U.S. Code » Title 10 » Subtitle Subtitle A— General Military Law › Part PART II— PERSONNEL › Chapter CHAPTER 47— UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE › Subchapter SUBCHAPTER X— PUNITIVE ARTICLES

10 U.S.C. § 920b

Art. 120b. Rape and sexual assault of a child

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 10 CasesGoogle Scholar
(a)Rape of a Child.—Any person subject to this chapter who—(1) commits a sexual act upon a child who has not attained the age of 12 years; or(2) commits a sexual act upon a child who has attained the age of 12 years by—(A) using force against any person;(B) threatening or placing that child in fear;(C) rendering that child unconscious; or(D) administering to that child a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance;is guilty of rape of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.(b)Sexual Assault of a Child.—Any person subject to this chapter who commits a sexual act upon a child who has attained the age of 12 years is guilty of sexual assault of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.(c)Sexual Abuse of a Child.—Any person subject to this chapter who commits a lewd act upon a child is guilty of sexual abuse of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.(d)Age of Child.—(1)Under 12 years.—In a prosecution under this section, it need not be proven that the accused knew the age of the other person engaging in the sexual act or lewd act. It is not a defense that the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 12 years.(2)Under 16 years.—In a prosecution under this section, it need not be proven that the accused knew that the other person engaging in the sexual act or lewd act had not attained the age of 16 years, but it is a defense in a prosecution under subsection (b) (sexual assault of a child) or subsection (c) (sexual abuse of a child), which the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 16 years, if the child had in fact attained at least the age of 12 years.(e)Proof of Threat.—In a prosecution under this section, in proving that a person made a threat, it need not be proven that the person actually intended to carry out the threat or had the ability to carry out the threat.(f)Consent.—Lack of consent is not an element and need not be proven in any prosecution under this section. A child cannot consent to any sexual act, lewd act, or use of force.(g)Definitions.—In this section:(1)Sexual act and sexual contact.—The terms “sexual act” and “sexual contact” have the meanings given those terms in section 920(g) of this title (article 120(g)), except that the term “sexual act” also includes the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.(2)Force.—The term “force” means—(A) the use of a weapon;(B) the use of such physical strength or violence as is sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a child; or(C) inflicting physical harm.In the case of a parent-child or similar relationship, the use or abuse of parental or similar authority is sufficient to constitute the use of force.(3)Threatening or placing that child in fear.—The term “threatening or placing that child in fear” means a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to cause the child to fear that non-compliance will result in the child or another person being subjected to the action contemplated by the communication or action.(4)Child.—The term “child” means any person who has not attained the age of 16 years.(5)Lewd act.—The term “lewd act” means—(A) any sexual contact with a child;(B) intentionally exposing one’s genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple to a child by any means, including via any communication technology, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person;(C) intentionally communicating indecent language to a child by any means, including via any communication technology, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or(D) any indecent conduct, intentionally done with or in the presence of a child, including via any communication technology, that amounts to a form of immorality relating to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, and tends to excite sexual desire or deprave morals with respect to sexual relations.(Added Pub. L. 112–81, div. A, title V, § 541(b), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1407; amended Pub. L. 112–239, div. A, title X, § 1076(a)(3), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 1948; Pub. L. 114–328, div. E, title LX, § 5430(c), Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2950; Pub. L. 118–159, div. A, title V, § 565, Dec. 23, 2024, 138 Stat. 1904.)Editorial NotesAmendments

2024—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 118–159 redesignated subsec. (g) as (f), struck out “not legally married to the person committing the sexual act, lewd act, or use of force” before “cannot consent to any sexual act”, and struck out former subsec. (f). Prior to amendment, text of subsec. (f) read as follows: “In a prosecution under subsection (b) (sexual assault of a child) or subsection (c) (sexual abuse of a child), it is a defense, which the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the persons engaging in the sexual act or lewd act were at that time married to each other, except where the accused commits a sexual act upon the person when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the sexual act is occurring or when the other person is incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, and that condition was known or reasonably should have been known by the accused.”

Subsecs. (g), (h). Pub. L. 118–159, § 565(2), redesignated subsec. (h) as (g). Former subsec. (g) redesignated (f).

2016—Subsec. (h)(1). Pub. L. 114–328 inserted before period at end “, except that the term ‘sexual act’ also includes the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person”.

