33 U.S.C. § 526
Repealed. Pub. L. 100–17, title I, § 135(e), Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 174
[repealed]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10
cases, 1956–2015 · leading case: United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). “Thus, the States could discourage automobile use through taxes on gasoline or parking, for example, and use the revenues to subsidize mass transit projects so they would be "self-supporting" within the meaning of the covenant. Bridge and tunnel tolls could be increased for…”
Delaware River Port Auth. v. Tiemann, 403 F. Supp. 1117 (D.N.J. 1975). “The Administrator’s authority to prescribe tolls derives from Section 503 of the General Bridge Act of 1946, 33 U.S. C. § 526. As originally enacted by Congress the power to set “reasonable and just” tolls was delegated to the Secretary of the Army.”
Molinari v. New York Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 838 F. Supp. 718 (E.D.N.Y 1993). “” 33 U.S.C. § 526 (repealed 1987). The Secretary of Transportation was granted authority to prescribe reasonable rates of toll for transit over the bridge.”
City of Burlington v. Turner, 336 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Iowa 1972). “33 U.S.C. § 526 . 14 . 33 U.S.C. § 529 . 15 .”
Auto. Club of New York, Inc. v. Cox, 592 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979). “One section, 33 U.S.C. § 526 , vested in the Secretary of the Army, later the Secretary of Transportation, rate-making authority in terms quite similar to the General Bridge Act of 1906.”
Delaware River Jt. Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Miller, 147 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1956). “1252 ; 33 U.S.C.A. § 526 . 19 . The budget of plaintiff, which operates, maintains and repairs at least 21 bridges, see Bartron v.”
Auto. Club of New York, Inc. v. Cox, 444 F. Supp. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). “Section 503 of the General Bridge Act of 1946, 33 U.S.C. § 526 , as does Section 4 of the Bridge Act of 1906, requires tolls for interstate bridges to be “reasonable and just”.”
Delaware River Port Auth. v. Tiemann, 531 F.2d 699 (3rd Cir. 1976). “In order to maintain the status quo and avoid needless administrative expense and confusion accompanying another — possibly temporary — rate adjustment, we further direct the district court to order that the present schedule remain in effect pending the Administrator’s…”
Pub. Serv. Coor. Trans. v. Del. River Port Auth., 276 A.2d 378 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971). “847 , 33 U.S.C. § 526 ." An answer was filed by defendant, who then responded to plaintiff's appropriate request for admissions, from which record the foregoing facts appear.”
Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Pub. Accounts of the State of Texas & Ken Paxton, Attorney Gen. of the State of Texas (Tex. App. 2015). “We cannot say that these for purposes of the General Bridge Act of 1946, changes caused the covenant to have a substantially 33 U.S.C. § 526 . different impact in 1974 than when it was adopted in 1962.”
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