a), his agreement to be sentenced as a Range II offender does not create a jurisdictional problem because Range II sentences for Class B felonies are available under the Sentencing Act, id.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(e)(3) — 1 case
State v. Russell, 800 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. 1990).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(f) — 1 case
State v. John Hill (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106(g) — 1 case
Fabian Claxton v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024).
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