10 U.S.C. § 823
Art. 23. Who may convene special courts-martial
Historical and Revision Notes | ||
|---|---|---|
Revised section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
823(a) 823(b) | 50:587(a). 50:587(b). | May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (Art. 23), 64 Stat. 115. |
In subsection (a)(7), the words “Secretary concerned” are substituted for the words “Secretary of a Department”.
In subsection (b), the word “If” is substituted for the word “When”. The words “if considered” are substituted for the words “when deemed”.
2021—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 117–81, § 1081(a)(13), inserted comma after “Army”.
Pub. L. 116–283, § 924(b)(21)(B)(i), substituted “Air Force or Space Force military installation” for “Air Force base” and “the Air Force, or the Space Force” for “or the Air Force”.
Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 116–283, § 924(b)(21)(B)(ii), inserted “or a corresponding unit of the Space Force” after “Air Force”.
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 117–81, § 534(b), designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).
Amendment by section 534(b) of Pub. L. 117–81 effective on the date that is two years after
For transfer of authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the Coast Guard, including the authorities and functions of the Secretary of Transportation relating thereto, to the Department of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 468(b), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 65
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1958–2022 · leading case: Richard E. Brown, on Behalf of Himself & All Others Similarly Situated v. United States of Am., Richard E. Brown & David l.taylor, 508 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir. 1975).
Richard E. Brown, on Behalf of Himself & All Others Similarly Situated v. United States of Am., Richard E. Brown & David l.taylor, 508 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir. 1975). “JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge: This is a class action brought by individuals who were convicted by special courts-martial that were convened by officers in the United States Navy and Marine Corps under what the United States Court of Military Appeals subsequently held was an…”
United States v. Wiesen, 57 M.J. 48 (C.A.A.F. 2002). “23(a)(3), UCMJ, 10 USC § 823 (a)(3). Based on the size of 9 United States v.”
United States v. Blaylock, 15 M.J. 190 (1983). “Likewise, in the case at bar, we hold that, since General Palmer, the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction, was empowered by Article 23(a)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (a)(1), to convene special courts-martial, no “jurisdictional” error existed — even if he…”
Brown v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1973). “This special court-martial was ostensibly convened pursuant to the authority of 10 U.S.C. § 823 (a)(7) which grants special courts-martial convening authority to “the commanding officer or officer in charge of any .”
United States v. Jette, 25 M.J. 16 (1987). “We hold that Colonel Kimball was authorized by Article 23(a)(4), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (a)(4), to act as a convening authority *17 in this case.”
United States v. Jeter, 35 M.J. 442 (1992). “23(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 823 (b) (applies a similar provision to special courts-martial).”
United States v. Hardy, 4 M.J. 20 (1977). “So, our inquiry narrows to whether the general court-martial convening authority had the power to order his subordinate to withdraw a case from an inferior court-martial to which that subordinate had already referred it through a valid exercise of the latter’s authority under…”
United States v. Yates, 28 M.J. 60 (1989). “23(a)(7), UCMJ, 10 USC § 823 (a)(7). True, the convening authority’s power in this case is based on a similar statutory provision, Art.”
United States v. Caputo, 18 M.J. 259 (1984). “I therefore can only record my own doubts and misgivings and strongly urge Congress to clarify its intentions in this highly significant area of military law.”
United States v. Ortiz, 16 C.M.A. 127 (1966). “the Commanding Officer, 2d Bridge Company, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, did not possess the inherent authority under Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 23, 10 USC § 823 , to appoint a special court-martial, nor had the Secretary of the Navy authorized him,…”
United States v. Voorhees, 50 M.J. 494 (C.A.A.F. 1999). “Article 23, UCMJ, 10 USC § 823 , delineates those commanding officers or officers in charge who are authorized to convene a special court-martial.”
United States v. Ridley, 22 M.J. 43 (1986). “ARY REVIEW CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT’S SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL LACKED JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE CONVENING AUTHORITY WAS JUNIOR IN RANK TO THE ACCUSER WHERE THE ACCUSER, WHO HAD NO AUTHORITY TO CONVENE COURTS-MARTIAL, COMMANDED A SUBORDINATE UNIT ATTACHED TO THE CONVENING…”
United States v. Fernandez, 24 M.J. 77 (1987). “Disqualification of this convening authority under Article 23(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (b), was not reasonably raised in this case.”
