18 U.S.C. § 3173
Sixth amendment rights
No provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1977–2025 · leading case: United States v. Alston
United States v. Alston (1980)
“(1976) addresses the question of post-conviction appellate delay; they deal only with delay before trial, or after a mistrial, or grant of a new trial, or completion of a successful appeal of collateral attack.”
United States v. Jerry Lee Howard (2000)
“1982); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (“No provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution.”
United States v. Santiago-Becerril (1997)
“2d 1408, 1413 (7th Cir.1992). Section 3173 of the STA states that “[n]o provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution.”
United States v. Mark A. Mitchell (1983)
“” 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (1974). It would be, however, “an unusual case in which the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act have been met but the sixth amendment right to speedy trial has been violated.”
United States v. Frye (2004)
“See 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (“No provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as re *735 quired by amendment VI of the Constitution.”
United States v. Harry H. Nance, United States of America v. Leon Stelly, United States of America v. Taybren Lee (1982)
“19 The Speedy Trial Act was enacted in part out of dissatisfaction with sixth amendment speedy trial jurisprudence, and to put more life into defendants’ speedy trial rights.”
United States v. Gonzalo Gonzalez (1982)
“18 U.S.C. § 3173 (1976); see, e.g., United States v.”
In Re Grand Jury Investigation. Appeal of Joseph Braun, Witness (1979)
“Of course, as the Speedy Trial Act explicitly recognizes, see 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (1976), and as we declare here, adherence to the time period established by Congress does not bar judicial scrutiny under the applicable constitutional standard.”
United States v. Anthony Rice (2014)
“See 18 U.S.C. § 3173 . But as a number of courts have noted, it will be an “unusual case” in which the Act is followed but the Constitution violated.”
United States v. Glen Herman (1978)
“18 U.S.C. § 3173 . 4 . The government urges us to charge the time between arrest and Herman’s withdrawal of his guilty plea to Herman.”
United States v. Louis Carini (1977)
“Indeed there are, for the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3173 , expressly establishes rights in addition to, and not in lieu of, those conferred by the Sixth Amendment upon defendants in criminal cases.”
United States v. Munoz Amado (1999)
“3d 11, 21 (1st Cir.1997). Section 3173 of the STA states that “[n]o provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution.”
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