Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104 (2026)
Negotiable instrument
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), "negotiable instrument" means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
- (1) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;
- (2) Is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
- (3) Does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.
- (b) "Instrument" means a negotiable instrument.
- (c) An order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (a), except paragraph (1), and otherwise falls within the definition of "check" in subsection (f) is a negotiable instrument and a check.
- (d) A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is not an instrument governed by this chapter.
- (e) An instrument is a "note" if it is a promise and is a "draft" if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of both "note" and "draft," a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either.
- (f) "Check" means
- (i) a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank,
- (ii) a cashier's check or teller's check, or
- (iii) a payee-initiated demand draft. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term, such as "money order."
- (g) "Cashier's check" means a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank.
- (h) "Teller's check" means a draft drawn by a bank (i) on another bank, or (ii) payable at or through a bank.
- (i) "Traveler's check" means an instrument that (i) is payable on demand, (ii) is drawn on or payable at or through a bank, (iii) is designated by the term "traveler's check" or by a substantially similar term, and (iv) requires, as a condition to payment, a countersignature by a person whose specimen signature appears on the instrument.
- (j) "Certificate of deposit" means an instrument containing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of money has been received by the bank and a promise by the bank to repay the sum of money. A certificate of deposit is a note of the bank.
- (k) "Payee-initiated demand draft" means a draft that is not signed by a customer, as defined in § 47-4-104(a)(5), and that is created by a third party under the purported authority of the customer for the purpose of charging the customer's account with a bank. A payee-initiated demand draft may contain any or all of the following:
- (1) The customer's printed or typewritten name or account number;
- (2) A notation that the customer authorized the draft; or
- (3) The statement "No signature required," "Authorization on file," "Signature on file," or words to that effect.
A payee-initiated demand draft shall not include a check purportedly drawn by and bearing the signature of a fiduciary, as defined in § 47-3-307(a)(1).
Acts 1995, ch. 397, § 2; 2003 , ch. 62, §§ 2, 3.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 38
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1974–2024 · leading case: Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “13 At that time, the “sum certain” provision in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-104 (l)(b), -106 required that the “computation [of interest] must be one which can be made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source.”
State of Tennessee v. Perry A. March, 293 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). “§ 47-3-104(a), and is “payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder .”
Thompson v. Adcox, 63 S.W.3d 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “T.C.A. § 47-3-104 (1992) was the predecessor statute of T.”
Waldron v. Delffs, 988 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “4 Since the note at issue satisfies the criteria set forth in T.C.A. § 47-3-104, it qualifies as a negotiable instrument.”
Cont'l Bankers Life Ins. Co. of the South v. Bank of Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1979). “T.C.A. § 47-3-104 provides the requirements of a negotiable instrument: (1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this chapter must (a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and (b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other…”
Heinold Commodities & Sec., Inc. v. Hunt (In Re Hunt), 30 B.R. 425 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-3-104(2)(b), § 47-3-104(l)(b), § 47-3-413(2) and § 47-3-409(1).”
Franklin v. Kwik Cash of Martin (In Re Franklin), 254 B.R. 718 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2000). “1999) (citing T.C.A. § 47-3-104); Drinkard v. Jennings, 582 S.”
Bank of Crockett v. Cullipher, 752 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). “See also T.C.A. § 47-3-104. The fact that the notes in question were secured by real property does not affect their status as negotiable instruments governed by Article 3.”
Lorrie Thompson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 773 F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2014). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104 . A note can be sold or assigned to another party who then receives the right to enforce the instrument.”
Third Nat. Bk., Nashville v. Hardi-Gardens Sup. of Ill., Inc., 380 F. Supp. 930 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). “T.C.A. § 47-3-104(1) (b). 2. Apparently defendants believe that payment of all of the notes is rendered conditional because certain notes refer to separate franchise agreements.”
Waller, Lansden, Dortch, & Davis v. Haney, 851 S.W.2d 131 (Tenn. 1992). “The trial court found the note was unconditional on its face and was a negotiable instrument as defined in T.C.A. § 47-3-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code.”
Guar. Partners v. Huff, 830 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). “” However, they are not “negotiable instruments” subject to the rules in Article 3 unless they contain all the elements required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104 (l). 4 *76 In order to be a negotiable instrument, Tenn.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(1) — 5 cases
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “13 At that time, the “sum certain” provision in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-104 (l)(b), -106 required that the “computation [of interest] must be one which can be made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source.”
