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U.S. CodeTitle 29Chapter 10— Disclosure of Welfare and Pension Plans

29 U.S.C. § 301 to 309 (2026)

Repealed. Pub. L. 93–406, title I, § 111(a)(1), Sept. 2, 1974, 88 Stat. 851

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1965–2019 22citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 22 opinions since 1965.

29 U.S.C. § 302 has no page of its own: the Office of the Law Revision Counsel prints it together with other sections as the single entry 29 U.S.C. § 301 to 309, shown below.

[repealed]

The 20 cases that cite 29 U.S.C. § 301 to 309 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBell v. Emp. Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
cites § 301 to 309 2×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“*395 The term “employees’ beneficiary association” was used in ERISA’s predecessor, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, as amended by the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, 29 U.S.C. § 302 (a)(3) (repealed effective January 1, 1975).”
The case’s holding
A commercial program marketed by a third-party entrepreneur is insurance subject to state regulation rather than an employee benefit plan.
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 111 cases
The case’s holding
A bonus plan providing royalty interests is not an ERISA-governed plan if it rewards employees during active years and lacks a systematic deferral of income.
Later courts cite it for
“the words 'provides retirement income' patently refer only to plans designed for the purpose of paying retirement income whether as a result of their express terms or surrounding circumstances.” · 15 citing courts
3
GREENDeborah Malivuk v. Ameripark, LLC, 694 F. App'x 705 (11th Cir. 2017).
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 14 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“52 was not entitled to Chevron deference because 29 U.S.C. § 302 (m) was not ambiguous and thus there was no" gap to be filled by regulation.”
Later courts cite it for
“as the dol puts it, because plaintiff is not pursuing minimum wage 22 claims or overtime claims, but instead seeks only to collect improperly withheld tips, she does 23 not have a cause of action under the flsa.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 89 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“1982), described the "structural defect” test in this way: Federal court review of trust fund plans derives from 29 U.S.C. § 302 (e) [of the National Labor-Management Relations Act, which has provisions similar to the relevant sections of ERISA], and is limited to consideration…”
The case’s holding
A plan administrator's interpretation of a disability definition is upheld if it is made rationally and in good faith.
Later courts cite it for
“nature of the plaintiffs cause of action.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENEqual Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1029 (D.N.J. 1982).
cites § 301 to 309 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“For the definitions, see 29 U.S.C. § 302 (a)(1) and (2) (WPPDA) and 29 U.”
6
GREENUnited States v. Dominick Santiago, 528 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1976).
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“29 U.S.C. § 302 (a)(1) provided as follows: The term “employee welfare benefit plan” means any plan, fund, or program which is communicated or its benefits described in writing to the employees, and which was heretofore or is hereafter established by an employer or by an…”
The case’s holding
Diverting welfare fund assets into a union general fund constitutes conversion to the use of another under the embezzlement statute intended to protect plan beneficiaries.
Later courts cite it for
“the legislative history of section 664 clearly indicates that its intended purpose was to preserve welfare funds for the protection of those entitled to their benefits.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENLamb v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 509 F. Supp. 560 (D.N.J. 1980).
cites § 301 to 309 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“The policy was issued to Overlook. Overlook, as the employer, gathered the employees’ contributions by payroll deduction, added its own contribution, and remitted the premiums to CGLIC.”
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“Formerly 29 U.S.C. § 302 (c)(5). 2 . Section 7 rights explicitly include "the right to .”
9
GREENHurd v. Hutnik, 419 F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1976).
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“If they do, the Court must determine whether those vested rights attach only to such monies as are in the fund, as the defendant employers contend, or whether the retired employees have a vested right to a pension for life.”
Later courts cite it for
“that the members of the milk industry association knew ..., as demonstrated in 1971 when they first sought the destruction of the fund, that termination of the plan would leave the pensioners without financial security in their declining years.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENUnited States v. John J. Daley, 454 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1972).
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“Finally, the defendant urges at some length that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the Fund was an “employee pension benefit fund” as described in 29 U.S.C. § 302 (a) (2) (1970). We do not think it necessary or helpful to deal individually with each alleged…”
The case’s holding
Embezzlement may be charged in a single count because several separate transactions may form one continuing scheme of embezzlement.
Later courts cite it for
“embezzlement, by its very nature, contemplates that several separate transactions may form a single, continuing scheme, and may therefore be charged in a single count.” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENPartick Edwin Golden, Jr. v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1975).
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“The minutes refer specifically to Section 3, Subdivision 6 of the former Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 302 (a)(6), which defined a “participant” as “any employee or former employee of an employer or any member of an employee organization who is or may become eligible to receive a…”
The case’s holding
A committee's discretionary decision to forfeit a profit-sharing benefit stands absent fraud, bad faith, or grossly mistaken judgment, and such forfeiture is not an unlawful restraint of trade.
Later courts cite it for
“when the party who would assume the role of sole arbiter is charged with fraud, bad faith, or a grossly mistaken exercise of judgment.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENJuan Miranda v. R. A. Audia, 681 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1982).
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“Federal court review of trust fund plans derives from 29 U.S.C. § 302 (e), and is limited to consideration of “structural deficiencies.”
13
GREENMahoney v. JJ Weiser & Co., 564 F. Supp. 2d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“” While ERISA does not define “employees’ beneficiary association,” the DOL does so using a four-part test developed under the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 302 (1970) (repealed 1975). Under these criteria, the DOL must find that: (1) membership in the…”
14
GREENWirtz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 239 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
cites § 301 to 309 3×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“It is coneededly an employer engaged in commerce and in an industry or activity affecting commerce, within the meaning of § 3 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 302 . Since about 1939, a number of Gulf’s employes at its Philadelphia Refinery have constituted a group insured under the “Blue…”
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“I agree with the Ninth Circuit that: [Tjhere are in theory arguments for holding that judicially compelled payments by retirement pension funds in accordance with the provisions of a detailed written agreement, which would not significantly affect the actuarial soundness of the…”
16
GREENPierce v. NECA-IBEW Welfare Trust Fund, 488 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“Further relevant requirements of ERISA are that the trustees of such funds exercise the care and skill “that a prudent man” would exercise under like circumstances [ 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B)] and that they manage the fund in accordance with the documents governing the trust […”
17
GREENInt'l Ass'n of Bridge v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1981).
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“See 29 U.S.C. § 302 and 29 U.S.C. § 1104 . Further relevant requirements of ERISA are that the trustees of such funds exercise the care and skill “that a prudent man” would exercise under like circumstances [ 29 U.”
Later courts cite it for
“the sole benefit of the employees covered by the trust.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“By its express terms, § 302(c)(5) only applies where the payments in question are made to ERISA trust funds established for “the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer and their families and dependents” and where the payments are “for the benefit of’ the…”
19
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 0 casesunknown
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“¶ 4), must meet all these criteria for the 6 These criteria were developed for application to the same term under the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 302 (1970), which was repealed in 1975 when ERISA was enacted as its successor.”
cites § 301 to 309 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 301 to 309
“To the extent that the umpire was casting a deadlock breaking vote in administration of the trust, authority was properly vested in the umpire pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 302 (c). The umpire observed, however, that neither he nor the trustees had authority or jurisdiction to settle…”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196519922019

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1977. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D.N.J.32d Cir.25th Cir.26th Cir.27th Cir.21st Cir.111th Cir.19th Cir.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 16 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Show all 22 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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