Requirements within the scope of this chapter with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any establishment at which inspection is provided under subchapter I of this chapter, which are in addition to, or different than those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, except that any such jurisdiction may impose recordkeeping and other requirements within the scope of section 642 of this title, if consistent therewith, with respect to any such establishment. Marking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State or Territory or the District of Columbia with respect to articles prepared at any establishment under inspection in accordance with the requirements under subchapter I of this chapter, but any State or Territory or the District of Columbia may, consistent with the requirements under this chapter, exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Secretary over articles required to be inspected under said subchapter I, for the purpose of preventing the distribution for human food purposes of any such articles which are adulterated or misbranded and are outside of such an establishment, or, in the case of imported articles which are not at such an establishment, after their entry into the United States. This chapter shall not preclude any State or Territory or the District of Columbia from making requirement 11 So in original. Probably should be “requirements”. or taking other action, consistent with this chapter, with respect to any other matters regulated under this chapter.
Notes of Decisions
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
· cites it 4× “Section 408 of the FMIA, 21 U. S. C. § 678 , prohibits the imposition of "[m]arking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those made under" the Act.”
Am. Meat Inst. v. Leeman, 180 Cal. App. 4th 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 8× “” ( 21 U.S.C. § 678 ,) 9 3. The Trade Associations’ Declaratory Relief Lawsuit The Trade Associations represent packers and processors of meat.”
Nat'l Meat Assn. v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012).
· cites it 4× “” 21 U.S. C. § 678. 3 B In 2008, the Humane Society of the United States released an undercover video showing workers at a slaughterhouse in California dragging, kicking, and electroshocking sick and disabled cows in an effort to move them.”
Alex Berezovsky v. Bank of Am., 869 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2017).
“2d 950 (2012) (finding express preemption in 21 U.S.C. § 678’s directive that any requirements “in addition to, or different than those made under [the Federal Meat Inspection Act] may not be imposed by any State”); Perez v.”
Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2010).
· cites it 4× “21 U.S.C. § 678 (emphasis added). Consistent with the presumption against preemption, we must give this provision a narrow interpretation.”
Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2016 MT 126 (Mont. 2016).
· cites it 2× “” Seizing on the statute’s subsequent language that allows for “concurrent jurisdiction” with the several States, the Court persists that this language grants state courts personal jurisdiction. The phrase “concurrent jurisdiction” is a well-known term of art long employed by…”
Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence, 731 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2013).
· cites it 2× “2d 950 (2012) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 678 ). There, the Supreme Court held that a state regulatory ban on the sale of meat products from nonambulatory animals effectively regulated the “operations” of slaughterhouses and was therefore preempted.”
Chicago-Midwest Meat Ass'n v. City of Evanston, 589 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1979).
· cites it 2× “21 U.S.C. § 678 (emphasis added). The association argues that the local ordinances under attack in this case — which, we must assume, provide for inspection of meat delivery vehicles either while on their delivery routes or while unloading at the point of delivery — must fall…”
United States v. Rudolph George Stanko, 491 F.3d 408 (8th Cir. 2007).
“While it is true that the FMIA prohibits states from imposing “[mjarking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those” mandated under the FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 678 , nothing in the text of the FMIA indicates an intent to preempt state…”
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