United States v. Kohut, 44 M.J. 245 (C.A.A.F. 1996). “We hold that the convening authority in this case had jurisdiction under Article 23, UCMJ, 10 USC § 823 , to lawfully convene appellant’s special court-martial.”
United States v. Lewis, 34 M.J. 745 (1991). “3 Article 23(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (b); R.C.M. 504(c); United States v.”
United States v. Grindstaff, 45 M.J. 634 (N.M.C.C.A. 1997). “23, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (listing special court-martial convening authorities).”
United States v. Shiner, 40 M.J. 155 (1994). “Article 23(b) provides that if an officer described in Article 23(a) “is an accuser, the court shall be convened by superior competent authority, and may in any ease be convened by such authority if considered advisable by him.”
McKinney v. Jarvis, 46 M.J. 870 (A.C.C.A. 1997). “Articles 23(a) and 24(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 823 (a) and 824(a) (1988) [hereinafter UCMJ].”
United States v. Ortiz, 15 C.M.A. 505 (1965). “f Military Justice, Article 23, 10 USC § 823 . Code, supra, Article 23, provides pertinently as follows: “ (a) Special courts-martial may be convened by— (1) any person who may convene a general court-martial; (2) the commanding officer of a district, garrison, fort, camp,…”
United States v. Brown, 40 M.J. 625 (1994). “23, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (1988). Subsequently, the appellant’s defense counsel proposed a pretrial agreement whereby the appellant would waive an Article 32 pretrial investigation 2 and plead guilty at a general court-martial in exchange for a limitation on confinement and mitigation…”
United States v. Greenwell, 19 C.M.A. 460 (1970). “Authority to convene a special court-martial is specifically delineated in Article 23, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 823 , 1 the pertinent portions of which provide: *461 “(a) Special courts-martial maybe convened by— (7) the commanding officer or officer in charge…”
United States v. Corcoran, 17 M.J. 137 (1984). “” “Accuser” is defined by Article 1(9), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 801 (9), as “a person who signs and swears to charges, any person who directs that charges nominally be signed and sworn to by another, and any other person who has an interest other than an official interest in the…”
United States v. O'Connor, 19 M.J. 673 (1984). “, Article 23(a)(4), 10 U.S.C. § 823 (a)(4). . Air Force Regulation 35-54 (15 September 1981), Rank, Precedence, and Command.”
United States v. Martinez, 11 C.M.A. 224 (1960). “Article 23(a) (1), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 823 . And inasmuch as the case at bar is noncapital, and since there is no mandatory punishment for accused’s offenses which is beyond the authority of a special court-martial to impose, there can be no question but…”
United States v. Watson, 37 M.J. 166 (1993). “23(a)(5), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 823 (a)(5). He does not have authority to convene general courts-martial unless the secretary of his service grants it.”
United States v. Egan, 53 M.J. 570 (A.C.C.A. 2000). “Article 23(a)(6), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (a)(6), confers authority to convene special courts-martial on the “commanding officer of any separate or detached command or group of detached units of any of the armed forces placed under a single commander for this purpose.”
United States v. Jette, 22 M.J. 803 (1985). “, 10 U.S.C. § 823 . The rules by which command devolves are determined by the Secretary of the Air Force and are found in Air Force Regulation 35-54, Rank, Precedence, and Command (15 September 1981), paragraphs 10 and 18; RCM 504(b)(1), Discussion.”
United States v. Surtasky, 16 C.M.A. 241 (1966). “” At the same time, pursuant to his authority under Article 23(a)(7), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 823 , the Secretary invested Head with authority to convene special courts-martial for the trial of enlisted personnel of the command.”
United States v. Brewick, 47 M.J. 730 (N.M.C.C.A. 1997). “The commander of the unit had authority under Article 23(a)(5), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (a)(5), to convene a special court-martial and refer a case to trial.”
