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Tex. CodesPenal CodeTitle 2. General Principles of Criminal ResponsibilityChapter 9. Justification Excluding Criminal Responsibility

Tex. Penal Code § 9.51 (2026)

Arrest And Search

Edition and currency
laws through the 89th Legislature (2025). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 89th Legislature (2025) cited 1984–2025 48citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 48 opinions since 1984, 5 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (14 cases).

Sec. 9.51. ARREST AND SEARCH. (a) A peace officer, or a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest, if:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful or, if the arrest or search is made under a warrant, he reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and

(2) before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer's direction, unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(b) A person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his direction) is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making a lawful arrest, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest if, before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for the arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the peace officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (a) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if the arrest is delayed.

(d) A person other than a peace officer acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make a lawful arrest, or to prevent escape after a lawful arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (b) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the felony or offense against the public peace for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to another if the arrest is delayed.

(e) There is no duty to retreat before using deadly force justified by Subsection (c) or (d).

(f) Nothing in this section relating to the actor's manifestation of purpose or identity shall be construed as conflicting with any other law relating to the issuance, service, and execution of an arrest or search warrant either under the laws of this state or the United States.

(g) Deadly force may only be used under the circumstances enumerated in Subsections (c) and (d).

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

The 20 cases that cite Tex. Penal Code § 9.51 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENTennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
cites § 9.51 2×cited by 4,187 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“§ 508 (1982); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (c) (1974); Utah Code Ann.”
The case’s holding
Deadly force is a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment reasonableness and is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of harm.
Later courts cite it for
“where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.” · 344 citing courts
2
GREENJuan Mendez, Sr. v. Taylor Poitevent, 823 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2016).
cites § 9.51 2×subsections: (c)(2)cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“Tex. Penal Code § 9.51. Under that defense, if conduct is privileged, then it is not tortious.”
The case’s holding
Summary judgment is appropriate when a federal agent uses deadly force against a suspect who attacks the agent during an attempted arrest.
Later courts cite it for
“under rule 56(d), deferring summary judgment and ordering discovery is appropriate only if the 'nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENSamtani v. City of Laredo, 274 F. Supp. 3d 695 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
cites § 9.51 2×subsections: (a)cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“”) (internal quotations omitted); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (The peace officer privilege can only be invoked if there is a “reasonable belief’ that the use of force is “necessary”).”
Later courts cite it for
“while much liberality is allowed in construing pro se complaints, a pro se litigant cannot simply dump a stack of exhibits on the court and expect the court to sift through them to determine if some nugget is buried somewhere in that mountain of papers, waiting to be unearthed and refined into a cognizable claim.” · 15 citing courts
4
GREENKacz v. State, 287 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009).
cites § 9.51 5×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (a) (Vernon 2003).”
5
GREENState v. Attaway, 870 P.2d 103 (N.M. 1994).
cites § 9.51 2×cited by 264 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“§ 23A-35-8 (1988); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (West 1974); Utah Code Ann.”
The case’s holding
The determination of whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a deviation from the knock-and-announce rule is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review.
Later courts cite it for
“in new mexico, the ultimate question in all cases regarding alleged search and seizure violations is whether the search and seizure was reasonable.” · 11 citing courts
6
GREENDrew Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014).
cites § 9.51 2×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (a) (West 2011).”
The case’s holding
A movant must establish that jury misconduct occurred and was material and probably caused injury to warrant a new trial.
Later courts cite it for
“to warrant a new trial based on jury misconduct, the movant must establish not only that jury misconduct occurred, but also that it was material and probably caused injury.” · 6 citing courts
7
GREENFaust v. State, 491 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
cites § 9.51 2×subsections: (a) (c)cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a). It also authorizes, in limited circumstances, the use by an officer of deadly force.”
The case’s holding
A content-neutral police skirmish line separating groups for public safety during a parade is a lawful time, place, and manner restriction on protected speech.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no dispute that the protestors had a first amendment right to express their views in a public forum.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENAustin v. City of Pasadena, 74 F.4th 312 (5th Cir. 2023).
cites § 9.51 1×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“Rather, the evidence demonstrated the officers’ “handling of Shaw’s epileptic seizure and subsequent postictal state arose from their desire to establish physical control over Shaw in order to achieve a safe environment for emergency medical personnel to provide necessary care.”
The case’s holding
Qualified immunity does not protect officers who use excessive force or act with deliberate indifference by delaying emergency medical treatment for a detainee experiencing a medical emergency.
Later courts cite it for
“local governments are liable for a policy or custom that causes a constitutional injury under section 1983.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENJose Davila v. USA, 713 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2013).
cites § 9.51 1×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (a). As we have already established, the NPS Rangers’ use of force against Davila, Duarte, and Davila’s grandson was reasonable, given the totality of circumstances of the traffic stop.”
The case’s holding
The detention-of-goods exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act does not bar a false imprisonment claim when the alleged intentional tort occurs after the detention of goods ends.
Later courts cite it for
“as the party opposing dismissal and requesting discovery, the plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating the necessity of discovery.” · 7 citing courts
10
GREENDuran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 921 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996).
cites § 9.51 1×subsections: (a)(1)cited by 160 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“See TexPenal Code Ann. § 9.51(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 1994).”
The case’s holding
Summary judgment is improper when genuine issues of material fact exist regarding an agent's employment status and whether the agent acted within the scope of their authority.
11
GREENRamirez v. State, 822 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991).
cites § 9.51 2×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“Further, Gonzales’ arming himself in response to Rousett’s request for assistance was authorized under Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (Vernon 1974), which authorizes citizens to use force to assist an officer in making an arrest.”
12
GREENManzi v. State, 56 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001).
cites § 9.51 1×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“24 (Vernon 1977); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.51 (Vernon 1994).”
The case’s holding
Consent to search is voluntary under the totality of the circumstances when the State proves it by clear and convincing evidence, even if the consenting person was in custody and handcuffed.
13
GREENState v. Iduarte, 232 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007).
cites § 9.51 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“Additionally, appellee ran away from Officer Eddleman and into the unlighted apartment after Officer Eddleman told him that he was arresting him for public intoxication. Officer Eddleman certainly had the right, if not the duty, to follow appellee back into the apartment to…”
14
GREENVillafranca v. United States, 587 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2009).
cites § 9.51 1×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (b). Here, the district court found that Villafranca committed the crime of resisting arrest.”
The case’s holding
Federal agents sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act may invoke the Texas peace-officer force privilege, so reasonable force used in a lawful arrest is not actionable assault.
Later courts cite it for
“liability under the ftca is determined 'in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENCity of Dallas v. Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc., 883 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994).
cites § 9.51 1×subsections: (a)cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“TexPenal Code Ann. § 9.51(a)-(c) (Vernon 1974); see Newsom, 858 S.”
The case’s holding
An off-duty police officer becomes an on-duty officer exercising discretionary authority immediately upon observing a crime being committed.
Later courts cite it for
“an off-duty police officer who observes a crime immediately becomes an on-duty police officer.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENState of Texas v. City of Houston, 625 F. App'x 670 (5th Cir. 2015).
cites § 9.51 1×subsections: (a)cited by 19 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 9.51
“See Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a), (d) (defining the circumstances under which a peace officer may use deadly force), 31 .”
The case’s holding
Lethal force against a dog during a warrant search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where the dog is biting at officers' legs and aggressively barking, posing an imminent threat.
17
GREENBrock v. State, 295 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
cites § 9.51 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.51 -.53 (Vernon 2003).”
Later courts cite it for
“we review the trial court's decision regarding including a lesser-included offense in the jury charge for abuse of discretion.” · 4 citing courts
18
GREENCity of San Antonio v. Higle, 685 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984).
cites § 9.51 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“This section justifies the use of force by an officer when he believes the use of such force is immediately necessary to make or assist in the making of an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing an escape after arrest.”
19
GREENHolland ex rel. Holland v. City of Houston, 41 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
cites § 9.51 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“1996) (citing tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.51); see Fraire, 957 F.”
Later courts cite it for
“where the essence of a claim under the ttca arises from an intentional tort, allegations of negligence are insufficient to avoid the 101.057 exception to liability.” · 4 citing courts
20
GREENVasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992).
cites § 9.51 1×subsections: (a)cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 9.51
“2 When the suspect refused to stop and to “drop the gun” as ordered and continued to advance upon the officer, under the authority of section 9.”
Later courts cite it for
“qjuestions of the officer's individual negligence ... are immaterial when deciding whether the officer was performing discretionary functions.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198420042025

