Sec. 9.32. DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PERSON. (a) A person is justified in using deadly force against another:
(1) if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31; and
(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:
(A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or
(B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery.
(b) The actor's belief under Subsection (a)(2) that the deadly force was immediately necessary as described by that subdivision is presumed to be reasonable if the actor:
(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used:
(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;
(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or
(C) was committing or attempting to commit an offense described by Subsection (a)(2)(B);
(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and
(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.
(c) A person who has a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used is not required to retreat before using deadly force as described by this section.
(d) For purposes of Subsection (a)(2), in determining whether an actor described by Subsection (c) reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary, a finder of fact may not consider whether the actor failed to retreat.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 5316, ch. 977, Sec. 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 235, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
Amended by:
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2007.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
547
cases (
109 in the last 5 years), 1982–2026 · leading case:
Villarreal, Rene Daniel, 453 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
Villarreal, Rene Daniel, 453 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
· cites it 8× “See Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b). The State raises this question in its petition for discretionary review, in which it challenges the court of appeals’s reversal of the murder conviction of Rene Daniel Villarreal, appellant, based on the conclusion that he was egregiously harmed by…”
Morales, Jose Manuel, 357 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
· cites it 6× “Counterpart provisions with respect to self-defense that does not involve deadly force were also added.”
Braughton, Christopher Ernest, 569 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
· cites it 2× “See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.32(b). But the jury here could have rationally determined that appellant did not have any "reason to believe" that Dominguez was committing or attempting to commit robbery or murder at the time that appellant shot him.”
Elizondo, Jose Guadalupe Rodriguez, 487 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
· cites it 3× “Paragraph IV begins by tracking the language of Texas Penal Code section 9.32. However, as the appellate court correctly noted, the instruction fails to include portions of the presumption language that could have benefitted Elizondo: The jury charge only provided that a…”
Gamino, Cesar Alejandro, 537 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
· cites it 3× “9 Under Texas Penal Code, Section 9.32, a person is justified in using deadly force if he would be justified in using force under Section 9.”
Krajcovic v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
· cites it 5× “" Before September 1, 2007, deadly force under Texas Penal Code Section 9.32(a) was justified only "if a reasonable person in the actor's situation would not have retreated.”
Trammell v. State, 287 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App. 2009).
· cites it 6× “[10] Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.32 (a) (Vernon Supp.”
Reeves, Gary Patrick, 420 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
· cites it 2× “See Tex. Penal Code § 9.32. 3 . See Tex. Penal Code § 9.”
Dusti Kenne Lee v. State, 415 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App. 2013).
· cites it 4× “Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.32 . Many murder cases revolve around whether the actor was reasonable in that belief when causing a death.”
Ferrel v. State, 55 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
· cites it 2× “" [3] The court of appeals did not hold that appellant was entitled to a deadly-force self-defense instruction under Texas Penal Code § 9.32(a), so I do not reach that question.”
Mejia v. Davis, 906 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2018).
· cites it 2× “See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.32 (a)(2) (deadly force justified "when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary" to protect against another's attempted use of deadly force); Alonzo , 353 S.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(1) — 3 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(2) — 5 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(3) — 2 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(3)(A) — 2 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(3)(B) — 4 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a) — 124 cases
Ferrel v. State, 55 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
“" [3] The court of appeals did not hold that appellant was entitled to a deadly-force self-defense instruction under Texas Penal Code § 9.32(a), so I do not reach that question.”
Krajcovic v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
“" Before September 1, 2007, deadly force under Texas Penal Code Section 9.32(a) was justified only "if a reasonable person in the actor's situation would not have retreated.”
Morales, Jose Manuel, 357 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
“Counterpart provisions with respect to self-defense that does not involve deadly force were also added.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)(1) — 22 cases
Elizondo, Jose Guadalupe Rodriguez, 487 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
“Paragraph IV begins by tracking the language of Texas Penal Code section 9.32. However, as the appellate court correctly noted, the instruction fails to include portions of the presumption language that could have benefitted Elizondo: The jury charge only provided that a…”
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)(1)(A) — 1 case
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)(2) — 28 cases
Morales, Jose Manuel, 357 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
“Counterpart provisions with respect to self-defense that does not involve deadly force were also added.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)(2)(A) — 29 cases
Mejia v. Davis, 906 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2018).
“See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.32 (a)(2) (deadly force justified "when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary" to protect against another's attempted use of deadly force); Alonzo , 353 S.”
Morales, Jose Manuel, 357 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
“Counterpart provisions with respect to self-defense that does not involve deadly force were also added.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)(2)(B) — 16 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)(3) — 4 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)(3)(A) — 4 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)(3)(B) — 1 case
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)(B) — 1 case
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b) — 42 cases
Villarreal, Rene Daniel, 453 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
“See Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b). The State raises this question in its petition for discretionary review, in which it challenges the court of appeals’s reversal of the murder conviction of Rene Daniel Villarreal, appellant, based on the conclusion that he was egregiously harmed by…”
Braughton, Christopher Ernest, 569 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
“See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.32(b). But the jury here could have rationally determined that appellant did not have any "reason to believe" that Dominguez was committing or attempting to commit robbery or murder at the time that appellant shot him.”
Morales, Jose Manuel, 357 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
“Counterpart provisions with respect to self-defense that does not involve deadly force were also added.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b)(1) — 5 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b)(1)(A) — 8 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b)(1)(B) — 1 case
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b)(1)(C) — 6 cases
Villarreal, Rene Daniel, 453 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
“See Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b). The State raises this question in its petition for discretionary review, in which it challenges the court of appeals’s reversal of the murder conviction of Rene Daniel Villarreal, appellant, based on the conclusion that he was egregiously harmed by…”
Morales, Jose Manuel, 357 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
“Counterpart provisions with respect to self-defense that does not involve deadly force were also added.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b)(2) — 5 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b)(3) — 8 cases
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(c) — 22 cases
Krajcovic v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
“" Before September 1, 2007, deadly force under Texas Penal Code Section 9.32(a) was justified only "if a reasonable person in the actor's situation would not have retreated.”
Morales, Jose Manuel, 357 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
“Counterpart provisions with respect to self-defense that does not involve deadly force were also added.”
— Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(d) — 2 cases
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