U.S. Code » Title 10 » Subtitle Subtitle A— General Military Law › Part PART II— PERSONNEL › Chapter CHAPTER 47— UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE › Subchapter SUBCHAPTER V— COMPOSITION OF COURTS-MARTIAL

10 U.S.C. § 822

Art. 22. Who may convene general courts-martial

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(a) General courts-martial may be convened by—(1) the President of the United States;(2) the Secretary of Defense;(3) the commanding officer of a unified or specified combatant command;(4) the Secretary concerned;(5) the commanding officer of an Army Group, an Army, an Army Corps, a division, a separate brigade, or a corresponding unit of the Army or Marine Corps;(6) the commander of a fleet; the commanding officer of a naval station or larger shore activity of the Navy beyond the United States;(7) the commanding officer of an air command, an air force, an air division, or a separate wing of the Air Force or Marine Corps, or the commanding officer of a corresponding unit of the Space Force;(8) any other commanding officer designated by the Secretary concerned; or(9) any other commanding officer in any of the armed forces when empowered by the President.(b)(1) If any such commanding officer is an accuser, the court shall be convened by superior competent authority, and may in any case be convened by such authority if considered desirable by him.(2) A commanding officer shall not be considered an accuser solely due to the role of the commanding officer in convening a general court-martial to which charges and specifications were referred by a special trial counsel in accordance with this chapter.(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 44; Pub. L. 99–433, title II, § 211(b), Oct. 1, 1986, 100 Stat. 1017; Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title X, § 1057(a)(2), Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3440; Pub. L. 114–328, div. E, title LV, § 5181, Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2899; Pub. L. 116–283, div. A, title IX, § 924(b)(21)(A), Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 3824; Pub. L. 117–81, div. A, title V, § 534(a), Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 1696.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Revised section

Source (U.S. Code)

Source (Statutes at Large)

822(a)

822(b)

50:586(a).

50:586(b).

May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (Art. 22), 64 Stat. 115.

Subsection (a)(2) is substituted for the words “the Secretary of a Department”.

In subsection (a)(4), the words “continental limits of the” are omitted, since section 101(1) of this title defines the United States to include the States and the District of Columbia.

In subsection (a)(6), the words “any other commanding officer” are substituted for the words “such other commanding officers as may be”.

In subsection (b), the word “If” is substituted for the word “When”. The words “if considered” are substituted for the words “when deemed”.

Editorial NotesAmendments

2021—Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 116–283 substituted “Marine Corps, or the commanding officer of a corresponding unit of the Space Force” for “Marine Corps”.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 117–81 designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).

2016—Subsec. (a)(6). Pub. L. 114–328 struck out “in chief” after “the commander”.

2006—Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 109–163 struck out “a Territorial Department,” before “an Army Group”.

1986—Subsec. (a)(2) to (9). Pub. L. 99–433 added pars. (2) and (3) and redesignated existing pars. (2) to (7) as (4) to (9), respectively.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2021 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 117–81 effective on the date that is two years after Dec. 27, 2021, and applicable with respect to offenses that occur after that date, with provisions for delayed effect and applicability if regulations are not prescribed by the President before the date that is two years after Dec. 27, 2021, see section 539C of Pub. L. 117–81, set out as a note under section 801 of this title.

Effective Date of 2016 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 114–328 effective on Jan. 1, 2019, as designated by the President, with implementing regulations and provisions relating to applicability to various situations, see section 5542 of Pub. L. 114–328 and Ex. Ord. No. 13825, set out as notes under section 801 of this title.

Training for Sexual Assault Initial Disposition Authorities on Exercise of Disposition Authority for Sexual Assault and Collateral Offenses

Pub. L. 116–92, div. A, title V, § 540A, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1365, provided that:“(a)In General.—The training for sexual assault initial disposition authorities on the exercise of disposition authority under chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), shall include comprehensive training on the exercise of disposition authority with respect to cases for which disposition authority is withheld to such authorities pursuant to the memorandum described in subsection (b) for the purpose of promoting confidence and trust in the military justice process with respect to such cases.“(b)Memorandum Described.—The memorandum described in this subsection is the memorandum of the Secretary of Defense titled ‘Withholding Initial Disposition Authority Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice in Certain Sexual Assault Cases’ and dated April 20, 2012, or any successor memorandum.”

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 119 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1958–2025 · leading case: United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
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United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242 (C.A.A.F. 2017). · cites it 2× “Ar- ticle 22(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (b) (2012). “The term ‘ac- cuser’ means a person who signs and swears to charges, any person who directs that charges nominally be signed and sworn to by another, and any other person who has an inter- est other than an official interest in…”
United States v. Hutchins, 72 M.J. 294 (C.A.A.F. 2013). · cites it 2× “See Article 22, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2006); Mullan v. United States, 42 Ct.”
United States v. Yates, 28 M.J. 60 (1989). · cites it 3× “22(a)(8), UCMJ, 10 USC § 822 (a)(8), and its language “designated by the Secretary concerned.”
United States v. Nealy, 71 M.J. 73 (C.A.A.F. 2012). · cites it 2× “M) 504, that it was convened by an unqualified authority, Article 22(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (a) (2006), or that there was “any defect in the court’s jurisdiction over the originally preferred charge,” United States v.”
Loving v. United States, 64 M.J. 132 (C.A.A.F. 2006). · cites it 2× “See Articles 22 and 23, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822 , 823 (2000) (designating officials authorized to “convene” general and special courts-martial).”
United States v. Best, 61 M.J. 376 (C.A.A.F. 2005). · cites it 2× “Congress has established statutory qualifications for convening authorities (Articles 22, 23, 24, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822 , 823, 824 (2000)), court members (Article 25, UCMJ, 10 U.”
United States v. Adams, 66 M.J. 255 (C.A.A.F. 2008). · cites it 2× “See Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 822 , 823, 824, 825 (2000). A convening authority’s actions create the structural basis of a courts-martial and when the plain language of the convening authority’s order is clear, complete, and…”
United States v. Jeter, 35 M.J. 442 (1992). · cites it 2× “In describing who may convene a general court-martial, Article 22(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 822 (a), refers to various commanding officers; and then Article 22(b) provides, “If any such commanding officer is an accuser, the court shall be convened by superior competent authority, and…”
United States v. Schweitzer, 68 M.J. 133 (C.A.A.F. 2009). “§ 801 (9) (1994), 2 such as to disqualify him from referring the charges to a court-martial under Article 22, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (1994). The military judge ruled, during a joint session, that LtGen Pace was not an accuser in these cases.”
United States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57 (C.A.A.F. 2006). · cites it 2× “31 Articles 22, 23, and 24, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822 , 823, 824 (2000). 32 See, e.”
United States v. Weiss, 36 M.J. 224 (1992). “22, 23, and 24, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 822 , 823, and 824, respectively (prescribing who may convene courts-martial).”
United States v. Dinges, 55 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 2001). · cites it 2× “22(b) and 23(b), UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 822 (b) and 823(b). Moreover, Professor Davis describes an accuser as one who “initiates a charge out of a hostile animus toward the accused or a personal interest adverse to him.”
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