26 U.S.C. § 3321

Imposition of tax

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(a) General rule

There is hereby imposed on every rail employer for each calendar month an excise tax, with respect to having individuals in his employ, equal to 4 percent of the total rail wages paid by him during such month.

(b) Tax on employee representatives(1) In general

There is hereby imposed on the income of each employee representative a tax equal to 4 percent of the rail wages paid to him during the calendar month.

(2) Determination of wages

The rail wages of an employee representative for purposes of paragraph (1) shall be determined in the same manner and with the same effect as if the employee organization by which such employee representative is employed were a rail employer.

(c) Termination if loans to railroad unemployment fund repaidThe tax imposed by this section shall not apply to rail wages paid on or after the 1st day of any calendar month if, as of such 1st day, there is—(1) no balance of transfers made before October 1, 1985, to the railroad unemployment insurance account under section 10(d) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and(2) no unpaid interest on such transfers.(Added Pub. L. 98–76, title II, § 231(a), Aug. 12, 1983, 97 Stat. 426; amended Pub. L. 99–272, title XIII, § 13301(a), Apr. 7, 1986, 100 Stat. 325; Pub. L. 100–647, title I, § 1018(u)(17), title VIII, § 7106(a), Nov. 10, 1988, 102 Stat. 3590, 3772.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

Section 10(d) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, referred to in subsec. (c)(1), is classified to section 360(d) of Title 45, Railroads.

Amendments

1988—Pub. L. 100–647, § 7106(a), amended section generally, revising and restating provisions of subsecs. (a) and (b) and specifying imposition of 4 percent tax on rail wages rather than a tax based on the “applicable percentage” of rail wages, and in subsec. (c) substituting provisions relating to termination if loans to railroad unemployment fund repaid for provisions relating to rates of tax.

Pub. L. 100–647, § 1018(u)(17), added a period at end of par. (4).

1986—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 99–272 amended subsec. (c) generally. Prior to amendment subsec. (c) read as follows:

“(c) Rate of Tax.—For purposes of this section—

“(1) For taxable period july 1 through december 31, 1986.—The applicable percentage for the taxable period beginning on July 1, 1986, and ending on December 31, 1986, shall be 2 percent.

“(2) Subsequent taxable periods.—The applicable percentage for any taxable period beginning after 1986 shall be the sum of—

“(A) 2 percent, plus

“(B) 0.3 percent for each preceding taxable period.

In no event shall the applicable percentage exceed 5 percent.”

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1988 Amendment

Amendment by section 1018(u)(17) of Pub. L. 100–647 effective, except as otherwise provided, as if included in the provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99–514, to which such amendment relates, see section 1019(a) of Pub. L. 100–647, set out as a note under section 1 of this title.

Pub. L. 100–647, title VII, § 7106(d), Nov. 10, 1988, 102 Stat. 3774, provided that: “The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 3322, 6157, 6201, 6317, 6513, and 6601 of this title, omitting section 3323 of this title, and amending provisions set out as a note under section 231n of Title 45, Railroads], and the provisions of subsection (b) [set out below], shall apply to remuneration paid after December 31, 1988.”

Effective Date

Pub. L. 98–76, title II, § 231(d), Aug. 12, 1983, 97 Stat. 429, provided that: “The amendments made by this section [enacting this chapter and amending sections 6157, 6201, 6317, 6513, and 6601 of this title] shall apply to remuneration paid after June 30, 1986.”

Continuation of Surtax Rate Through 1990

Pub. L. 100–647, title VII, § 7106(b), Nov. 10, 1988, 102 Stat. 3773, provided that:“(1)In general.—In the case of any calendar month beginning before January 1, 1991“(A) there shall be substituted for ‘4 percent’ in subsections (a) and (b) of section 3321 of the 1986 Code the percentage equal to the sum of—“(i) 4 percent, plus“(ii) the surtax rate (if any) for such calendar month, and“(B) subsection (c) of such section shall not apply to so much of the tax imposed by such section as is attributable to the surtax rate.“(2)Surtax rate.—For purposes of paragraph (1), the surtax rate shall be—“(A) 3.5 percent for each month during a calendar year if, as of September 30, of the preceding calendar year, there was a balance of transfers (or unpaid interest thereon) made after September 30, 1985, to the railroad unemployment insurance account under section 10(d) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act [45 U.S.C. 360(d)], and“(B) zero for any other calendar month.”

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 39 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1946–2022 · leading case: Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). · cites it 2× “401 , 26 U. S. C. § 3321 . [3] 183 F. 2d 768 . [4] United States ex rel.”
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). “Code, §3321, 26 U. S. C. §3321 . Hence the general sentence of fine and imprisonment imposed on each under the substantive counts was valid.”
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Julie Su, 41 F.4th 1147 (9th Cir. 2022). “The phrase “period of continuing sickness” means either “consecutive days of sickness, whether from 1 or more causes” or “successive days of sickness due to a single cause without interruption of more than 90 consecutive days.” Id. § 352(a)(1)(B)(iii). The benefits available…”
Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950). “This appeal was taken from an order of the District Court whereby a Ford automobile belonging to Otis Mason Martin was forfeited under §§ 3321 and 3720 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3321 , 3720, upon proof that on January 20, 1950 it had been used by Martin with…”
Albert Hugh Jolley v. United States, 232 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1956). “26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3321 and 2803. . Appellant emphasizes the difference in name of this finance company and the “North American Loan Company” referred to by the witness Moon, and appellee replies that Moon had doubtless had a lapse of memory on this detail, brought about by the…”
James E. Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962). “§ 3670 ; Internal Revenue Code 1954, § 6321, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3321 . 12 . Section 7403(a).”
Vandevander v. United States, 172 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1949). “A libel of information for forfeiture under Internal Revenue Code, § 3321, 26 U.S. C.A. § 3321, was filed against a seized automobile.”
Tony Watson v. United States, 224 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1955). “§ 3116; and the third, concealing the liquor with intent to defraud the United States of the tax, in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 3321 . The defendant moved to require the Government to elect on which count it would prosecute.”
United States v. One 1941 Pontiac Sedan, 83 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). “An automobile used as an armed convoy for other vehicles loaded with smuggled liquors was held to violate a section of the internal revenue statutes, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3321 , relating to the forfeiture of vehicles used in the removal or for the deposit or concealment of intoxicating…”
One 1951 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, Motor No. Jba504187 v. United States, 212 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1954). “26 U.S.C.A. § 3321 (b) (3). Associates Discount Corporation, claiming an interest in the vehicle by virtue of a conditional sales contract which was acquired in good faith, filed its answer and claim for remission of the forfeiture to the extent of its interest under the…”
City of Galveston v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 685 (Fed. Cl. 1995). “26 U.S.C. §§ 3321 et seq. (1988). . City of Galveston v.”
United States v. One 1941 Buick Coach Auto., 85 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Ala. 1949). “' The evidence does not support the' libellant’s contention that this Buick automobile -was used' directly in the removal, deposit or concealment of distilled spirits on which a tax imposed by the laws of the United' States had not been páid, as alleged in the 'forth paragraph…”
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