30 U.S.C. § 301
Authorization for lease of oil and gas deposits; by and to whom leased
Whenever the Secretary of the Interior shall deem it to be consistent with the public interest he is authorized to lease deposits of oil and gas in or under lands embraced in railroad or other rights of way acquired under any law of the United States, whether the same be a base fee or mere easement: Provided, That, except as hereinafter authorized, no lease shall be executed hereunder except to the municipality, corporation, firm, association, or individual by whom such right of way was acquired, or to the lawful successor, assignee, or transferee of such municipality, corporation, firm, association, or individual.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8
cases, 1941–2015 · leading case: Union Pacific Railroad v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc.
Union Pacific Railroad v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (2014)
“” ( 30 U.S.C. § 301 .) By this time, a hodgepodge patchwork of easements and ownership interests in railroad rights-of-way had spread across the West.”
MacDonald v. United States (1941)
“373 , 30 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq., which authorizes leases for such purpose.”
Home on the Range v. AT & T Corp. (2005)
“Moreover, under the 1862 Act, as amended in 1864, the government’s specific reservation of mineral rights “shall not be construed to include coal and iron land.”
Wyoming v. United States Department of the Interior (2015)
“30 U.S.C. § 301 . Like the MLA, the Right-of-Way Leasing Act grants the Secretary general rulemaking authority to carry out the Act.”
Rice v. United States (1972)
“Therefore, he concluded, the United States had no mineral interest that it could lease to the railroad under the Railroad Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. On December 31, 1969, Northern Pacific Railway assigned its right to apply for an oil and gas lease to right of way…”
United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1949)
“373 , 30 U.S.C.A. § 301 , is applicable here and requires the lessee to have an oil lease from plaintiff before he can lawfully extract and dispose of the oil from under defendant’s right of way is not tenable.”
United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1951)
“373 , 30 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the railroad had the right to extract and sell the oil from its right of way.”
Wyoming v. Udall (1966)
“373 , 30 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. 8. The action of the Cheyenne Land Office pursuant to the Act of May 21, 1930, supra, to lease the oil and gas deposits underlying the said right of way to Union Pacific was in all respects just, true and correct.”
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.