Notes of Decisions
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012).
· cites it 8× “29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1). Nor may employers ―discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful.”
Joseph Egan v. Delaware River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2017).
· cites it 8× “29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1). The FMLA also makes it “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”
Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2008).
· cites it 10× “2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1)(2)). A In order to state a claim for interference under the FMLA, Phillips must have given notice of her need for FMLA leave.”
Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325 (1st Cir. 2005).
· cites it 8× “Second, he alleged that Nichols fired him in retaliation for his taking medical leave, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615 . After the close of discovery, Nichols filed on August 2, 2004 a motion for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint.”
Penny Bachelder Mark Bachelder v. Am. West Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).
· cites it 6× “29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1). 8 The regulations explain that this prohibition encompasses an employer’s consideration of an employee’s use of FMLA-covered leave in making adverse employment decisions: [E]mployers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment…”
Lori Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 384 F.3d 238 (6th Cir. 2004).
· cites it 7× “The district court ruled that Defendant violated the - FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615 (a)(1) and 2614(a), by failing to reinstate Plaintiff to her position on the door line or an equivalent position by June 28, 2000.”
Gary Waag v. Sotera Def. Solutions, Inc., 857 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2017).
· cites it 5× “The FMLA makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].”
Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2007).
· cites it 6× “There are two recovery theories available under the FMLA: the interference theory, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1), and the retaliation theory, pursuant to 29 U.”
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2012).
· cites it 4× “The FMLA makes it unlawful for any employer "to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided [by the Act]," 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1), or to "discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any…”
Quinn v. St. Louis Cnty., 653 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2011).
· cites it 5× “29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1). Quinn is right that FMLA interference includes “not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave,” as well as “manipulation by a covered employer to avoid responsibilities under [the] FMLA.”
Darst ex rel. Bankr. Est. of Chalimoniuk v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2008).
· cites it 5× “Chalimoniuk sued IBC and Gordon, alleging that his termination constituted a wrongful denial of FMLA benefits in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1). 6 The district court found that Chalimoniuk lacked evidence that he was in treatment for alcoholism on July 29, August 2 and…”
29 U.S.C. § 2615(a): 2 cases
29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1): 7 cases
29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2): 4 cases
29 U.S.C. § 2615(b): 1 case
29 U.S.C. § 2615(l)(b): 1 case
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