MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

Appellant, Andre Norris, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, enhanced, and assessed a sentence of thirty-five years confinement and a fine of $2,500.1 In two points of error, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by (1) giving an backyard but lost him in the alleyway. Lusk then called 911 and Lubbock County Police officers arrived to secure the crime scene and commence a search for the intruder. During the investigation, broken glass was discovered on both sides of Lusk’s backdoor and the intruder’s ball cap was located. The bedroom was in disarray and jewelry worth $5,000 was missing. Lusk was unable to identify the man who broke into his house, explaining that during the encounter he was more concerned with securing the shotgun than looking at the intruder.

As part of their investigation, officers photographed the damage to Lusk’s house and interior disarray. They also collected the ball cap for DNA analysis and lifted fingerprints off broken glass shards originating in and around Lusk’s backdoor. At trial, testimony established that fingerprints lifted from the broken glass were identified as belonging to Norris, and Daniel Lindley, a DPS forensic scientist, testified that DNA from the ball cap was a “match” for Norris.^[3] After the State rested, Appellant rested without putting on any evidence.

During the charge conference, Norris requested a limiting instruction concerning the fingerprint evidence produced by the State. That request was denied. Norris also requested an instruction on the lesser-included offense of robbery and then modified that request to include the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. That request was also denied.

As presented to the jury, the abstract portion of the jury charge stated a “person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property of another, he intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury.” The jury charge went on to state that “[t]he offense is aggravated robbery if the person committing robbery uses or exhibits a deadly weapon” and “[a] firearm is a deadly weapon.”

The application portion of the charge stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

Now bearing in mind the foregoing instructions, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about October 6, 2011, in Lubbock County, Texas, as alleged in the indictment, the defendant, Andre Norris, did then and there, while in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property, intentionally or knowingly threaten or place Michael Lusk in fear of imminent bodily injury or death and the defendant did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, then you will find the defendant guilty of the offense of aggravated robbery and so say you by your verdict. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty, then you should acquit the defendant and say by your verdict “Not guilty.”

Upon submission, the jury found Norris guilty of aggravated robbery. Following the punishment phase of the trial, the jury found the punishment enhancement allegation to be true and sentenced him to thirty-five years confinement and a fine of $2,500. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In analyzing a jury-charge issue, we first determine if error occurred, and, if so, we then conduct a harm analysis. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. 2005). The degree of harm required for reversal depends on whether the appellant has preserved error by objection. Id. A jury-charge error requires reversal when, after proper objection, the appellant suffers Asome harm@ to his rights. Id.; Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh=g), reaffirmed by, Middleton v.

State, 1215 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). If an appellant fails to object at trial and offers no objections to the charge, charge error does not require reversal unless appellant shows Aegregious harm.@ Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174.

POINT OF ERROR ONE: DEADLY W EAPON INSTRUCTION

Because there was evidence at trial that Lusk’s shotgun may have been unloaded, Appellant asserts on appeal the trial court should have included an instruction in its charge that a “deadly weapon” means a firearm if “you [the jury] find that in the manner of its use or intended use it was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” At trial, Appellant did not object to the trial court’s “deadly weapon” instruction, nor did he request this additional instruction.

The trial court submitted its deadly weapon instruction under Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (West Supp. 2014) (“‘Deadly Weapon’ means a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury.”). Lusk testified that, during the robbery, Appellant was carrying a shotgun, pointed it at him, worked the gun’s bolt action, and threatened to kill him, and he was afraid for his safety. Because Appellant did not object to the trial court’s “deadly weapon” instruction and did not request any additional instructions in that regard, error, if any, does not require reversal unless he is able to show Aegregious harm.@ See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

Since the adoption of the Penal Code in 1974, the issue of whether an object is a deadly weapon is entirely controlled by legislation, Thomas v. State, 821 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), and trial judges are not at liberty to omit the statutory definition of “deadly weapon” from their jury instructions under any circumstances where it is the law applicable to the case. Id. Under section 1.07(a)(17)(A) of the Penal Code, an object meets the statutory definition of a deadly weapon if it is a firearm. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (West Supp. 2014). Accordingly, if the State proves at trial that an object is in fact a firearm, the State need not “show that the object [is] really capable of causing death, either in the manner of its actual use or in the manner of its intended use.” Thomas, 821 S.W.2d at 620. See Hammons v. State, 856 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d) (“Once such a showing is made, the State need not verify that the object was actually capable of causing death.”).

Here, the State introduced testimony corroborated by photographs illustrating that Appellant carried and threatened Lusk with a shotgun during the robbery. See Gregg v. State, 820 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, no pet.) (shotgun is a deadly weapon per se); Rodriguez v. State, 644 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, no pet.) (a sawed-off shotgun is a firearm and by definition a deadly weapon). Hence, there was no need for the jury to find, as suggested by Appellant, that the shotgun was really capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, either in the manner of its actual use or in the manner of its intended use, see Thomas, 821 S.W.2d at 620; Hammons, 856 S.W.2d at 800, in order for the jury to find the shotgun was in fact a “deadly weapon.”

Indeed, the issue for the jury here was whether the shotgun was “used” (employed or utilized in order to achieve its purpose) or “exhibited” (consciously displayed) during the commission of the robbery. See Boston v. State, 373 S.W.3d 832, 837 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012), aff’d, 410 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“the mere carrying of a weapon during a robbery can be legally sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the intended use of the weapon was that it be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury”). See also Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (“If the trier of fact finds that a pistol has been used in the commission of the offense . . . then it has found that a deadly weapon has been used since a pistol is a deadly weapon per se.”). Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in its “deadly weapon” instruction and overrule Appellant’s first point of error.

POINT OF ERROR TWO: LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION

Appellant next asserts the trial court erred by not giving a lesser-included offense instruction for robbery4 because there were material issues whether Appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon in light of testimony that the shotgun might be unloaded. This issue is simply a rehash of Appellant’s first point of error.

Robbery is a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery. See Penaloza v. State, 349 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). See also Alonzo v. State, No. 07-12-00244-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3703, at[*13] (Tex. App.— Amarillo Apr. 7, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). With the first prong of our test satisfied, we must next determine whether there is some evidence presented from which a jury could rationally find that Appellant is guilty of robbery but not guilty of aggravated robbery. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc).

Having considered all the evidence at trial, we find there is no evidence contradicting Lusk’s testimony that a shotgun was carried by Appellant during the robbery and that he was threatened with the weapon and feared for his safety. As such, there is not a scintilla of evidence indicating a deadly weapon was not used or exhibited during the robbery. Hampton v. State, 109 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“[T]here must be some evidence directly germane to the lesser-included offense for the finder of fact to consider before an instruction on a lesser-included offense is warranted.”).

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to submit Appellant’s requested lesser-included offense instruction because Appellant has not established that some evidence in the record supports a finding that, if he was guilty, he was guilty solely of the lesser-included offense of robbery. See Young v. State, 428 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Appellant’s second point of error is overruled.

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Patrick A. Pirtle Justice Do not publish.