Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-108 (2026)

Authorized emergency vehicles

✓ current as of May 2026

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(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions stated in this section.

(b)
- (1) A driver of an authorized emergency vehicle operating the vehicle in accordance with subsection (a) may:
  - (A) Park or stand, notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter that regulate parking or standing;
  - (B) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;
  - (C) Exceed the speed limits so long as life or property is not thereby endangered; and
  - (D) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions.
- (2) Subdivision (b)(1) shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall subdivision (b)(1) protect the driver from the consequences of the driver's own reckless disregard for the safety of others.

(c)
- (1) The exemptions granted under subsection (b) to a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle shall only apply when the vehicle is making use of audible and visual signals meeting the requirements of the applicable laws of this state, except that while parked or standing, an authorized emergency vehicle shall only be required to make use of visual signals meeting the requirements of the applicable laws of this state.
- (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, while parked or standing, from making use of both audible and visual signals meeting the requirements of the applicable laws of this state, in the discretion of the driver.

(d) An authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle may be equipped with or display a red light only in combination with a blue light visible from in front of the vehicle.

(e) Notwithstanding the requirement of this section that drivers of authorized emergency vehicles exercise due regard for the safety of all persons, no municipality or county nor the state or any of its political subdivisions, nor their officers or employees, shall be liable for any injury proximately or indirectly caused to an actual or suspected violator of a law or ordinance who is fleeing pursuit by law enforcement personnel. The fact that law enforcement personnel pursue an actual or suspected violator of a law or ordinance who flees from pursuit shall not render the law enforcement personnel, or the employers of the law enforcement personnel, liable for injuries to a third party proximately caused by the fleeing party unless the conduct of the law enforcement personnel was negligent and that negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries to the third party.

Acts 1955, ch. 329, § 7; T.C.A., § 59-808; Acts 1986, ch. 822, § 1; 1989, ch. 173, § 1; 2001, ch. 60, § 1.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 29 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1982–2024 · leading case: Nevill v. City of Tullahoma, 756 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn. 1988).

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Nevill v. City of Tullahoma, 756 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn. 1988). · cites it 24× “Both courts found that the officers violated T.C.A. § 55-8-108, the Emergency Vehicle Statute, although there is no dispute but that the officers displayed the audio and visual signals as required to qualify for the immunities of that statute.”

Hardeman Cnty. v. Judy I. McIntyre, 420 S.W.3d 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 12× “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-108. Additionally, the only direct evidence of speed suggests that the ambulance was traveling less than fifteen miles per hour over the posted speed limit, which is within the Ambulance Service’s internal policy for speed in an emergency situation.”

Kennedy v. City of Spring City, 780 S.W.2d 164 (Tenn. 1989). · cites it 24× “" T.C.A. § 55-8-108. T.C.A. § 55-8-108(e), which became effective the day before the accident that is the basis of this action occurred, expressly provides that: The fact that law enforcement personnel pursue an actual or suspected violator of a law or ordinance who flees from…”

Wright v. City of Knoxville, 898 S.W.2d 177 (Tenn. 1995). · cites it 5× “The first, Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-108, concerns the rights of emergency vehicles to deviate from basic traffic laws.”

Haynes v. Hamilton Cnty., 883 S.W.2d 606 (Tenn. 1994). · cites it 4× “Hamilton County, however, remains immune from liability arising from its employees’ negligent conduct to the extent authorized by Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-108 (1993). That statute, in part, provides: (a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, .”

Bennett v. Putnam Cnty., 47 S.W.3d 438 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 6× “Among other things, Putnam County asserts that the above statute is not applicable to the existing situation by virtue of T.C.A. § 55-8-108 (1998), which provides in pertinent part: 55-8-108.”

Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394 (Tenn. 1995). · cites it 2× “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-108(e) (1993). Having decided that the public duty doctrine is viable, we consider it both desirable and necessary to retain, and further refine, the “special-duty” exception.”

Gardner v. Insura Prop. & Cas. Ins., 956 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 4× “T.C.A. § 55-8-108(e). The Rules of Civil Procedure provide that: Every pleading stating a claim or defense relying upon the violation of a statute shall, in a separate count or paragraph, either specifically refer to the statute or state all of the facts necessary to constitute…”

Bonds v. Emerson, 94 S.W.3d 491 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 8× “Whether or not Investigator Bonds, in the circumstances of this case, was entitled to the protection of T.C.A. § 55-8-108 to the extent that he could lawfully drive his uncertified, unmarked car at a speed of 99 miles an hour through a residential area while only using his siren…”

McClenahan v. Lawhorne, 849 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “Castello was operating his vehicle in compliance with T.C.A. § 55-8-108, that the City was immune from suit under T.”

Sandra Newman v. Rubye J. Jarrell, 354 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “§ 55-8-108 is the operative statute. TenmCode Ann.”

Garren v. City of Englewood, 854 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “The current regulation is codified at T.C.A. § 55-8-108.”

Show all 29 citing cases →

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-108(a) — 1 case

Cannon v. City of Chattanooga (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-108(b)(2) — 1 case

Hardeman Cnty. v. Judy I. McIntyre, 420 S.W.3d 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-108. Additionally, the only direct evidence of speed suggests that the ambulance was traveling less than fifteen miles per hour over the posted speed limit, which is within the Ambulance Service’s internal policy for speed in an emergency situation.”

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-108(b)(l) — 1 case

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-108(d) — 3 cases

Wright v. City of Knoxville, 898 S.W.2d 177 (Tenn. 1995). “The first, Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-108, concerns the rights of emergency vehicles to deviate from basic traffic laws.”

Cannon v. City of Chattanooga (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Gregory Hill v. City of Germantown, TN (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

— Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-108(e) — 7 cases

Kennedy v. City of Spring City, 780 S.W.2d 164 (Tenn. 1989). “" T.C.A. § 55-8-108. T.C.A. § 55-8-108(e), which became effective the day before the accident that is the basis of this action occurred, expressly provides that: The fact that law enforcement personnel pursue an actual or suspected violator of a law or ordinance who flees from…”

Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394 (Tenn. 1995). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-108(e) (1993). Having decided that the public duty doctrine is viable, we consider it both desirable and necessary to retain, and further refine, the “special-duty” exception.”

Gardner v. Insura Prop. & Cas. Ins., 956 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). “T.C.A. § 55-8-108(e). The Rules of Civil Procedure provide that: Every pleading stating a claim or defense relying upon the violation of a statute shall, in a separate count or paragraph, either specifically refer to the statute or state all of the facts necessary to constitute…”

Sandra Newman v. Rubye J. Jarrell, 354 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). “§ 55-8-108 is the operative statute. TenmCode Ann.”

Est. of Lisa Duncan, by & through Edward Human, Pers. Rep. v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

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