15 U.S.C. § 1221

Definitions

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As used in this chapter—(a) The term “automobile manufacturer” shall mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, or other form of business enterprise engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of passenger cars, trucks, or station wagons, including any person, partnership, or corporation which acts for and is under the control of such manufacturer or assembler in connection with the distribution of said automotive vehicles.(b) The term “franchise” shall mean the written agreement or contract between any automobile manufacturer engaged in commerce and any automobile dealer which purports to fix the legal rights and liabilities of the parties to such agreement or contract.(c) The term “automobile dealer” shall mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, or other form of business enterprise resident in the United States or in any Territory thereof or in the District of Columbia operating under the terms of a franchise and engaged in the sale or distribution of passenger cars, trucks, or station wagons.(d) The term “commerce” shall mean commerce among the several States of the United States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or among the Territories or between any Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation.(e) The term “good faith” shall mean the duty of each party to any franchise, and all officers, employees, or agents thereof to act in a fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party: Provided, That recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.(Aug. 8, 1956, ch. 1038, § 1, 70 Stat. 1125.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 294 cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1957–2025 · leading case: Gen. Motors Corp. Chevrolet Motor Div. v. The New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc. Dba the New A.C. Chevrolet, 263 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2001).
Gen. Motors Corp. Chevrolet Motor Div. v. The New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc. Dba the New A.C. Chevrolet, 263 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2001). · cites it 3× “15 U.S.C. § 1221 (e). 16 The narrowness of this definition is evident not only from the statute’s plain language, but also from the case law constru *326 ing § 1221(e).”
Jackson v. Volvo Trucks North Am., Inc., 462 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2006). · cites it 4× “The Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act Jackson filed suit against Volvo under the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221 , et seq. (ADDCA). That statute authorizes any “automobile dealer” to file federal claims against manufacturers arising from franchise…”
Arnold Pontiac-Gmc, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564 (3rd Cir. 1986). · cites it 4× “§ 1 , and 2) the first cause of action in count II of the complaint concerning the motor vehicle allocation claim (Truck Division) arising under the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq. In all other matters, we will affirm the district court.”
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). “1125 , 15 U. S. C. § 1221 et seq.; the Puerto Rico competition statute, P.”
Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123 (D.N.H. 1975). · cites it 7× “Counts III and IV allege violations of the Dealers’ Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq., and reiterate the.”
Schmitt-Norton Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 524 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Minnesota 1981). · cites it 4× “Ford’s efforts to force the dealership to move to a new location and Ford’s subsequent treatment of the dealership after its move form the basis of the plaintiffs’ complaint.”
Bronx Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). · cites it 3× “” 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (c). In its September 2000 order, the Court held that since Mrs.”
DeCantis v. Mid-Atl. Toyota Distributors, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Va. 1974). · cites it 12× “§ 1222 with 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (b). See Lawrence Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.”
Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982). · cites it 2× “) and Automobile Dealer Suits Against Manufacturers ( 15 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq.) do not contain provisions similar to 15 United States Code section 77n.”
Gregoris Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. in USA, 630 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y 1986). · cites it 4× “In addition, plaintiff alleges that defendant Nissan has violated the Dealers Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221 to 1225. Gregoris is a Datsun dealership owned by Gerard DeGregoris.”
H.D. Corp. Of Puerto Rico & H.D. 65, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. & Ford Motor Co. Caribbean, Inc., 791 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1986). · cites it 3× “Count one alleges that defendants’ refusal to repurchase the remaining $500,000 worth of parts and accessories from Dobbs Houses constituted an “arbitrary, unreasonable, coercive and discriminatory” breach of the termination and repurchase agreements for Hull Dobbs and Hull…”
Conroy Datsun Ltd. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U. S. A., 506 F. Supp. 1051 (N.D. Ill. 1980). · cites it 4× “(“Nissan”) pursuant to the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act (“the Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq., alleging Nissan’s failure to act in good faith in complying with the provisions of the plaintiffs’ automobile dealership franchise.”
— 15 U.S.C. § 1221(e) — 1 case
Cecil Corley Motor Co., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.