15 U.S.C. § 1671
Congressional findings and declaration of purpose
On the basis of the findings stated in subsection (a) of this section, the Congress determines that the provisions of this subchapter are necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying into execution the powers of the Congress to regulate commerce and to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.
Pub. L. 90–321, title V, § 504(c),
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 113
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1970–2026 · leading case: In Re Ballard, 238 B.R. 610 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999).
In Re Ballard, 238 B.R. 610 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999). “” Subsequently, in 1968, the United States Congress enacted 15 USCA § 1671, et seq. Section 1671 contained findings, including “[t]he unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for personal services encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit.”
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974). “Petitioner argues that the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s restrictions on garnishment, 15 U. S. C. § 1671 et seg., are such an exemption.”
Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970). “163 , 15 U. S. C. § 1671 (1964 ed., Supp. V). The wage-earning bankrupt who must take a vacation without pay or forgo a vacation altogether cannot be said to have achieved the "new opportunity in life and [the] clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and…”
Union Pac. R.R. v. Trona Valley Fed. Credit Union, 57 P.3d 1203 (Wyo. 2002). “Union Pacific contends that deducting the child support garnishment would result in a violation of the Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671 through 1677, and Wyoming law.”
Joanna Cieszkowska v. Gray Line New York, 295 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2002). “, and that no private right of action for a claim existed under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq. The court also determined that the plaintiffs claim that she was defamed failed to state a federal cause of action.”
Jack McCabe v. City of Eureka, Missouri, 664 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1981). “Subchapter II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act addresses restrictions on garnishment and in 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (a)(2) Congress found the purpose for such restrictions included the fact that garnishment “frequently results in loss of employment by the debtor, and [results in]…”
Coward v. Smith, 636 P.2d 793 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). “The 1970 amendments brought Kansas law into compliance with Title III of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1671 et seq. This is clear from a comparison of the language in the applicable sections.”
Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). “15 U.S.C. § 1671 ; see Long Island Trust Co.”
Haines v. Gen. Motors Corp., 603 F. Supp. 471 (S.D. Ohio 1984). “§ 1983 and 15 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq., as well as several pendent state claims.”
Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 399 F. Supp. 855 (D. Ariz. 1975). “The Department of Labor (hereinafter the Department) asserts that portions of such deposits may be subject to the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq. 2 [Consumer Credit Protection Act, Subchapter II].”
In the Matter of Edward G. Brissette, Gene Paul Master, Michael Anthony Simon, Bankrupts-Appellants, 561 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1977). “2431 ; 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (b).) There is no indication, however, in the statute or the legislative history that Congress intended that the CCPA protections apply as bankruptcy exemptions.”
Richard D. Snapp v. United States Postal Serv.-Texarkana Mgmt. Sectional Ctr., William M. Capshaw, Manager, Postmaster, 664 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1982). “5 Recognizing that section 1337 only confers jurisdiction if the claim arises under a statute regulating commerce, Snapp points to Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S. C.A. § 1671 et seq. Title III, which restricts the percentage of an employee’s wages…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.