U.S. Code » Title 15 » Chapter CHAPTER 70— COMPREHENSIVE SMOKELESS TOBACCO HEALTH EDUCATION

15 U.S.C. § 4406

Preemption

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(a) Federal action

Except as provided in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (and the amendments made by that Act), no statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and health, other than the statements required by section 4402 of this title, shall be required by any Federal agency to appear on any package or in any advertisement (unless the advertisement is an outdoor billboard advertisement) of a smokeless tobacco product.

(b) State and local action

No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and health, other than the statements required by section 4402 of this title, shall be required by any State or local statute or regulation to be included on any package or in any advertisement (unless the advertisement is an outdoor billboard advertisement) of a smokeless tobacco product.

(c) Effect on liability law

Nothing in this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other person.

(Pub. L. 99–252, § 7, Feb. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 34; Pub. L. 111–31, div. A, title II, § 205(b), June 22, 2009, 123 Stat. 1849.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, referred to in subsec. (a), is div. A of Pub. L. 111–31, June 22, 2009, 123 Stat. 1776. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 2009 Amendment note set out under section 301 of Title 21, Food and Drugs, and Tables.

Amendments

2009—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 111–31 substituted “Except as provided in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (and the amendments made by that Act), no” for “No”.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases, 1990–2017 · leading case: Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). · cites it 4× “See 15 U. S. C. § 4406 . All of these considerations indicate that § 5 is best read as having superseded *519 only positive enactments by legislatures or administrative agencies that mandate particular warning labels.”
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). · cites it 2× “34 (codified at 15 U. S. C. § 4406 (a)). Thus, as with cigarettes, Congress reserved for itself an aspect of smokeless tobacco regulation that is particularly important to the FDCA's regulatory scheme.”
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Phil J. Marotta, etc., 214 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 2017). · cites it 2× “2009); 15 U.S.C. § 4406 (c) (2006). While Reynolds argues that these acts—and consequently, their savings clauses—are inapplicable *601 here by their own terms (namely, that 15 U.”
Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997). · cites it 5× “15 U.S.C. § 4406 (b). 15 Unlike the FCLAA, the Smokeless Tobacco Act contains a “savings clause,” which provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other person.”
Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv., Inc., 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000). · cites it 2× “Such reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, its premise—that Congress would have expressly left state tort law intact if that had been its intent—is not necessarily true.”
Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 974 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1998). · cites it 2× “2608 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 4406 ). . Id. . The savings clause in the Smokeless Tobacco Act provides: (c) Effect on liability laws Nothing in this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common-law or under State statutory law to any other person.”
Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1996). · cites it 2× “[15] 15 U.S.C. § 4406 : "Nothing in this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other person.”
Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App. 1991). “” 15 U.S.C. § 4406 (c). Although an analysis of the various differences between the two Acts seems to us a highly problematic inquiry, two conclusions can readily be drawn.”
Earl E. Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 782 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2015). “30 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4406 ). This argument suffers from a similar misunderstanding of basic preemption doctrine: a “saving clause (like the express pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”
Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417 (Pa. 1990). “See: 15 U.S.C. § 4406 (c). 5 . A risk-utility analysis was articulated and espoused by the Dissenting Opinion in Dambacher by Dambacher v.”
Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997). “15 U.S.C. § 4406 . Thus, although the CSTHEA is entitled the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, and although Congress addressed in the CSTHEA several of the concerns addressed by FDA in the Regulations, the court finds that Congress did not intend to reserve…”
Berger v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2016). “34 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4406 (c)). Even more directly, when Congress passed the TCA as recently as 2009, it broadly stated: (a) In general (1) Preservation Except as provided in paragraph (2)(A), nothing in this subchapter, or rules promulgated under this subchapter,…”
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