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U.S. CodeTitle 30Chapter 2— Mineral Lands and Regulations in General

30 U.S.C. § 26 (2026)

Locators’ rights of possession and enjoyment

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1887–2026 116citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 116 opinions since 1887, 6 of them in the last five years.

The locators of all mining locations made on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the public domain, their heirs and assigns, where no adverse claim existed on the 10th day of May 1872 so long as they comply with the laws of the United States, and with State, territorial, and local regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their possessory title, shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to extend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations. But their right of possession to such outside parts of such veins or ledges shall be confined to such portions thereof as lie between vertical planes drawn downward as above described, through the end lines of their locations, so continued in their own direction that such planes will intersect such exterior parts of such veins or ledges. Nothing in this section shall authorize the locator or possessor of a vein or lode which extends in its downward course beyond the vertical lines of his claim to enter upon the surface of a claim owned or possessed by another.

(R.S. § 2322.)
The 20 cases that cite 30 U.S.C. § 26 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENPeople v. Rinehart, 1 Cal. 5th 652 (2016).
cites § 26 6×cited by 13 cases
Later courts cite it for
“the real property interests of miners vis-à -vis each other and the federal government.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENUnited States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
cites § 26 2×cited by 832 cases
Where it cites § 26
“"Discovery" of a mineral deposit, followed by the minimal procedures required to formally "locate" the deposit, gives an individual the right of exclusive possession of the land for mining purposes, 30 U. S. C. § 26 ; as long as $100 of assessment work is performed annually, the…”
The case’s holding
Automatic forfeiture of unpatented mining claims for failure to meet statutory filing deadlines does not violate the due process clause.
Later courts cite it for
“filing deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who fall just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced.” · 34 citing courts
3
GREENTosco Corp. v. Hodel, 611 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Colo. 1985).
cites § 26 5×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 26
“30 U.S.C. § 26 provides in part that “[t]he locators of all mining locations .”
The case’s holding
Substantial compliance with annual assessment work requirements, and the performance of $500 in patent work, maintains a pre-1920 oil shale claim, and the government may be estopped from invalidating it.
cites § 26 2×cited by 242 cases
Where it cites § 26
“If a person locates a valuable mineral deposit on federal land, and perfects the claim by properly staking it and complying with other statutory requirements, the claimant "shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of…”
The case’s holding
A facial challenge to a state regulation fails if the federal scheme does not manifest an intent to preempt all state land use regulation (upholding facial challenge to state environmental regulation).
Later courts cite it for
“it is appropriate to expect an administrative regulation to declare any intention to preempt state law with some specificity” · 6 citing courts
5
GREENWatt v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
cites § 26 2×cited by 127 cases
Where it cites § 26
“30 U. S. C. § 26 . Congress plainly contemplated that mineral deposits on SRHA lands would be subject to location under the mining laws, [11] and the Department of the Interior has consistently permitted prospectors to make entries under the mining laws on SRHA lands.”
The case’s holding
Gravel is included within the scope of a mineral reservation contained in a federal patent issued under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act.
Later courts cite it for
“the determination of whether a particular substance is included in the surface estate or the mineral estate should be made in light of the use of the surface estate that congress contemplated.” · 5 citing courts
6
GREENKen McMaster v. United States, 731 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2013).
cites § 26 2×cited by 36 cases
The case’s holding
Under the Wilderness Act, a located mining claim without a completed patent application is not a valid existing right, and the Quiet Title Act is the exclusive remedy for adverse title claims.
Later courts cite it for
“if we determine that chevron deference applies, then we move to step two, where we will defer to the agency's interpretation if it is 'based on a permissible construction of the statute.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENJoshua Bohmker v. State of Oregon, 903 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2018).
cites § 26 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 26
“30 U.S.C. § 26 (emphasis added). To protect this right to exclusive possession, a locator annually must perform $100 worth of labor or carry out improvements worth $100 in value.”
Later courts cite it for
“wholly lacking in the specific factual support that would be needed to create a genuine issue of material fact” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENSilver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 445 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1968).
cites § 26 4×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 26
“The defendant's theory is that the Yankee Girl vein apexes outside the Surprize Group on property owned or claiie` by it, or by a third party, Sunshine Consolidated, and that 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1964) accords it extralateral rights to follow the vein into the Surprize Group.”
The case’s holding
A court maintains jurisdiction over a transitory contract action even if the defendant asserts title to foreign real estate as a defense.
Later courts cite it for
“the view is generally maintained that where the relief sought acts upon the party personally and does not require the court to deal directly with 'the real estate itself, the proceeding need not be maintained in the state or county where the property is situate.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENChevron Mining Inc. v. United States, 863 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2017).
cites § 26 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 26
“” 30 U.S.C. § 26 . A mining claim is a parcel of land containing precious metal in its soil or rock.”
