Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (2026)
Resistance to officer
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) A law enforcement officer, after giving notice of the officer's identity as an officer, may use or threaten to use force that is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of an individual suspected of a criminal act who resists or flees from the arrest.
- (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the officer may use deadly force to effect an arrest only if all other reasonable means of apprehension have been exhausted or are unavailable, and where feasible, the officer has given notice of the officer's identity as an officer and given a warning that deadly force may be used unless resistance or flight ceases, and:
- (1) The officer has probable cause to believe the individual to be arrested has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury; or
- (2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the individual to be arrested poses a threat of serious bodily injury, either to the officer or to others unless immediately apprehended.
- (c) All law enforcement officers, both state and local, shall be bound by this section and shall receive instruction regarding implementation of this section in law enforcement training programs.
Code 1858, § 5040; Shan., § 7000; Code 1932, § 11539; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 40-808; Acts 1985, ch. 359, § 1; 1990, ch. 980, § 19.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1985–2024 · leading case: Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). “" Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982). As construed by the Tennessee courts, this statute allows the use of deadly force only if a police officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a felony, the officer warns the person that he intends to arrest him, and the…”
Thompson v. Williamson Cnty., Tenn., 965 F. Supp. 1026 (M.D. Tenn. 1997). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1990). As noted, there are genuine issues of material fact with regard to what exactly happened during the last few minutes of the Deceased’s life.”
Reavis v. Frost, 967 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 2020). “at 4 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982)). Garner clearly established that when a “suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”
Dorna F. Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1989). “The officer’s action was in accord with the common law rule regarding the use of force against escaping felons, which Tennessee had codified as follows: “If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the…”
Candi Ryder v. The City of Topeka & Michael Meyer, 814 F.2d 1412 (10th Cir. 1987). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982). In Gamer , a Memphis police officer shot and killed an unarmed, fleeing burglary suspect in order to apprehend him.”
Joseph Todd Eric Brown v. City of Clewiston & Luis Perez, 848 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1988). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982). Although the police department’s policy was more restrictive than the state statute, it also authorized the use of deadly force in cases of burglary.”
Darryl Pruitt v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama, 771 F.2d 1475 (11th Cir. 1985). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982); see Garner, — U.”
State v. Roberson, 846 S.W.2d 278 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). “…P.J., concurs with attached concurring opinion. WADE, J., concurs in both opinions. . T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (1988). . T.C.A. § 40-7-108.”
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999). “§ 40-808 (1982) (amended 1985) (current version at Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-7-108)). . Brotherton does not assert that the issues in this appeal differ from those resolved by the prior state and federal decisions.”
State of Tennessee v. Paul Robert Carrier, Jr. (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013). “She stated that the instruction is based on the language found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-108 regarding that topic. She said that “in general it means that you may use deadly force in protection of yourself or in the protection of another person .”
Gipp v. Webb (D.N.D. 2024). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982). For those reasons, the Court finds North Dakota Century Code Section 29-06-13 is constitutional as applied to this case regarding Officer Webb’s discharge of his taser.”
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