cites § 1349 2×cited by 990 cases
Superseded by statute on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds. As recognized in Kaplan v. Conyers.
- Where it cites § 1349
- “) (now codified at 31 U. S. C. § 1349 (b)). FWS offered respondent backpay from February 15, 1981, the date his 30-day suspension would have ended, through September 18, 1981, the date the camp was closed.”
- The case’s holding
- The Civil Service Reform Act precludes judicial review in the Claims Court for certain personnel actions affecting nonpreference excepted service employees.
- Later courts cite it for
- “an integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review, designed to balance the legitimate interests of the various categories of federal employees with the needs of sound and efficient administration.” · 85 citing courts
cites § 1349 2×cited by 147 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “See 31 U. S. C. § 1349 (b). It therefore ordered the imposition of a one month's suspension for Rogers.”
- The case’s holding
- Agency delay in providing notice of an impending removal proceeding is harmless error if it does not cause substantial harm or prejudice.
- Later courts cite it for
- “congress clearly intended that an arbitrator would apply the same substantive rules as the board does in reviewing an agency disciplinary decision.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 1349 1×cited by 300 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “31 U.S.C. § 1349 . As to Count 128, Plaintiff argues that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the suspension was appropriate.”
- The case’s holding
- A court may allow a sur-reply when a moving party includes new evidence or arguments in a reply brief that vitiates the nonmovant's ability to respond.
- Later courts cite it for
- “when new submissions and/or arguments are included in a reply brief, and a nonmovant's ability to respond to the new evidence has been vitiated.” · 21 citing courts
cites § 1349 3×cited by 19 cases
Reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in this case: Cornelius v. Nutt (1985).
- Where it cites § 1349
- “In requiring Rogers to serve a two-week suspension for unauthorized use of a patrol vehicle, the arbitrator disregarded the explicit mandatory requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b)(1982), see supra note 10.”
- The case’s holding
- In adverse action arbitration, harmful error governs prejudice to the individual grievant, but an arbitrator may weigh significant collective bargaining violations important to the union even absent grievant prejudice.
- Later courts cite it for
- “standard of proof' (if not of the burden of proof itself),” · 2 citing courts
cites § 1349 3×cited by 17 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “Kimm was suspended for willfully using a government-owned vehicle for other than official purposes in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b). Because the board’s determination that Kimm’s use was willful was not supported by substantial evidence, we reverse.”
cites § 1349 1×cited by 15 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “ID at 20-21; see 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b) (requiring a minimum penalty of a 1-month suspension for willful misuse of a Government passenger vehicle).”
cites § 1349 1×cited by 13 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “See 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b). This reticulate mass of statutory and regulatory law expressly contemplating suspensions for even high-level government employees is further evidence that DoL’s disciplinary-deduction rule is not at home in the federal arena.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “caution dictates against simply importing dol-created standards into the federal sector without any conscious rulemaking at either dol or opm.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 1349 1×cited by 8 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “§ 638a(c)(2) (1976) (now 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b) (1982)). The government responds that petitioner’s return trip home was not authorized because November 6 was an off duty day, and petitioner’s 10-hour detour “on the town” was personal and included the consumption of alcoholic…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “this court's standard of review of a penalty determination is whether the penalty is clearly excessive or an abuse of discretion.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 1349 1×cited by 8 cases
Reversed by United States v. Fausto (1988): the U.S. Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
- Where it cites § 1349
- “Because plaintiff admits that he willfully misused a government vehicle, see Defendant’s Cross-Motion Attachment C, he is subject to a statutorily mandated suspension without pay for not less than one month.”
cites § 1349 1×cited by 8 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “Penalties for violating the Anti-Deficiency Act are codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1350. The court thus finds that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as funds are not available to satisfy plaintiffs’ claim.”
cites § 1349 3×cited by 1 case
- Where it cites § 1349
- “Charge 3: Willful Misuse of a Government-Owned Vehicle The final charge against the Ambassador is that he violated 31 U.S.C. § 1349 and 5 C.F.R. § 2635.704 by authorizing his wife to use a government-owned vehicle.”
cites § 1349 1×cited by 7 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “481 , sustaining her suspension for 30 days from a position with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (agency) on the basis that she had authorized a clerical employee to use a government-owned car for nonofficial purposes in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b) (1982). We…”
cites § 1349 1×cited by 3 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “§ 1350 (criminal penalties for violating the ADA); 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (a) (authorizing administrative discipline for violating the ADA).”
cites § 1349 1×cited by 1 case
- Where it cites § 1349
- “Home-to-work transportation is authorized only for official purposes, and diversion investigators are subject to discipline under 31 U.S.C. § 1349 for misuse of their government vehicles.”
cites § 1349 1×cited by 2 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “See 31 U.S.C. § 1349 . But it does not relieve the court from its responsibility to comply with the law.”
cites § 1349 4×cited by 0 casesunpublished
- Where it cites § 1349
- “2 DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶2 The agency issued a July 7, 2015 decision to suspend the appellant for 30 days based on a charge of willful misuse of a Government vehicle for nonofficial purposes in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b), and the appellant filed an appeal with…”
cites § 1349 4×cited by 0 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “Finally, Flores argues that the Board should have mitigated his penalty, in light of his physical condition at the time of the infractions, his thirty years of “unblemished” service, and 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b). Flores’s arguments are unpersuasive.”
cites § 1349 4×cited by 0 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “Chufo for thirty days without pay, which is the mandatory minimum punishment for misuse of a Government vehicle under 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b) (1988). Mr. Chufo appealed his case to the Board.”
cites § 1349 2×cited by 0 cases
- Where it cites § 1349
- “” Finally, the Army asserts that an employee who violates the statutory prohibition against personal use of a government-owned vehicle must be suspended for not less than one month, and no lesser penalty is permitted under 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b). We agree with the Army that the…”
cites § 1349 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
- Where it cites § 1349
- “¶21 The agency charged the appellant with willful misuse of a GOV for nonofficial purposes as proscribed by 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (b). For an action to constitute a “willful” use for a nonofficial purpose within the meaning of this provision, the officer or employee must have had…”
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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.