17 U.S.C. § 204
Execution of transfers of copyright ownership
Section 204 is a somewhat broadened and liberalized counterpart of sections 28 and 29 of the present statute [sections 28 and 29 of former title 17]. Under subsection (a), a transfer of copyright ownership (other than one brought about by operation of law) is valid only if there exists an instrument of conveyance, or alternatively a “note or memorandum of the transfer,” which is in writing and signed by the copyright owner “or such owner’s duly authorized agent.” Subsection (b) makes clear that a notarial or consular acknowledgment is not essential to the validity of any transfer, whether executed in the United States or abroad. However, the subsection would liberalize the conditions under which certificates of acknowledgment of documents executed abroad are to be accorded prima facie weight, and would give the same weight to domestic acknowledgments under appropriate circumstances.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 307
cases (42 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: TD Bank NA v. Vernon Hill, II, 928 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 2019).
TD Bank NA v. Vernon Hill, II, 928 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 2019). “” 17 U.S.C. § 204 (a); see Barefoot Architect, Inc.”
Small Just. LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 873 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 2017). “The footnote first explained that insofar as 17 U.S.C. § 204 required “a written and signed conveyance” for DuPont to transfer a copyright to Xcentric, then DuPont’s checking of the box on the “Submit your Report” page did not suffice to effect the transfer of the copyright in…”
DRK Photo v. McGraw-Hill Global Educ. Holdings, LLC, 870 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2017). “Although a third party may not raise noncompliance with 17 U.S.C. § 204 (a)’s writing requirement as a defense to a copyright transfer where the parties to the transfer do not dispute its existence, Jules Jordan Video, Inc.”
Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007). “In a memorandum and order filed November 22, 2005, it declined to determine whether the written ratification of a prior oral transfer could satisfy the Copyright Act’s requirement that transfers of copyright ownership be in writing, 17 U.S.C. § 204 (a), or whether the transfer…”
SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 578 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2009). “2 did not sufficiently identify which copyrights were to change hands, and therefore failed to satisfy the requirements necessary to transfer ownership of a copyright under Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 204 (a). Having found that SCO’s assertions of copyright…”
Michael Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc., et, 693 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2012). “These include that the oral agreement allegedly made in 2005 was not a work-for-hire agreement and was thus invalid, was contrary to the parties’ intentions, had to be in writing pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 204 (a), and was in violation of the statute of frauds.”
Bangkok Broad. & T v. Co. v. IPTV Corp., 742 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2010). “) Further, Plaintiff argues that in light of 17 U.S.C. § 204 (a) (“ § 204(a)”), IPTV’s counterclaims, “which merely restate as claims IPTV’s defense of an oral license agreement,” are rendered infirm.”
X-IT Prods., L.L.C. v. Walter Kidde Portable Equip., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 577 (E.D. Va. 2001). “See 17 U.S.C. § 204 (a). That section provides that “[a] transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or…”
Accusoft Corp., Appellant\\cross-Appellee v. James L. Palo Simon Weiczner Individually & D/B/A Snowbound Software, Appellees\\cross-Appellants, 237 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2001). “Although the settlement agreement clearly did transfer AccuSoft’s copyright in the IFL to Snowbound, the master accepted AccuSoft’s contention that a non-exclusive license issued by AccuSoft before the settlement agreement was signed would continue in effect under 17 U.S.C. §…”
Xu Liu v. Price Waterhouse LLP & Comput. Language Rsch., Inc., Defendants/third-Party v. Xiaomei Yang, Third-Party, 302 F.3d 749 (3rd Cir. 2002). “They assert that even if the parties intended that Price Waterhouse would own the copyrights in the derivative work, Price Waterhouse by law cannot own these copyrights because the derivative work’s authors did not execute a written document assigning ownership of the derivative…”
Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). “[20] Moreover, to the extent that current copyright law aids in interpretation of this 1969 transaction, current law requires a writing signed by the transferor *662 to effect a copyright transfer.”
Vance v. Latimer, 648 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Mich. 2009). “§ 204 (b)(1), which provides that “[a] certifícate of acknowledgment is not required for the validity of a transfer, but is prima facie evidence of the execution of the transfer if — (1) in the ease of a transfer executed in the United States, the certificate is issued by a…”
— 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) — 7 cases
Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822 (3rd Cir. 2011).
Billy-Bob Teeth, Inc., Cross-Appellee v. Novelty, Inc., 329 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2003).
Balsamo/Olson Grp., Inc. v. Bradley Place Ltd. P'ship, 966 F. Supp. 757 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
Imperial Residential Design, Inc. v. Palms Dev. Grp., Inc., 70 F.3d 96 (11th Cir. 1995).
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