U.S. Code » Title 29 » Chapter CHAPTER 9— PORTAL-TO-PORTAL PAY

29 U.S.C. § 259

Reliance in future on administrative rulings, etc.

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(a) In any action or proceeding based on any act or omission on or after May 14, 1947, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,11 See References in Text note below. if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of the agency of the United States specified in subsection (b) of this section, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged. Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that after such act or omission, such administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, practice, or enforcement policy is modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect.(b) The agency referred to in subsection (a) shall be—(1) in the case of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.]—the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor;(2) in the case of the Walsh-Healey Act—the Secretary of Labor, or any Federal officer utilized by him in the administration of such Act; and(3) in the case of the Bacon-Davis Act 1—the Secretary of Labor.(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 10, 61 Stat. 89.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, referred to in text, is act June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§ 201 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 201 of this title and Tables.

The Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts, referred to in text, are defined for purposes of this chapter in section 262 of this title.

Executive DocumentsTransfer of Functions

Functions relating to enforcement and administration of equal pay provisions vested by subsec. (b)(1) of this section in Administrator of Wage and Hour Division of Department of Labor transferred to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 1, 43 F.R. 19807, 92 Stat. 3781, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, effective Jan. 1, 1979, as provided by section 1–101 of Ex. Ord. No. 12106, Dec. 28, 1978, 44 F.R. 1053.

For transfer of functions of other officers, employees, and agencies of Department of Labor, with certain exceptions, to Secretary of Labor, with power to delegate, see Reorg. Plan No. 6, of 1950, §§ 1, 2, 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1263, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 251 cases (32 in the last 5 years), 1948–2026 · leading case: Johnnie Mae Cole v. Farm Fresh Poultry, Inc., 824 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1987).
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Johnnie Mae Cole v. Farm Fresh Poultry, Inc., 824 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1987). · cites it 9× “It also raised an affirmative defense, claiming that it qualified for the “good faith” exemption of 29 U.S.C. § 259 barring the action because it had acted in conformity with and in reliance on the Wage and Hour Division’s interpretation of the FLSA.”
Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2011). · cites it 2× “the FLSA; (2) the administrative duties performed by Kuebel at home did not render the entirety of his commute time compensable because they were not “integral and indispensable” to his “principal” job activities, *358 and thus did not extend his workday to include his morning…”
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 195 L. Ed. 2d 282 (2016). “As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 2126, an affirmative defense in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) protects regulated parties against retroactive liability for actions taken in good-faith reliance on superseded agency guidance, 29 U.S.C. § 259 (a). And a separate FLSA…”
Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990). · cites it 2× “§ 1640 (f); Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 259 ; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.”
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018). “See 29 U.S.C. § 259 (a). Given the Department of Labor's longstanding view that service advisors fit within the § 213(b)(10)(A) exemption, see ante, at 1138, the reliance defense would surely shield employers from retroactive liability were the Court to construe the exemption…”
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003). · cites it 2× “See 29 U.S.C. §§ 259 , 260 (1999). One of these provisions, § 259, “was designed to protect employers from liability if they took certain actions on the basis of an interpretation of the law by a government agency, even if the agency’s interpretation later turned out to be wrong.”
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). · cites it 2× “The Wage and Hour Administrator, whose rulings also provide a defense in sex discrimination cases, 29 U. S. C. § 259 , refused to follow the EEOC.”
Perry v. Randstad Gen. Partner (US) LLC, 876 F.3d 191 (6th Cir. 2017). · cites it 4× “29 U.S.C. § 259 (a), (b)(1); see also 29 C.”
Dean v. 1715 Northside Drive, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2016). · cites it 10× “§ 260 or, alternatively dismissal of the plaintiffs FLSA claims altogether under 29 U.S.C. § 259 . The defendants also move for the dismissal of the plaintiffs claims that extend past the FLSA’s two-year statute of limitations period set out in 29 U.”
Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster Gen. v. Donald D. McQuigg, 950 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1991). · cites it 6× “See 29 U.S.C. § 259 (1988). However, the district court disagreed, and on December 7, 1988, it ordered summary judgment for McQuigg on the Postal Service’s good-faith defense.”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Home Ins., 553 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). · cites it 6× “§ 263 (f)(2); and that it acted in good faith reliance on administrative rulings and regulations as permitted under § 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 259 . I. PROCEDURAL SETTING This case is before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals for the Second…”
Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). · cites it 4× “As part of its affirmative defenses, Chi-potle invokes 29 U.S.C. § 259 to claim that it relied on administrative authority in classifying the plaintiffs and is thus free from liability (the “Eleventh Affirmative Defense”), and 29 U.”
Show all 251 citing cases →
— 29 U.S.C. § 259(b) — 1 case
Rossman v. EN Eng'g, LLC (N.D. Ill. 2020).
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