2013—Pub. L. 112–239 made technical amendment to directory language of Pub. L. 112–81, which enacted this section.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2016 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 114–328 effective on Jan. 1, 2019, as designated by the President, with implementing regulations and provisions relating to applicability to various situations, see section 5542 of Pub. L. 114–328 and Ex. Ord. No. 13825, set out as notes under section 801 of this title.

Effective Date of 2013 Amendment

Pub. L. 112–239, div. A, title X, § 1076(a), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 1947, provided that the amendment made by section 1076(a)(3) is effective Dec. 31, 2011, and as if included in Pub. L. 112–81 as enacted.

Effective Date

Amendment by Pub. L. 112–81 effective 180 days after Dec. 31, 2011, and applicable with respect to offenses committed on or after such effective date, see section 541(f) of Pub. L. 112–81, set out as an Effective Date of 2011 Amendment note under section 843 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 319 cases (127 in the last 5 years), 2013–2026 · leading case: United States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564 (A.F.C.C.A. 2017).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
United States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564 (A.F.C.C.A. 2017). · cites it 4× “He was also convicted, contrary to his pleas, of attempting to knowingly persuade, induce or entice a person he believed to be a child who had not yet attained the age of 18 years to engage in sexual activity which, if undertaken, would constitute a criminal offense under…”
United States v. Johnston, 75 M.J. 563 (N.M.C.C.A. 2016). · cites it 3× “PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT MARKS, Judge: A panel of members with enlisted representation, sitting as a general court-martial, found the appellant guilty, contrary to his pleas, of four specifications of sexual abuse of a child and one specification of indecent exposure, in…”
United States v. Specialist CEY BRISTOL J. WILLIAMS, 75 M.J. 663 (A.C.C.A. 2016). · cites it 2× “11 The analysis section of the 2012 adoption of Article 120b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920b, in the Manual states: The new “Sexual Abuse of a Child” offense .”
United States v. Kearns, 73 M.J. 177 (C.A.A.F. 2014). “3136, 3257 (2006)) (the punitive articles under which Appellant was charged have been replaced or superseded by Article 120b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920b (2012)). Texas statutes also criminalize the act of sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person between the ages of…”
United States v. Sergeant FRANCIS A. CARISTA, 76 M.J. 511 (A.C.C.A. 2017). “BACKGROUND A general court-martial consisting of a military judge sitting alone convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of lewd acts with JG, a child under the age of 12, in violation of Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920b…”
United States v. Murphy, 942 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2019). “See 10 U.S.C. § 920b(b). This statute provides as an affirmative defense ʺthat the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 16 years.”
United States v. Busch, 75 M.J. 87 (C.A.A.F. 2016). “2 Appellant was convicted of sexual abuse of a child in 2013 under the 2011 version of Article 120b(e), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920b(c) (2012). During the plea inquiry, the military judge asked the parties for their views on the maximum authorized…”
United States v. Fetrow, 75 M.J. 574 (A.F.C.C.A. 2016). “Appellant was found not guilty of four specifications of sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Article 120b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920b. Appellant was also found not guilty of a specification of aggravated sexual contact with a child, abusive sexual contact with a child, and…”
United States v. Hendrix, 76 M.J. 283 (C.A.A.F. 2017). “Contrary to Appellant’s pleas, a general court-martial with enlisted representation convicted Appellant of one specification of sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Article *285 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920b (2012). Appellant’s adjudged and…”
United States v. Robinson, 76 M.J. 663 (A.F.C.C.A. 2017). “PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT SANTORO, Judge: Officer and enlisted members sitting as a general court-martial convicted Appellant, contrary to his plea, of one specification of intentionally communicating indecent language to a child under age 16 in violation of Article 120b,…”
United States v. Mooney, 76 M.J. 545 (A.F.C.C.A. 2017). “PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT DUBRISKE, Senior Judge: Consistent with his pleas pursuant to a pretrial agreement (PTA), Appellant was convicted by a military judge sitting alone of one specification of sexual assault of a child and one specification of sexual abuse of a child,…”
