29 U.S.C. § 142

Definitions

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When used in this chapter—(1) The term “industry affecting commerce” means any industry or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct commerce or tend to burden or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce.(2) The term “strike” includes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees.(3) The terms “commerce”, “labor disputes”, “employer”, “employee”, “labor organization”, “representative”, “person”, and “supervisor” shall have the same meaning as when used in subchapter II of this chapter.(June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title V, § 501, 61 Stat. 161.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

Subchapter II of this chapter, referred to in par. (3), was in the original “the National Labor Relations Act as amended by this Act” [29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.].

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 246 cases (51 in the last 5 years), 1948–2026 · leading case: Adams v. Am. Fed'n of State, 167 F. Supp. 3d 730 (D. Maryland 2016).
Adams v. Am. Fed'n of State, 167 F. Supp. 3d 730 (D. Maryland 2016). · cites it 3× “” 29 U.S.C. § 142 (3). “It necessarily follows that employees of a school district are not ‘employees’ who can sue their unions under the NLRA for a breach of the duty of fair representation.”
United States v. Vincent J. Ricciardi, United States of Am. v. Stanley M. Unger, 357 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1966). · cites it 6× “The jurisdictional test for the cases against both appellants is therefore: are any of the employees of the employers who made the payments “employed in an industry affecting commerce”? 29 U.S.C. § 142 (1) defines “industry affecting commerce” as “any industry or activity in…”
Raymond Crilly v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. & United Transp. Union, Local 1594, 529 F.2d 1355 (3rd Cir. 1976). · cites it 3× “…Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152 (6) and 152(7), and §§ 501(1) and 501(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 142 (1) and 142(3). SEPTA, however, contends that it is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and therefore excluded from…”
Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). “23, that § 501 (2) of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 142 (2), is not to be considered in connection with § 13, but rather is only an aid to construction of § 8 (b) (4), 29 U.”
Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). “See also 29 U.S.C. § 142 (applying same definition to Labor Management Relations Act).”
Dist. 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n Afl-Cio v. Amoco Oil Co., 554 F.2d 774 (6th Cir. 1977). · cites it 4× “For reasons of drafting economy, Title V includes § 501(3), 29 U.S.C. § 142 (3), which plainly incorporates by reference eight definitions found in Title I, including the § 2(3) definition of “employee” as amended.”
Frank Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l Afl-Cio, Taca Airlines, S.A. & Charles J. Huttinger, 901 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1990). “(b)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or accept, or agree to accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) of this section.”
Billie Davenport v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Afl-Cio, 166 F.3d 356 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “It contends, however, that the Agreement “did not resolve” that dispute and instead "effected a series of amendments to ' the underlying CBA.” Id. 9 . 29 U.S.C. § 152 itself provides definitions only for use in subchapter II of Chapter 7, Title 29 of the United States Code.”
Pari Mutuel Clerks Union of Louisiana, Local 328 Affiliated With the Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Afl-Cio v. Fair Grounds Corp., 703 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1983). · cites it 3× “§ 501(1), 29 U.S.C. § 142 (1) (1976). The jurisdiction of the NLRB is differently circumscribed.”
Groden v. N&D Transp. Co., Inc., 866 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2017). “(citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 142 (1), 152(2), (6)). In addition, as noted above, the complaint alleged facts addressing the Belmont factors before asserting that N&D was the alter ego of D&N and that, as D&N’s .”
Jacksonville Mar. Ass'n v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local No. 1408-A, 424 F. Supp. 58 (M.D. Fla. 1976). · cites it 5× “In either event, or both, the conduct would violate the agreement not to engage in strikes or lockouts during the life of the contract, as provided in article 15. Defendants, however, have not sought injunctive relief from plaintiffs’ alleged violation of the collective…”
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). “161 , 29 U. S. C. § 142 (3). 9 Although the Board referred to § 302 (b) rather than § 302 (c), it is clear from the context of the Board's discussion that the latter citation was the one intended.”
— 29 U.S.C. § 142(1) — 1 case
— 29 U.S.C. § 142(2) — 2 cases
Bricklayers & Masons Union No. 1 v. Superior Court, 53 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
— 29 U.S.C. § 142(3) — 4 cases
United States v. Lavery, 161 F. Supp. 283 (M.D. Penn. 1958).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.