Sec. 21.122. BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES. (a) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this chapter only if:
(1) a complainant demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(2) the complainant makes the demonstration in accordance with federal law as that law existed June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of alternative employment practices, and the respondent refuses to adopt such an alternative employment practice.
(b) To determine the availability of and burden of proof applicable to a disparate impact case involving age discrimination, the court shall apply the judicial interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and its subsequent amendments (29 U.S.C. Section 621 et seq.).
(c) To demonstrate that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact, the complainant must demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complainant demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the elements of a respondent's decision-making process are not capable of separation for analysis, that decision-making process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
(d) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific practice does not cause a disparate impact, the respondent may not be required to demonstrate that the practice is consistent with business necessity.
Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 76, Sec. 9.05(a), eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
Notes of Decisions
Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. 2011).
· cites it 3× “In addition, the Texas Legislature expressly provided for disparate impact protection in Texas Labor Code § 21.122(a)(1), 4 where it defined the burden of proof for disparate impact cases in the employment context: *427 An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact…”
Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Dearing, 150 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.122. Furthermore, the language in the Act— added in 1995 — mirrors the language added to Title VII in 1991 codifying disparate-impact cases under Title VII, except that the Texas Act treats disparate impact on the basis of age distinctly by removing…”
Elgaghil v. Tarrant Cnty. Junior Coll., 45 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. App. 2000).
“See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.122 . However, Elgaghil conceded in both his deposition testimony and in his appellate brief that he was not aware of any other members in his protected class who had been the subject of disparate impact as a result of TCJC’s employment policies and…”
City of Austin v. Chandler, 428 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2014).
“See Tex. Lab.Code § 21.122(b) (requiring courts to apply judicial interpretation of ADEA to Texas’s standard for burden of proof in age-based discrimination claims).”
Univ. of Texas & Ellen Wartella v. Paula Poindexter (Tex. App. 2009).
· cites it 4× “" See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.122 (c) (West 2006) ("decision-making process may be analyzed as one employment practice" when "elements of a respondent's decision-making process are not capable of separation for analysis"); (11) see also 42 U.”
— Tex. Lab. Code § 21.122(a) — 1 case
— Tex. Lab. Code § 21.122(a)(1) — 3 cases
Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. 2011).
“In addition, the Texas Legislature expressly provided for disparate impact protection in Texas Labor Code § 21.122(a)(1), 4 where it defined the burden of proof for disparate impact cases in the employment context: *427 An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact…”
— Tex. Lab. Code § 21.122(b) — 5 cases
City of Austin v. Chandler, 428 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2014).
“See Tex. Lab.Code § 21.122(b) (requiring courts to apply judicial interpretation of ADEA to Texas’s standard for burden of proof in age-based discrimination claims).”
City of Austin v. Raymond E. Chandler, Daniel J. Amador, David Becker, John Beese, Nathan Blane Brown, Michael Carter, Anastacio Cruz, Eddie De La Garza, Jose L. Delgado, Carlos S. Dominguez, Kenneth J. Ferro, David Gannon, Abel Garza, Vincent Giles, Jr. (Tex. App. 2014).
— Tex. Lab. Code § 21.122(c) — 1 case
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