Ramos v. State, 547 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Ramos v. State, 547 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
21 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Broadnax, James Garfield (texcrimapp, 2011-12-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Broadnax, James Garfield
Tex. Crim. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Id. , § 8.04(d) 46. 547 S.W.2d 33, 33-34 (Tex. Cr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis, Selwyn Preston
Tex. Crim. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
DAVIS – 10 mens rea.20 In that case, as in this one, the defendant contended that “he was intoxicated to such an extent, that he failed to have the requisite intent necessary to commit a burglary.”21 We held that the defendant’s contention was contrary to longstanding Texas law that was recodified by § 8.04 of the Penal Code.22 We relied upon Ramos and the statute in subsequent cases to reject legal sufficiency claims based upon intoxication,23 and we explained in Skinner v. State that “Texas Penal Code § 8.04(a) bars the use of evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the culp…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Davis, Selwyn Preston
Tex. Crim. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Id. , § 8.04(d). 20. 547 S.W.2d 33, 33-34 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. State
Tex. Crim. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Id., § 8.04(d). 20 . 547 S.W.2d 33, 33-34 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977). 21 .
discussed Cited "see" Brandon Joseph Williams v. State
Tex. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ramos v. State, 547 S.W.2d 33, 33-34 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (declining appellant’s invitation to “overrule a long line of cases” to hold that “ ‘he was intoxicated to such an extent, that he failed to have the requisite intent necessary to commit burglary1 ”); see also Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 328-29 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (holding inadmissible expert’s testimony, “offered at the guilt stage of trial, to show that appellant’s intoxication from cocaine use prevented him from forming the applicable mens rea”); Skinner v. State, 956 S.W.2d 532, 543 (Tex. *270 Crim.App.199…
discussed Cited "see" Taylor v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ramos v. State, 547 S.W.2d 33 , 34 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (section 8.04 “quite clearly” a reeodification of article 36).
Richard Hernandez RAMOS, Appellant,
v.
the STATE of Texas, Appellee
52899.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb 23, 1977.
547 S.W.2d 33
Robert D. Hudnall, Dallas, for appellant., Henry Wade, Dist. Atty.; Gary M. Love, Robert C. Hinton Jr., Dale G. Markland, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and David S. McAngus, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Roberts.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

ROBERTS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary of a building. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 30.02. After finding appellant guilty, the jury assessed his punishment at seventeen years.

The evidence was that at about eight o’clock on a Sunday night the complaining witness and a Dallas police officer, after responding to a silent burglar alarm, found appellant hidden in the complainant’s lumber store. The back door of the store had been broken into, and a window between the back room and the room in which appellant was found had also been broken. Appellant was found hidden behind a desk; he was wearing gloves taken from the store’s stock. In one of his pockets was a screwdriver, also taken from the store’s stock. The officer testified that the appellant was intoxicated.

The appellant testified that he had been drinking all day Sunday. He went to the house of his estranged wife early in the evening and found that, without his knowledge, she had moved and taken their children with her. He testified that he then “remember[ed] walking down Mercedes Street and then the next time I remember, I was in the lumber yard.” Appellant stated that he did not remember breaking in the lumber yard; he claimed only that he was “mad and drunk.”

Appellant’s sole contention is that “he was intoxicated to such an extent, that he failed to have the requisite intent necessary to commit a burglary.” Appellant acknowledges that Texas law has long been contrary to his contention, see Art. 36, V.A.P.C. (1925), but urges that we overrule a long[*34] line of cases [1] in order to uphold his contention. This we decline to do, especially in light of the Legislature’s recent enactment of Section 8.04 of the new Penal Code. That section provides that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the commission of a crime, but may be relied upon as a mitigating factor at the punishment phase of the trial. [2] See also V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 8.01; Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Hart v. State, 537 S.W.2d 21 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

Appellant’s contention is overruled.

The judgment is affirmed.

1

. Appellant cites Evers v. State, 31 Tex.Cr.R. 318, 20 S.W. 744 (1892) as the principal authority in this group of cases.

2

. Section 8.04 thus appears quite clearly to have been a recodification of existing law, albeit in somewhat altered language. See Searcy and Patterson, Practice Commentary to Section 8.04, V.T.C.A., Penal Code; see also Art. 36, V.A.P.C., supra; Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Hart v. State, 537 S.W.2d 21 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).