17 U.S.C. § 202
Ownership of copyright as distinct from ownership of material object
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 95
cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1973–2024 · leading case: Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 P.3d 1148 (Cal. 2001).
Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 P.3d 1148 (Cal. 2001). “, a copyrightis wholly distinct from the material object (see 17 U.S.C. § 202 ), determining the tax consequences of a transaction involving the transfer of such a right has been difficult because the transaction often includes the concurrent transfer of tangible property.”
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). “” 17 U. S. C. §202 . See also §101 (“ ‘Copies’ are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of…”
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). “17 U. S. C. § 202 (distinguishing between a copyrighted work and “any material object in which the work is embodied”).”
Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2017). “1984)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 202 ("Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct *794 from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”
Photographic Illust'rs Corp. v. Orgill, Inc., 953 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2020). “2015) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 202 ). But we rely on the fact of delivery not in isolation, but as "'a relevant factor' to determine the existence of an implied [sub]license.”
Itofca, Inc. v. Megatrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2003). “ITOFCA is right of course that a copyright is not transferred automatically with the transfer of the copyrighted good.”
People v. Williams, 920 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. 2009). “The State contends that section 202 of the Copyright Act ( 17 U.S.C. §202 (2000)) makes ownership of a copyright “distinct” from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied like a master recording.”
Donna Corbello v. Frankie Valli, 777 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2015). “17 U.S.C. § 202 . Rather, courts should focus primarily on “the licensor’s objective intent at the time of the creation and delivery of the software as manifested by the parties’ conduct.”
Evoqua Water Techs. v. M.W. Watermark, 940 F.3d 222 (6th Cir. 2019). “In Shugrue, the court held that 17 U.S.C. § 202 requires that an agreement unambiguously transfer copyrights.”
Indira Poola v. Howard Univ., 147 A.3d 267 (D.C. 2016). “” 17 U.S.C. § 202 . As we read Dr. Poola’s conversion claim, it is based, at least in part,- on loss of the tangible, material objects—e.”
In Re Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). “17 U.S.C. § 202 66 . Therefore, mere legal or authorized possession, such as in the case of a bailee or consignee, does not grant the requisite authority to make the first sale and will not protect the bailee or subsequent sellers from infringement actions.”
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011). “As one commentator has explained, "the physical object `copy' is distinct from the incorporeal `work of authorship' that the copy embodies.”
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