18 U.S.C. § 118
Interference with certain protective functions
Any person who knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or interferes with a Federal law enforcement agent engaged, within the United States or the special maritime territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in the performance of the protective functions authorized under section 37 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2709) or section 103 of the Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4802) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 25
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1930–2021 · leading case: United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). “The minor provision consolidated with § 254 was 18 U. S. C. § 118 (1940 ed.), derived from the Act of Mar.”
United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012). “§§ 2291 (a)(9) and 2290(a)(2)); • Counts Five and Six — Assault with a dangerous weapon within a special maritime jurisdiction ( 18 U.S.C. § 118 (a)(3)); • Counts Seven and Eight — Assault with a dangerous weapon on federal officers and employees ( 18 U.”
United States v. Gregorio Camejo, 333 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2003). “ing, or Wounding Defendant, charged and ultimately convicted of assault resulting in serious bodily injury ( 18 U.S.C. § 118 (a)(6)), contends that the district court erred in declining defendant’s request to instruct on what' defendant alleged to be the lesser included offense…”
United States v. Santos, 589 F.3d 759 (5th Cir. 2009). “Appellant claims that without Cazeau’s statements, the Government showed no evi *763 dence that the assault resulted in “serious bodily injury,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 118 (a)(6). Appellant argues that the failure to call Cazeau deprived him of his right to confront his…”
United States v. Robert McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97 (3rd Cir. 2001). “The similar language of 18 U.S.C. § 118 , relied upon in Chestaro , lends support to the conclusion that “simple assault” equates with traditional common-law assault.”
United States v. Black Bear, 542 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 2008). “BACKGROUND In 2002, Black Bear pled guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian country, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 118 (a)(3) and 1153. Black Bear received a sentence of sixty-three months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.”
United States v. Jack A. Gibson, 896 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1990). “Addressing the motion for acquittal, Gibson contends that the government introduced no evidence from which the jury could infer that Gibson acted with specific intent.”
United States v. Littlewind, 595 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2010). “Sylvester Littlewind appeals a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 118 (a)(3) and 1153, assault resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 18 U.”
United States v. Richard Quentin Lecompte, 108 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1997). “Alternatively, we conclude the testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence relevant to the issue of appellant’s intent to cause bodily harm as required under 18 U.S.C. § 118 (a)(3). The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Welch to testify regarding the…”
United States v. Daniel Reid & Theodore E. Thomas, Jr., 517 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1975). “Ohio statutes provided for the testing of cattle for infectious diseases and for co-operation with federal authorities for that purpose.”
United States v. Juan Ramon Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1974). “§ 152 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 118 , 121, 245) proscribing certain offenses against specialized federal law enforcement officers.”
James Stanley Pipes v. United States, 399 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1968). “Ill consolidates 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 118 and 254 of the 1940 Code.”
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