11 U.S.C. § 328

Limitation on compensation of professional persons

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(a) The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, with the court’s approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person under section 327 or 1103 of this title, as the case may be, on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, on a fixed or percentage fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis. Notwithstanding such terms and conditions, the court may allow compensation different from the compensation provided under such terms and conditions after the conclusion of such employment, if such terms and conditions prove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions.(b) If the court has authorized a trustee to serve as an attorney or accountant for the estate under section 327(d) of this title, the court may allow compensation for the trustee’s services as such attorney or accountant only to the extent that the trustee performed services as attorney or accountant for the estate and not for performance of any of the trustee’s duties that are generally performed by a trustee without the assistance of an attorney or accountant for the estate.(c) Except as provided in section 327(c), 327(e), or 1107(b) of this title, the court may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses of a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title if, at any time during such professional person’s employment under section 327 or 1103 of this title, such professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on which such professional person is employed.(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2563; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, § 431, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 370; Pub. L. 109–8, title XII, § 1206, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 194.)Historical and Revision Noteslegislative statements

Section 328(c) adopts a technical amendment contained in the Senate amendment indicating that an attorney for the debtor in possession is not disqualified for compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses simply because of prior representation of the debtor.

senate report no. 95–989

This section, which is parallel to section 326, fixes the maximum compensation allowable to a professional person employed under section 327. It authorizes the trustee, with the court’s approval, to employ professional persons on any reasonable terms, including on a retainer, on an hourly or on a contingent fee basis. Subsection (a) further permits the court to allow compensation different from the compensation provided under the trustee’s agreement if the prior agreement proves to have been improvident in light of development unanticipatable at the time of the agreement. The court’s power includes the power to increase as well as decrease the agreed upon compensation. This provision is permissive, not mandatory, and should not be used by the court if to do so would violate the code of ethics of the professional involved.

Subsection (b) limits a trustee that has been authorized to serve as his own counsel to only one fee for each service. The purpose of permitting the trustee to serve as his own counsel is to reduce costs. It is not included to provide the trustee with a bonus by permitting him to receive two fees for the same service or to avoid the maxima fixed in section 326. Thus, this subsection requires the court to differentiate between the trustee’s services as trustee, and his services as trustee’s counsel, and to fix compensation accordingly. Services that a trustee normally performs for an estate without assistance of counsel are to be compensated under the limits fixed in section 326. Only services that he performs that are normally performed by trustee’s counsel may be compensated under the maxima imposed by this section.

Subsection (c) permits the court to deny compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses if the professional person is not disinterested or if he represents or holds an interest adverse to the estate on the matter on which he is employed. The subsection provides a penalty for conflicts of interest.

Editorial NotesAmendments

2005—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 109–8 inserted “on a fixed or percentage fee basis,” after “hourly basis,”.

1984—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–353 substituted “not capable of being anticipated” for “unanticipatable”.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2005 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 109–8 effective 180 days after Apr. 20, 2005, and not applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before such effective date, except as otherwise provided, see section 1501 of Pub. L. 109–8, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.

Effective Date of 1984 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–353 effective with respect to cases filed 90 days after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Pub. L. 98–353, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 659 cases (79 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case: Matter of Liberal Market, Inc.
Matter of Liberal Market, Inc. (1982) ohsb · cites it 14× “11 U.S.C. §§ 328 , 329 and 330. In a manner of speaking, it is the duty of the Court to insure that the debtor receives what was “bargained for.”
In Re Frank Pio Crivello, Debtor. Kravit, Gass & Weber, S.C. v. M. Scott Michel, United States Trustee (1998) ca7 · cites it 10× “We agree with the lower courts’ conclusion that bankruptcy courts have discretion to deny fees under 11 U.S.C. § 328 (c) for professionals employed under 11 U.”
Unsecured Creditors' Committee, Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin Financial Advisors, Inc. v. Pelofsky (In Re Thermadyne H (2002) bap8 · cites it 13× “Trustee was the only party that continued to object to the indemnification and exculpa *754 tion provisions, arguing that the provisions were per se inconsistent with the notions of professionalism, they placed creditors at risk of financial injury, and they could not be…”
In Re Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc. (2000) mdb · cites it 12× “Rather, Berlack argued, the court would be restricted to the standards of 11 U.S.C. § 328 (a). Berlack suggested that the court allow the employment of Snyder, Weiner on terms similar to those approved in In re Olympic Marine Services, Inc.”
In Re: United Artists Theatre Company, Debtors v. Donald F. Walton, Acting United States Trustee for Region 3 Donald F. (2003) ca3 · cites it 4× “” 11 U.S.C. § 328 (a). The question we therefore ask is whether it is reasonable for the Debtors to indemnify Houlihan Lokey despite its own negligence (but not gross negligence).”
Asarco, L.L.C. v. Barclays Capital, Inc. (2012) ca5 · cites it 6× “(“Bar-clays”) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 328 (a); and (2) denying Barclays’s request for a $2 million “success fee” based on the successful outcome of ASARCO, L.”
In Re Smart World Technologies, LLC (2009) ca2 · cites it 7× “How does a court determine whether a bankruptcy court has "pre-approved" a debtor's retention of a professional pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 328 (a)? In this case, we find that the bankruptcy court's order was a section 328(a) pre-approval, and that no later developments rendered…”
In the Matter Of: Rebecca Mitchell Barron, Debtor. Cynthia Daniels v. Rebecca Mitchell Barron John A. Barron Charles Eas (2003) ca5 · cites it 4× “” 11 U.S.C. § 328 (a). The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court and Daniels appealed to this court.”
In Re: B.U.M. International, Inc. Debtor, Friedman Enterprises v. B.U.M. International, Inc. (2000) ca9 · cites it 8× “Because the bankruptcy court specifically reserved the right to approve all fees and costs of FE when it approved FE’s employment, the fee structure had not been unconditionally approved under 11 U.S.C. § 328 . Accordingly, the court was entitled to review under 11 U.”
In Re the Circle K Corporation, Debtor. The Circle K Corporation v. Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, Inc. (2002) ca9 · cites it 4× “OPINION Overview This appeal presents the question of how a professional employed in the course of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding can be assured that its fees will be reviewed under the standards of 11 U.S.C. § 328 , rather than § 330. Section 328(a) permits a professional…”
Rus, Miliband & Smith v. Yoo (In Re Dick Cepek, Inc.) (2006) bap9 · cites it 4× “" 11 U.S.C. § 328 (a) (emphasis added). But this provision confers no unfettered authority on the debtor and its lawyer.”
Market Center East Retail Property, Inc. v. Lurie (2013) ca10 · cites it 3× “However, Market Center never submitted a proposed order approving the employment of Lurie to the bankruptcy court, nor did the bankruptcy court ever issue an order adopting a preemployment contract pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 328 . On November 6, 2009, Market Center secured an order…”
— 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) — 3 cases
Unsecured Creditors' Committee, Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin Financial Advisors, Inc. v. Pelofsky (In Re Thermadyne H (2002) bap8 “Trustee was the only party that continued to object to the indemnification and exculpa *754 tion provisions, arguing that the provisions were per se inconsistent with the notions of professionalism, they placed creditors at risk of financial injury, and they could not be…”
In re Argose, Inc. (2007) deb
— 11 U.S.C. § 328(b) — 1 case
In Re King (1988) vaeb
— 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) — 3 cases
In Re Inslaw, Inc. (1989) dcd
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