One bar per year. Tallest: 8 cases in 2009. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Tex. App.235th Cir.9S.D. Tex.4W.D. Tex.4Tex. Crim. App.2N.D. Tex.2D.N.J.1N.M.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 10 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)14 cases
Samtani v. City of Laredo, 274 F. Supp. 3d 695 (S.D. Tex. 2017).“”) (internal quotations omitted); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51 (The peace officer privilege can only be invoked if there is a “reasonable belief’ that the use of force is “necessary”).”
Faust v. State, 491 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).“Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a). It also authorizes, in limited circumstances, the use by an officer of deadly force.”
City of Dallas v. Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc., 883 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994).“TexPenal Code Ann. § 9.51(a)-(c) (Vernon 1974); see Newsom, 858 S.”
State of Texas v. City of Houston, 625 F. App'x 670 (5th Cir. 2015).“See Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(a), (d) (defining the circumstances under which a peace officer may use deadly force), 31 .”
Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992).“2 When the suspect refused to stop and to “drop the gun” as ordered and continued to advance upon the officer, under the authority of section 9.”
Showing the top 5 of 14. More in the list view →
(a)(1)2 cases
Duran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 921 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996).“See TexPenal Code Ann. § 9.51(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 1994).”
Victoria Lavigne Valdez v. State of Texas, No. 04-24-00479-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 6, 2025).
(a)(2)1 case
Cole v. Hunter, 497 F. Supp. 3d 172 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
(b)1 case
Villafranca v. United States, No. 08-10920 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2009).
(c)4 cases
Faust v. State, 491 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
Wicker v. City of Galveston, 944 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
Martin, Peter James, No. PD-1050-14 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 31, 2014).
Saldana v. USA, No. 99-51000 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2001).
(c)(2)2 cases
Juan Mendez, Sr. v. Taylor Poitevent, 823 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2016).“Tex. Penal Code § 9.51. Under that defense, if conduct is privileged, then it is not tortious.”
Irwin v. Santiago, No. 3:19-cv-02926 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2020).
(g)1 case
Sayantan Ghose v. State of Texas, No. 14-20-00314-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 3, 2022).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 89th Legislature (2025). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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