33 U.S.C. § 915

Invalid agreements

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(a) No agreement by an employee to pay any portion of premium paid by his employer to a carrier or to contribute to a benefit fund or department maintained by such employer for the purpose of providing compensation or medical services and supplies as required by this chapter shall be valid, and any employer who makes a deduction for such purpose from the pay of any employee entitled to the benefits of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000.(b) No agreement by an employee to waive his right to compensation under this chapter shall be valid.(Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 15, 44 Stat. 1434.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases, 1929–2004 · leading case: Edward O'neil, Pers. Rep. of the Est. of Raymond O'Neil v. Bunge Corp. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 365 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2004).
Edward O'neil, Pers. Rep. of the Est. of Raymond O'Neil v. Bunge Corp. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 365 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2004). “See 33 U.S.C. §§ 915 (b), 916. Section 908(i)’s main purpose “clearly is protection of the claimants’, and the public’s, interest in preserving them and their families from destitution and consequent reliance on the taxpaying public.”
Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Sys., Inc. v. John H. White & Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, U. S. Dep't of Labor, 681 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1982). “In a similar manner, Congress has prohibited waiver, 33 U.S.C. § 915 (b), and assignment, 33 U.”
S. H. Du Puy & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, United States Departmentof Labor, 519 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1975). · cites it 2× “2 In furtherance of the protec *538 tive purpose of the Act, other provisions specified that no agreement by an employee to waive his right to compensation would be valid and that no assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or benefits would be valid except as…”
T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Frank Williams, 275 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1960). “(5) A longshoreman injured on navigable waters may recover under the Louisiana Act, and later, obtain a determination by the Deputy Commissioner that coverage is exclusively under the federal act.”
Giuseppe Capotorto v. Compania Sud Americana De Vapores, Chilean Line, Inc., 541 F.2d 985 (2d Cir. 1976). “The Court seemed clearly to include longshoremen within its definition of “seamen,” since it cited as evidence of the solicitous congressional policy toward seamen’s releases “the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 915 , 916, in which all releases…”
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). “” 15 General Congressional policy is further shown in the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 915 , 916, in which all releases not made under the express terms of the Act are declared invalid.”
Lundborg v. Keystone Shipping Co., 981 P.2d 854 (Wash. 1999). “" 33 U.S.C.A. § 915 (b) (1998). See Lawson v.”
Strachan Shipping Co. v. Nash, 782 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1986). “Yet we are now told that settlements in compensation cases are not like common law settlements and the settlement that Nash executed with Chaparral did not settle the claims between the parties but only so much of the claim as the Board now in hindsight wants to decide was…”
Landry v. Carlson Mooring Serv., 643 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1981). · cites it 2× “Rather, the argument is that Texas law provides that recourse to state workers’ compensation remedies is, once pursued to final judgment, the exclusive course available to a litigant. Respondent asserts that availing oneself of the Texas courts for satisfaction of a claim based…”
Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. of New York v. Locke, 60 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1932). “Not only had Willard no power to make an award, which only the Deputy Commissioner could make, but no accord and satisfaction between the parties was lawful when once the jurisdiction ot the Commissioner had been invoked and the claim was pending before him.”
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Robert T. Nance, 858 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1989). · cites it 2× “Claimants are not permitted to waive their right to compensation except through settlements approved by the deputy commissioner, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 915 , 916. A regulation passed pursuant to the Act, 20 C.”
Lawson v. Stand. Dredging Co., 134 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1943). “33 U.S.C.A. § 915 (b). We think, however, that payments made to the employees in keeping with the provisions of the contract should in justice and fairness be considered as advance payments of compensation within the meaning of Section 914 (k) of the Act which provides: “If the…”
— 33 U.S.C. § 915(b) — 1 case
S. S. S. Co. v. Sheppeard, 34 F.2d 959 (S.D. Tex. 1929).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.