The case’s holding
Under CERCLA, the canon against surplusage requires courts to give effect to every statutory phrase so that none is inoperative or superfluous; each phrase must have distinct meaning.
Later courts cite it for
“the canon against surplusage indicates that courts generally must give effect to all statutory provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous- each phrase must have distinct meaning.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENUnited States v. Ned N. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979).
cites § 26 3×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 26
“These are 30 U.S.C. § 26 , 30 U.S.C. § 612 , 1 16 *292 U.”
11
GREENReoforce, Inc. v. United States, 853 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
cites § 26 1×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 26
“2d 64 (1985) (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 26 ). A locator secures mining rights only by discovering a valuable mineral, and Congress has made clear that “common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, or cinders” are not valuable mineral deposits under the Mining Law.”
Later courts cite it for
“demonstrate the existence of a legally cognizable property interest,” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENFreeman v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 37 F. Supp. 3d 313 (D.D.C. 2014).
cites § 26 3×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 26
“3d at 699 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 26 ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kunkes v.”
Later courts cite it for
“plaintiff challenging an agency's interpretation of its own regulations carries a 'heavy burden in advancing that claim.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENSilver Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 611 P.2d 1011 (Idaho 1979).
cites § 26 2×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 26
“"Extralateral rights" were created and are governed by the Congressional Act of May 10, 1872, now codified as 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1971), which provides: "The locators of all mining locations made on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge .”
The case’s holding
If a later contract does not explicitly rescind an earlier one, both instruments must be construed together to determine the parties' intent and enforceable provisions.
Later courts cite it for
“once the trial court has ascertained that a total rescission of the earlier contract has not been effected, the two instruments must be read and construed as one in order to determine the intent of the parties and what portion of the agreements are still enforceable.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENEdward R. Swoboda v. Pala Mining, Inc., 844 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1988).
cites § 26 6×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 26
“The district court determined that the patent for the Stewart Mine conveys title to the peg-matite dike, provided that the dike constitutes a vein in the context of 30 U.S.C. § 26 , and that the trust patent for the Pala Indian Reservation does not preclude ownership of the…”
15
GREENSilver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 547 P.2d 1240 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
cites § 26 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 26
“30 U.S.C. § 26 (1971). The right to follow a vein outside the boundaries of one's own claim has come to be called "extralateral rights".”
16
GREENUnited States v. Ray Shumway Molly Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 1999).
cites § 26 1×cited by 202 cases
The case’s holding
An owner of a mining or mill site claim possesses a vested interest and does not need a patent to use the property for legitimate purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“that an affidavit is selfserving bears on its credibility, not on its cognizability for purposes of establishing a genuine issue of material fact.” · 12 citing courts
17
GREENOrion Reserves Ltd. P'ship v. Salazar, 553 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
cites § 26 1×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 26
“See 30 U.S.C. § 26 . Utah law, to which Orion’s claims are subject because they are located in Utah, requires that a claimowner who has performed assessment work must, within thirty days, file an affidavit stating “that the annual assessment work required to maintain the claim…”
The case’s holding
A regulation that conflicts with a statute is void, and claimants must substantially comply with annual assessment work requirements to maintain mining claims.
Later courts cite it for
“a regulation contrary to a statute is void.” · 10 citing courts
18
cites § 26 2×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 26
“3 The Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 26 , provides that “[t]he locators of all mining locations made on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the public domain, their heirs and assigns, .”
The case’s holding
Forfeiture of unpatented mining claims for failure to pay a reasonable statutory maintenance fee does not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
Later courts cite it for
“a 'patent,' that is, an official document issued by the united states attesting that fee title to the land is in the private owner.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENMarathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 751 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Colo. 1990).
cites § 26 3×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 26
“[W]e conclude that [Krushnic and Virginia-Colorado ] must be confined to situations where there had been substantial compliance with the assessment work requirements of the 1872 Act, so that the “pos-sessory title” of the claimant, granted by 30 U.”
20
GREENBixby v. Reynolds Mining Corp., 826 P.2d 968 (N.M. 1992).
cites § 26 8×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 26
“Federal mining law, as evidenced by 30 U.S.C. § 26 , gives the lode locator exclusive possession of the surface: § 26.”
Later courts cite it for
“conclusions that are stated in an affidavit, unsupported by any factual basis ... are not sufficient to raise issues of material fact. the opposing party must set forth more than mere argument.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
188519552026

One bar per 5 years. Tallest: 14 cases in 1995–1999. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
9th Cir.2710th Cir.10E.D. Cal.8D. Colo.6D.D.C.6D. Alaska4Fed. Cir.4Idaho4

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 34 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments
(R.S. § 2322.)
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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