10 U.S.C. § 824

Art. 24. Who may convene summary courts-martial

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 10 CasesGoogle Scholar
(a) Summary courts-martial may be convened by—(1) any person who may convene a general or special court-martial;(2) the commanding officer of a detached company, or other detachment of the Army;(3) the commanding officer of a detached squadron or other detachment of the Air Force or a corresponding unit of the Space Force; or(4) the commanding officer or officer in charge of any other command when empowered by the Secretary concerned.(b) When only one commissioned officer is present with a command or detachment he shall be the summary court-martial of that command or detachment and shall hear and determine all summary court-martial cases brought before him. Summary courts-martial may, however, be convened in any case by superior competent authority when considered desirable by him.(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 45; Pub. L. 116–283, div. A, title IX, § 924(b)(21)(C), Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 3824.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Revised section

Source (U.S. Code)

Source (Statutes at Large)

824(a)

824(b)

50:588(a).

50:588(b).

May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (Art. 24), 64 Stat. 116.

In subsection (a)(4), the words “Secretary concerned” are substituted for the words “Secretary of a Department”.

In subsection (b), the words “only one commissioned” are substituted for the words “but one” for clarity. The word “considered” is substituted for the word “deemed”.

Editorial NotesAmendments

2021—Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 116–283 inserted “or a corresponding unit of the Space Force” after “Air Force”.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1965–2026 · leading case: United States v. Bartee, 76 M.J. 141 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Bartee, 76 M.J. 141 (C.A.A.F. 2017). · cites it 2× “Is this systemic exclusion based on rank re- versible error? We conclude that there was no systemic exclusion of mem- bers based on rank and that the convening authority did not violate Article 25, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 824 (2012). According- ly, we affirm the decisions of the…”
United States v. Blaylock, 15 M.J. 190 (1983). “Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 824 . . Articles 22 and 24 use the word “desirable,” while Article 23 uses the word “advisable.”
United States v. Ortiz, 15 C.M.A. 505 (1965). “It must be construed in light of Code, supra, Article 24, 10 USC § 824 , vesting appointing authority for summary courts-martial in all commanders authorized to convene special courts-martial and also specifically giving such powers to commanders of separate company-sized units…”
In Re Childress, 561 N.E.2d 614 (Ill. 1990). “Petitioner was also the subject of a summary court martial proceeding ( 10 U.S.C. §824 (1988)) for stealing the wallet of another soldier, and he served 30 days’ confinement for the offense.”
United States v. Centeno, 17 M.J. 642 (1983). “The emphasized portion of the quoted language supports the proposition that no one specific officer in command was the only officer in command, possessing the requisite Article 24, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.A. § 824 authority, who could receive charges.”
United States v. Hilton, 29 M.J. 1036 (1990). “The Court took judicial notice that, unless there is evidence in the record to the contrary (there was none in that case), command judge advocates are not officers exercising summary court-martial authority.”
Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1973). “§ 823 , and summary courts-martial, Article 24, 10 U.S.C. § 824 . Moreover, the convening authority has the authority to appoint the members of the court, Article 25, 10 U.”
United States v. Jones, 15 M.J. 890 (1983). “The summary court-martial convening authority may be the same or a superior commanding officer, see Article 24, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 824 . He is subject to the same basic considerations as the immediate commanding officer and will “ordinarily” dispose of the charges in a similar…”
United States v. Miner, 23 M.J. 694 (1986). “, 10 U.S.C. § 824 (a)(4). To determine whether Colonel W was a group commander and, therefore, empowered to convene the special court-martial which tried appellant we must turn to the regulatory provisions regarding devolution of command promulgated by the Secretary of the Air…”
United States v. DeBarrows, 41 M.J. 710 (1995). “The Secretary decided that all Coast Guard commanding officers, no matter what type of command, should at least be SpCM CAs, but declined to give SpCM CA to officers in charge under Article 23(a)(7) or to create any SCM-only CAs under Article 24(a)(4), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 824…”
United States v. Bierley, 23 M.J. 557 (1986). “Article 24(a)(4), 10 U.S.C. § 824 (a)(4), U.C.M.J. . Colonel W was the senior assigned officer eligible to assume command of the 27th Combat Support Group on 22 February 1986.”
United States v. Tucker, 17 M.J. 1004 (1984). “Article 24(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 824 (b) provides . .. Summary courts-martial may, however, be convened in any case by superior competent authority when considered desirable by him.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.