United States v. Cunningham, 21 C.M.A. 144 (1971). “Authority to convene a special court-martial is specifically delineated in Article 23, Uniform Code of Mil *145 itary Justice, 10 USC § 823 , 1 the pertinent portions of which provide: “(a) Special courts-martial may be convened by— (7) the commanding officer or officer in…”
United States v. Talty, 17 M.J. 1127 (1984). “It is clear that the Commanding Officer, USS NATHANEAL GREENE, was empowered to convene the court, Article 23, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 823 , and that appellant was amenable to trial by court-martial.”
United States v. Brinston, 28 M.J. 631 (1989). “On 7 September 1988, the commander of the 2854th Air Base Group came within the purview of Article 23(a)(4), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (a)(4), and was empowered to convene special courts-martial.”
United States v. McElwee, 16 C.M.A. 586 (1967). “Articles 23(a) and 65(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 823 and 865. This line of approach is bottomed upon Article 65(b) of the Uniform Code.”
United States v. Barry, 57 M.J. 799 (A.C.C.A. 2002). “23(a)(2), 10 U.S.C. § 823 (a)(2). . United States v.”
Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1973). “§ 822 , special courts-martial, Article 23, 10 U.S.C. § 823 , and summary courts-martial, Article 24, 10 U.”
United States v. Harrington, 23 M.J. 788 (1987). “Another case cited by the government is not applicable because the accuser outranked the convening authority and was disqualified under the provisions of Article 23(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 823 (b). United States v. Ridley, 22 M.”
United States v. Almy, 37 M.J. 465 (1993). “We hold that the Secretary of Transportation’s 1987 designation of “Commanding Officers of all Coast Guard units” as special court-martial convening authorities was not a delegation of secretarial authority under Article 23(a)(7), UCMJ, 10 USC § 823 (a)(7), as to then-existing…”
United States v. McGary, 9 C.M.A. 244 (1958). “The fact remains that he acted initially as special court-martial convening authority and subsequently as the supervisory authority.”
United States v. Ridley, 18 M.J. 806 (1984).
United States v. Delp, 31 M.J. 645 (1990).
United States v. Byers, 34 M.J. 923 (1992). “Unfortunately, the factual distinction between the accuser and unlawful command influence lines of cases has been blurred.”
United States v. Watson, 35 M.J. 602 (1992). “§ 823 (a)(4) (1988), and service regulations concerning the assumption of command when an officer who had temporarily but properly relieved the commanding officer of a combat support group was himself relieved when the commanding officer returned and purported to amend the…”
United States v. Woodward, 16 C.M.A. 266 (1966).
United States v. Newlove, 59 M.J. 540 (A.C.C.A. 2003).
Jones v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
United States v. Walker, 20 C.M.A. 79 (1970).
United States v. Banks, 4 M.J. 620 (1977).
United States v. Busse, 6 M.J. 832 (1979).
United States v. O'Quin, 16 M.J. 650 (1983).
States v. Duvall, 7 M.J. 832 (1979).
United States v. Bloss, 11 M.J. 641 (1981).
United States v. Almy, 34 M.J. 1082 (1992).
United States v. DeBarrows, 41 M.J. 710 (1995).
United States v. Shelton, 26 M.J. 787 (1988).
United States v. Haygood, 12 C.M.A. 481 (1961).
United States v. Riley, 20 C.M.A. 145 (1970).
United States v. Bloomer, 21 C.M.A. 28 (1971).
United States v. Gilfilen, 6 M.J. 699 (1978). “Appellant now contends that Captain Weir, the normal special court-martial convening authority, is an “accuser,” and that under Article 23(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C § 823(b), appellant’s court-martial lawfully could be convened only “by superior competent…”
United States v. Hevner, 20 C.M.A. 80 (1970).
United States v. Brown, 15 M.J. 620 (1982).
Reid v. United States (Fed. Cl. 2022).
United States v. Private E1 JAMES D. GREENLEE (A.C.C.A. 2011).
United States v. Hundley, 56 M.J. 858 (N.M.C.C.A. 2002).
United States v. King, 16 C.M.A. 142 (1966).
United States v. Sims, 20 C.M.A. 256 (1971).
— 10 U.S.C. § 823(b) — 1 case
United States v. Gilfilen, 6 M.J. 699 (1978). “Appellant now contends that Captain Weir, the normal special court-martial convening authority, is an “accuser,” and that under Article 23(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C § 823(b), appellant’s court-martial lawfully could be convened only “by superior competent…”
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