Texas Codes

Tex. Penal Code § 9.51 (2026)

Arrest And Search

✓ current as of May 2026

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Sec. 9.51. ARREST AND SEARCH. (a) A peace officer, or a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest, if:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful or, if the arrest or search is made under a warrant, he reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and

(2) before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer's direction, unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(b) A person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his direction) is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making a lawful arrest, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest if, before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for the arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the peace officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (a) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if the arrest is delayed.

(d) A person other than a peace officer acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make a lawful arrest, or to prevent escape after a lawful arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (b) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the felony or offense against the public peace for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to another if the arrest is delayed.

(e) There is no duty to retreat before using deadly force justified by Subsection (c) or (d).

(f) Nothing in this section relating to the actor's manifestation of purpose or identity shall be construed as conflicting with any other law relating to the issuance, service, and execution of an arrest or search warrant either under the laws of this state or the United States.

(g) Deadly force may only be used under the circumstances enumerated in Subsections (c) and (d).

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 48 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1984–2025 · leading case: Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

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Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). · cites it 2× “§ 508 (1982); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (c) (1974); Utah Code Ann.”

Juan Mendez, Sr. v. Taylor Poitevent, 823 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2016). · cites it 2× “Tex. Penal Code § 9.51. Under that defense, if conduct is privileged, then it is not tortious.”

Samtani v. City of Laredo, 274 F. Supp. 3d 695 (S.D. Tex. 2017). · cites it 2× “”) (internal quotations omitted); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (The peace officer privilege can only be invoked if there is a “reasonable belief’ that the use of force is “necessary”).”

Kacz v. State, 287 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. App. 2009). · cites it 5× “Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (a) (Vernon 2003).”

State v. Attaway, 870 P.2d 103 (N.M. 1994). · cites it 2× “§ 23A-35-8 (1988); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (West 1974); Utah Code Ann.”

Drew Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. App. 2014). · cites it 2× “” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (a) (West 2011).”

Faust v. State, 491 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a). It also authorizes, in limited circumstances, the use by an officer of deadly force.”

Austin v. City of Pasadena, 74 F.4th 312 (5th Cir. 2023). “See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 9.51– 9.54. Pasadena police officers and PSOs are trained and supervised to assure officers are appropriately guided to follow the law, City policy, and police department regulations.”

Jose Davila v. USA, 713 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2013). “” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (a). As we have already established, the NPS Rangers’ use of force against Davila, Duarte, and Davila’s grandson was reasonable, given the totality of circumstances of the traffic stop.”

Duran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 921 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App. 1996). “See TexPenal Code Ann. § 9.51(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 1994).”

Ramirez v. State, 822 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “Further, Gonzales’ arming himself in response to Rousett’s request for assistance was authorized under Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (Vernon 1974), which authorizes citizens to use force to assist an officer in making an arrest.”

Manzi v. State, 56 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. App. 2001). “24 (Vernon 1977); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.51 (Vernon 1994).”

Show all 48 citing cases →

— Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a) — 14 cases

Samtani v. City of Laredo, 274 F. Supp. 3d 695 (S.D. Tex. 2017). “”) (internal quotations omitted); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (The peace officer privilege can only be invoked if there is a “reasonable belief’ that the use of force is “necessary”).”

Faust v. State, 491 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a). It also authorizes, in limited circumstances, the use by an officer of deadly force.”

City of Dallas v. Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc., 883 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App. 1994).

State of Texas v. City of Houston, 625 F. App'x 670 (5th Cir. 2015).

Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App. 1992).

— Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a)(1) — 2 cases

Duran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 921 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App. 1996). “See TexPenal Code Ann. § 9.51(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 1994).”

Victoria Lavigne Valdez v. the State of Texas (Tex. App. 2025).

— Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a)(2) — 1 case

Cole v. Hunter (N.D. Tex. 2020).

— Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(b) — 1 case

Villafranca v. United States (5th Cir. 2009).

— Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(c) — 4 cases

Faust v. State, 491 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a). It also authorizes, in limited circumstances, the use by an officer of deadly force.”

Wicker v. City of Galveston, 944 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

Martin, Peter James (Tex. App. 2014).

Unknown.

— Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(c)(2) — 2 cases

Juan Mendez, Sr. v. Taylor Poitevent, 823 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2016). “Tex. Penal Code § 9.51. Under that defense, if conduct is privileged, then it is not tortious.”

Irwin v. Santiago (N.D. Tex. 2020).

— Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(g) — 1 case

Sayantan Ghose v. the State of Texas (Tex. App. 2022).

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