United States v. Slape, 76 M.J. 501 (A.F.C.C.A. 2016). “guilty by a military judge sitting alone of two specifications of abusive sexual contact by committing lewd acts upon a child under the age of 16, in violation of Article 120b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920b. Specifically, the military judge found that on divers occasions between on or…”
Show all 319 citing cases →
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(a) — 4 cases
United States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564 (A.F.C.C.A. 2017). “He was also convicted, contrary to his pleas, of attempting to knowingly persuade, induce or entice a person he believed to be a child who had not yet attained the age of 18 years to engage in sexual activity which, if undertaken, would constitute a criminal offense under…”
United States v. Baas (N.M.C.C.A. 2019).
United States v. Driskill (A.F.C.C.A. 2022).
United States v. MAESE (N.M.C.C.A. 2025).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(a)(2) — 2 cases
United States v. Patterson (A.F.C.C.A. 2024).
United States v. Patterson (C.A.A.F. 2025).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(b) — 8 cases
United States v. Murphy, 942 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2019). “See 10 U.S.C. § 920b(b). This statute provides as an affirmative defense ʺthat the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 16 years.”
Alan Dorrbecker v. Kevin Howard (4th Cir. 2026).
United States v. Thompson (A.F.C.C.A. 2023).
United States v. Sorrells (N.M.C.C.A. 2019).
United States v. Grubbs (N.M.C.C.A. 2019).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(c) — 31 cases
United States v. Busch, 75 M.J. 87 (C.A.A.F. 2016). “2 Appellant was convicted of sexual abuse of a child in 2013 under the 2011 version of Article 120b(e), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920b(c) (2012). During the plea inquiry, the military judge asked the parties for their views on the maximum authorized…”
United States v. Schmidt (C.A.A.F. 2022).
United States v. Wheeler (C.A.A.F. 2018).
United States v. Schmidt (N.M.C.C.A. 2020).
United States v. Schmidt (N.M.C.C.A. 2020).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(d)(1) — 1 case
United States v. DAVIS (N.M.C.C.A. 2025).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(d)(2) — 3 cases
United States v. Simmons (A.F.C.C.A. 2019).
United States v. Thompson (A.F.C.C.A. 2023).
United States v. ARMAO (N.M.C.C.A. 2023).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(g) — 1 case
United States v. Simmons (C.A.A.F. 2022).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(g)(5)(C) — 1 case
United States v. FULSOM (N.M.C.C.A. 2026).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(h)(1) — 4 cases
United States v. Kuhse (A.F.C.C.A. 2018).
United States v. Kitchen (A.F.C.C.A. 2023).
United States v. Patterson (A.F.C.C.A. 2024).
United States v. Baumgartner (A.F.C.C.A. 2025).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(h)(2) — 1 case
United States v. Patterson (A.F.C.C.A. 2024).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(h)(2)(B) — 1 case
United States v. Baumgartner (A.F.C.C.A. 2025).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(h)(4) — 2 cases
United States v. Scott (A.F.C.C.A. 2019).
United States v. DAVIS (N.M.C.C.A. 2025).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(h)(5) — 2 cases
United States v. Scott (A.F.C.C.A. 2019).
United States v. Kitchen (A.F.C.C.A. 2023).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(h)(5)(A) — 1 case
United States v. Baumgartner (A.F.C.C.A. 2025).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(h)(5)(B) — 5 cases
United States v. Johnston, 75 M.J. 563 (N.M.C.C.A. 2016). “PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT MARKS, Judge: A panel of members with enlisted representation, sitting as a general court-martial, found the appellant guilty, contrary to his pleas, of four specifications of sexual abuse of a child and one specification of indecent exposure, in…”
United States v. Miller (A.F.C.C.A. 2021).
United States v. Lopez (N.M.C.C.A. 2019).
United States v. Baumgartner (A.F.C.C.A. 2025).
United States v. DAVIS (N.M.C.C.A. 2025).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(h)(5)(C) — 4 cases
United States v. Folts (A.F.C.C.A. 2024).
United States v. Wilson-Crow (A.F.C.C.A. 2016).
United States v. Harrower (A.F.C.C.A. 2018).
United States v. Chief Warrant Officer Two JONATHAN K. CUNNINGHAM (A.C.C.A. 2025).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(h)(5)(D) — 7 cases
United States v. Schmidt (C.A.A.F. 2022).
United States v. Folts (A.F.C.C.A. 2024).
United States v. Schmidt (N.M.C.C.A. 2020).
United States v. Schmidt (N.M.C.C.A. 2020).
United States v. Cabuhat (A.F.C.C.A. 2023).
— 10 U.S.C. § 920b(j) — 1 case
United States v. Busch (A.F.C.C.A. 2015).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.