Third Nat. Bk., Nashville v. Hardi-Gardens Sup. of Ill., Inc., 380 F. Supp. 930 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). “T.C.A. § 47-3-104(1) (b). 2. Apparently defendants believe that payment of all of the notes is rendered conditional because certain notes refer to separate franchise agreements.”
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Webb, 464 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
Guar. Partners v. Huff, 830 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). “” However, they are not “negotiable instruments” subject to the rules in Article 3 unless they contain all the elements required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104 (l). 4 *76 In order to be a negotiable instrument, Tenn.”
Peoples Bank of Polk Cnty. v. McDonald (In Re Maryville Sav. & Loan Corp.), 27 B.R. 701 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(1)(b) — 1 case
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “13 At that time, the “sum certain” provision in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-104 (l)(b), -106 required that the “computation [of interest] must be one which can be made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(2)(a) — 1 case
State v. Mickey Harris, 977 S.W.2d 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(2)(b) — 3 cases
Heinold Commodities & Sec., Inc. v. Hunt (In Re Hunt), 30 B.R. 425 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-3-104(2)(b), § 47-3-104(l)(b), § 47-3-413(2) and § 47-3-409(1).”
Thompson v. Adcox, 63 S.W.3d 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “T.C.A. § 47-3-104 (1992) was the predecessor statute of T.”
State v. Stooksberry, 872 S.W.2d 906 (Tenn. 1994).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(a) — 3 cases
State of Tennessee v. Perry A. March, 293 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). “§ 47-3-104(a), and is “payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder .”
Franklin v. Kwik Cash of Martin (In Re Franklin), 254 B.R. 718 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2000). “1999) (citing T.C.A. § 47-3-104); Drinkard v. Jennings, 582 S.”
Tonya D. Thornley v. U. S. Bank, N.A. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(a)(1) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Perry A. March, 293 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). “§ 47-3-104(a), and is “payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder .”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(a)(l) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Perry A. March, 293 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). “§ 47-3-104(a), and is “payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder .”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(c) — 4 cases
State of Tennessee v. Perry A. March, 293 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). “§ 47-3-104(a), and is “payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder .”
Waldron v. Delffs, 988 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “4 Since the note at issue satisfies the criteria set forth in T.C.A. § 47-3-104, it qualifies as a negotiable instrument.”
In Re Cox, 381 B.R. 525 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008).
Harpeth Fin. Servs., LLC v. Jim Clay Pinson, Jr. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(e) — 1 case
Wilson v. Harris, 304 S.W.3d 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(f) — 1 case
Thompson v. Adcox, 63 S.W.3d 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). “T.C.A. § 47-3-104 (1992) was the predecessor statute of T.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(g) — 1 case
Harrah's Ent., Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins., 100 F. App'x 387 (6th Cir. 2004).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(h) — 1 case
Richard O'Leary, et ux. v. Ann Johnson, 84 S.W.3d 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(l)(a) — 1 case
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “13 At that time, the “sum certain” provision in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-104 (l)(b), -106 required that the “computation [of interest] must be one which can be made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(l)(b) — 2 cases
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “13 At that time, the “sum certain” provision in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-104 (l)(b), -106 required that the “computation [of interest] must be one which can be made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source.”
Heinold Commodities & Sec., Inc. v. Hunt (In Re Hunt), 30 B.R. 425 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-3-104(2)(b), § 47-3-104(l)(b), § 47-3-413(2) and § 47-3-409(1).”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(l)(b)(ii) — 1 case
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “13 At that time, the “sum certain” provision in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-104 (l)(b), -106 required that the “computation [of interest] must be one which can be made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(l)(c) — 1 case
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “13 At that time, the “sum certain” provision in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-104 (l)(b), -106 required that the “computation [of interest] must be one which can be made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-104(l)(d) — 4 cases
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “13 At that time, the “sum certain” provision in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-3-104 (l)(b), -106 required that the “computation [of interest] must be one which can be made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside source.”
Cont'l Bankers Life Ins. Co. of the South v. Bank of Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1979). “T.C.A. § 47-3-104 provides the requirements of a negotiable instrument: (1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this chapter must (a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and (b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other…”
Waldron v. Delffs, 988 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “4 Since the note at issue satisfies the criteria set forth in T.C.A. § 47-3-104, it qualifies as a negotiable instrument.”
Turner v. Bank of Com., 768 S.W.2d 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
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