U.S. Code » Title 29 » Chapter CHAPTER 9— PORTAL-TO-PORTAL PAY

29 U.S.C. § 255

Statute of limitations

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Any action commenced on or after May 14, 1947, to enforce any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act 11 See References in Text note below. —(a) if the cause of action accrues on or after May 14, 1947—may be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued;(b) if the cause of action accrued prior to May 14, 1947—may be commenced within whichever of the following periods is the shorter: (1) two years after the cause of action accrued, or (2) the period prescribed by the applicable State statute of limitations; and, except as provided in paragraph (c), every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within the shorter of such two periods;(c) if the cause of action accrued prior to May 14, 1947, the action shall not be barred by paragraph (b) if it is commenced within one hundred and twenty days after May 14, 1947 unless at the time commenced it is barred by an applicable State statute of limitations;(d) with respect to any cause of action brought under section 216(b) of this title against a State or a political subdivision of a State in a district court of the United States on or before April 18, 1973, the running of the statutory periods of limitation shall be deemed suspended during the period beginning with the commencement of any such action and ending one hundred and eighty days after the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, except that such suspension shall not be applicable if in such action judgment has been entered for the defendant on the grounds other than State immunity from Federal jurisdiction.(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 6, 61 Stat. 87; Pub. L. 89–601, title VI, § 601(b), Sept. 23, 1966, 80 Stat. 844; Pub. L. 93–259, § 6(d)(2)(A), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 61.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, referred to in text, is act June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§ 201 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 201 of this title and Tables.

The Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts, referred to in text, are defined for purposes of this chapter in section 262 of this title.

The effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, referred to in subsec. (d), means May 1, 1974, except as otherwise specifically provided, under provisions of section 29(a) of Pub. L. 93–259, set out as an Effective Date of 1974 Amendment note under section 202 of this title.

Amendments

1974—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 93–259 added subsec. (d).

1966—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 89–601 inserted provision allowing causes of action arising out of willful violations to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1974 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 93–259 effective May 1, 1974, see section 29(a) of Pub. L. 93–259, set out as a note under section 202 of this title.

Effective Date of 1966 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–601 effective Feb. 1, 1967, except as otherwise provided, see section 602 of Pub. L. 89–601, set out as a note under section 203 of this title.

Rules, Regulations, and Orders Promulgated With Regard to 1966 Amendments

Secretary authorized to promulgate necessary rules, regulations, or orders on and after the date of the enactment of Pub. L. 89–601, Sept. 23, 1966, with regard to the amendments made by Pub. L. 89–601, see section 602 of Pub. L. 89–601, set out as a note under section 203 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2,578 cases (776 in the last 5 years), 1947–2026 · leading case: Moreno v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 387 (Fed. Cl. 2008).
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Moreno v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 387 (Fed. Cl. 2008). · cites it 18× “In addition, the government argues that the plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred because the government did not act willfully in violating the FLSA, and therefore a two-year limitations period applies under 29 U.S.C. § 255 (a) (2000). 4 The government further argues that the…”
Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2011). · cites it 6× “The district court also held that Mountaire did not willfully violate the FLSA and that, therefore, the applicable statute of limitations for the FLSA claims under 29 U.S.C. § 255 (a) was two years, rather than three years as asserted by the employees.”
Whiteside v. Hover-Davis-Inc., 995 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2021). · cites it 3× “29 U.S.C. § 255 (a). But claims for unpaid overtime compensation arising out of an employer’s willful violation of the FLSA are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.”
Kwai Wong v. David Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2013). · cites it 4× “Likewise, the 1947 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)—which were enacted on the heels of the FTCA—provided that every action under the FLSA “shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued” 29 U.S.C. § 255 (a)…”
Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2011). · cites it 3× “§ 259 (a) by virtue of its reliance on the January 29, 1999 DOL opinion letter; and (4) because there was no evidence that any FLSA violation had been willful, a two-year statute of limitations applied, see 29 U.S.C. § 255 (a). Kuebel I, 2009 WL 1401694 , at *6-12, 2009 U.”
Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2019). · cites it 2× “2015) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 255 (a) ).) II. As addressed infra , whether a worker is an employee for FLSA purposes is a question of law.”
Fernandez v. Clean House, LLC, 883 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 2018). · cites it 2× “See 29 U.S.C. § 255 (a). Plaintiffs' employment had ended between two and three years before they filed suit.”
Contrera v. Langer, 278 F. Supp. 3d 702 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). · cites it 3× “The one dispute that can be addressed now is the question of whether notice should be provided to individuals who worked for defendants within the last three years—the maximum limitations period under the FLSA, see 29 U.S.C. § 255 (a)—as defendants propose, or whether it should…”
Brooke Clark v. A&L Homecare &Training Ctr., 68 F.4th 1003 (6th Cir. 2023). · cites it 2× “29 U.S.C. § 255 (a). If the plaintiffs in an FLSA suit move for court-approved notice to other employees, the court should waste no time in adjudicating the motion.”
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003). · cites it 3× “On plaintiffs’ federal law claims, the district court applied 29 U.S.C. § 255 (a)’s three-year statute of limitations, also finding that the representative evidence adduced by the plaintiffs adequately and accurately supported a damage award for all plaintiffs, notwithstanding…”
Bull v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 212 (Fed. Cl. 2005). · cites it 5× “See generally 29 U.S.C. § 255 . However, the statute of limitations may be extended by one year if plaintiffs demonstrate that the employer’s violation of the FLSA was “willful.”
Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010). · cites it 4× “Seventh, the majority contends that the Hotel Workers "proffered no evidence to support the concept that Decatur required any recruitment fees to be paid to the foreign recruiters or that it required the Workers to use these recruiters to apply to Decatur.”
Show all 2,578 citing cases →
— 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) — 27 cases
Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007).
King v. State, 614 N.W.2d 341 (Neb. 2000).
Sheila Ann Glenn, Patricia F. Johns, & Robbie Nugent v. Gen. Motors Corp., Saginaw Steering Gear Div., 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988).
Peter L. Knight, Dennis L. Wall, Michael D. Mulkey v. Columbus, Georgia, 19 F.3d 579 (11th Cir. 1994).
Bowrin v. Catholic Guardian Soc'y, 417 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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