Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1995). · Go Syfert
Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we hold that the statute of limitations for malpractice for failure to sue a tortfea-sor is tolled until litigation has concluded against other tortfeasors hable for the same indivisible injury.”
96 citation events (65 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Moser, Independent Administrator for Estate of Whitsett v. Junell, Jr. and Andrews & Kurth L.L.P. (texapp, 2007-02-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Moser, Independent Administrator for Estate of Whitsett v. Junell, Jr. and Andrews & Kurth L.L.P. (6×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2007 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
we hold that the statute of limitations for malpractice for failure to sue a tortfeasor is tolled until litigation has concluded against other tortfeasors liable for the same indivisible injury.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Estate of Whitsett v. Junell (6×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2007 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
we hold that the statute of limitations for malpractice for failure to sue a tortfea-sor is tolled until litigation has concluded against other tortfeasors hable for the same indivisible injury.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Brian Erikson and Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C. v. Oscar Renda (3×)
Tex. · 2019 · confidence medium
Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 483-84 (Tex. 1992); Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. 1995); Gulf Coast Inv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Riverwalk CY Hotel Partners, LTD. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP
Tex. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
The court further noted that it had elaborated on the first policy in a subsequent case when it stated “that attorney-client trust would be eroded if the client had to scrutinize every stage of the case for possible missteps.” Id. (citing Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 287 (Tex.1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nowak v. Pellis
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Underkofler v. Vanasek, 53 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex.2001); Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 121-23 (Tex. 2001); Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex.1995); Am.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Lewis Nowak v. Jeanne Pellis (2×)
Tex. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
See Underkofler v. Vanasek , 53 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. 2001); Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin , 41 S.W.3d 118 , 121–23 (Tex. 2001); Sanchez v. Hastings , 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. 1995) ; Am.
cited Cited as authority (rule) The Vacek Group, Inc. v. Clark
Tex. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Underkofler v. Vanasek, 53 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex.2001); Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex.2001); Murphy, 964 S.W.2d at 272 ; Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex.1995); Am.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) the Vacek Group, Inc., F/K/A Vacek-Crawford, Inc. v. Douglas C. Clark and Benckenstein, Norvell & Nathan, L.L.P.
Tex. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Underkofler v. Vanasek , 53 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. 2001); Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin , 41 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex. 2001); Murphy , 964 S.W.2d at 272 ; Sanchez v. Hastings , 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. 1995); Am.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Streber v. Hunter
W.D. Tex. · 1998 · confidence medium
The doctrine has also been applied when an attorney neglected to sue all tortfeasors in a wrongful death action, because requiring the client to bring a malpractice action against her lawyer prior to concluding litigation against the served tortfeasors “would jeopardize the client’s claims against the remaining defendants.” Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sv v. Rv
Tex. · 1996 · confidence medium
Sanchez, 898 S.W.2d at 288 (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) S.V. v. R.V.
Tex. · 1996 · confidence medium
Sanchez, 898 S.W.2d at 288 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited "see" Gail Gillette v. Stephen Graves
Tex. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. 1995) (holding, in a malpractice case complaining of the lawyers’ failure to sue a tortfeasor in a wrongful death case, that limitations was tolled until all litigation concluded against other -8- 04-18-00771-CV tortfeasors liable for the same indivisible injury); Gulf Coast, 821 S.W.2d at 160 (holding limitations on a legal malpractice suit implicating a lawyer’s actions in a non-judicial foreclosure sale was tolled during a subsequent suit against client for wrongful foreclosure); see also Estate of Whitsett v. Junell, 218 S.W.3d 765, 77…
discussed Cited "see" Gail Gillette v. Stephen Graves
Tex. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. 1995) (holding, in a malpractice case complaining of the lawyers’ failure to sue a tortfeasor in a wrongful death case, that limitations was tolled until all litigation concluded against other tortfeasors liable for the same indivisible injury); Gulf Coast, 821 S.W.2d at 160 (holding limitations on a legal malpractice suit implicating a lawyer’s actions in a non-judicial foreclosure sale was tolled during a subsequent suit against client for wrongful foreclosure); Estate of Whitsett v. Junell, 218 S.W.3d 765, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st …
discussed Cited "see" Richard Alan Haase v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrels, Agosto and Friend LLP (2×)
Tex. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (providing that ―the statute of limitations for malpractice for failure to sue a tortfeasor is tolled until litigation has concluded against other tortfeasors liable for the same indivisible injury‖); Estate of Whitsett v. Junell, 218 S.W.3d 765, 770 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (providing similar authority for claims alleging failure to assert additional causes of action against existing defendants).
discussed Cited "see" Noel v. Hoover
Colo. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, supra. Accordingly, we reject the Noels' reliance on decisions by the Texas Supreme Court in Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.1991), and Sanches v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.1995).
discussed Cited "see" Vanasek v. Underkofler (2×)
Tex. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex.1991); see Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex.1995) (applying Hughes). .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Joseph & Debra Domino v. Allmand & Lee, PLLC, Chris Lee, and Weldon R. Allmand
Tex. App. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The court reasoned that if forced to bring the malpractice case while the termination case proceeded on appeal, the Hugheses would have been forced to make inconsistent claims, compromising the likelihood of success in both suits; therefore, “[limitations are tolled for the second cause of action because the viability of the second cause of action depends on the outcome of the first.” Id. at 157 ; see also Apex, 41 S.W.3d at 121 (referencing Sanchez v. Hastings, 898 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex.1995), for the proposition that attorney-client trust would be eroded if the client had to scrutinize ev…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Graciela Avila SANCHEZ, Petitioner
v.
Steve T. HASTINGS, Guy H. Allison, Alberto R. Huerta, and Allison & Huerta, Respondents
94-0886.
Texas Supreme Court.
Jun 15, 1995.
898 S.W.2d 287
Anita J. Anderson, San Antonio, for petitioner., Terry Topham and Michael P. Warren, San Antonio, for respondents.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #39,819 of 633,719
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Texas (2)

On APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR TO the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas

PER CURIAM.

Graciela Sanchez filed a legal malpractice suit against the law firm of Allison & Huerta, P.C. and three of its lawyers. The trial court rendered a summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations precluded the suit. The court of appeals affirmed. 880 S.W.2d 471. Because we conclude that the pendency of the underlying wrongful death litigation tolled the statute until the litigation concluded, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

We review the summary judgment proof in the light most favorable to Sanchez, the non-movant. On June 8,1984, Graciela Sanchez’s husband, Carlos Sanchez, was killed when a portable crane mounted on his employer’s truck came in contact with electrical wires. Steve Hastings, an attorney at Allison & Huerta, P.C., filed a wrongful death and survivor action on behalf of Graciela Sanchez individually, as executor of her husband’s estate, and as guardian of their minor child against the manufacturer of the crane, and several other defendants. Hastings did not sue Carlos Sanchez’s employer, Cedar Creek Fabricators. While representing Graciela Sanchez, Hastings also served as the attorney for Cedar Creek Fabricators’ workers’ compensation insurance carrier in its subro-[*288] gation action against the defendants for reimbursement of the death benefits paid to Carlos Sanchez’s family.

The trial court appointed an attorney ad litem for the minor child. The ad litem filed a claim for gross negligence on behalf of the child against her father’s employer, Cedar Creek Fabricators. By the time the ad litem filed the claim, however, the statute of limitations had run for Graciela Sanchez to file her own gross negligence action against the employer.

The court held a hearing on May 1,1990 to consider a settlement agreement with one of the defendants and Hastings’ motion to be designated lead counsel representing the minor child. During arguments before the bench, the attorneys discussed the fact that Hastings may have had a conflict of interest in representing both Sanchez and Cedar Creek Fabricators. Sanchez was present in the courtroom during the hearing.

The trial court rendered the final judgment against the defendants in the wrongful death lawsuit on August 29, 1990. In October 1990, Sanchez contacted the ad litem, who explained to her the possibility of a claim against her attorneys for malpractice. On August 28, 1992, Graciela Sanchez filed the present lawsuit against Hastings and his firm.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that limitations ran from the May 1, 1990, and therefore barred Sanchez’s cause of action. Sanchez’s response asserted among other things that limitations should be tolled during the pendency of the wrongful death litigation, citing Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991). The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations had run.

In Hughes, we held that “when an attorney commits malpractice in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted.” Id. at 157. The holding in Hughes necessarily tolls limitations during the trial court proceedings.

Our holding in Hughes was based in part on the policy that a client should not be forced to take inconsistent positions in the underlying litigation and the malpractice action, thereby jeopardizing success in both. Id. The policy in Hughes applies here. A client such as Sanchez should not be forced to assert a claim against her lawyer for failure to add all tortfeasors prior to concluding the litigation against the defendants who were sued. A contrary rule would jeopardize the client’s claims against the remaining defendants. Moreover, if the client must carefully scrutinize every stage of the case for possible missteps it would erode the trust between client and lawyer necessary for the successful prosecution of litigation.

We hold that the statute of limitations for malpractice for failure to sue a tortfeasor is tolled until litigation has concluded against other tortfeasors liable for the same indivisible injury. Accordingly, a majority of this Court grants Sanchez’s application for writ of error and, without hearing oral argument, reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 170.