It shall be unlawful for any employer or his duly authorized agent to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee as to his employment because such employee has claimed or attempted to claim compensation from such employer, or because he has testified or is about to testify in a proceeding under this chapter. The discharge or refusal to employ a person who has been adjudicated to have filed a fraudulent claim for compensation is not a violation of this section. Any employer who violates this section shall be liable to a penalty of not less than $1,000 or more than $5,000, as may be determined by the deputy commissioner. All such penalties shall be paid to the deputy commissioner for deposit in the special fund as described in section 944 of this title, and if not paid may be recovered in a civil action brought in the appropriate United States district court. Any employee so discriminated against shall be restored to his employment and shall be compensated by his employer for any loss of wages arising out of such discrimination: Provided, That if such employee shall cease to be qualified to perform the duties of his employment, he shall not be entitled to such restoration and compensation. The employer alone and not his carrier shall be liable for such penalties and payments. Any provision in an insurance policy undertaking to relieve the employer from the liability for such penalties and payments shall be void.
Notes of Decisions
Daniel Brink v. Continental Insurance Company (2015)
cadc · cites it 3×
“The district court similarly held that the comprehensive statutory scheme barred appel *1124 lants’ RICO claims as well as their discrimination and retaliatory discharge claims arising under the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. § 948a. Id. at 254-56 (dismissing Counts I and II).”
Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, LLC (2013)
dcd · cites it 9×
“Plaintiffs have brought the instant action against Defendants Torres AES and Scott Torres (“Defendants”), alleging retaliatory discharge for Elliot’s having sought workers’ compensation benefits under the Defense Base Act (“DBA”), in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 948a, and also…”
Brink v. Xe Holding, LLC (2012)
dcd · cites it 6×
“1 Plaintiffs allege violations of the Long-shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 948a, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.”
Wallace v. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co., Inc. (1989)
txed · cites it 3×
“LHWCA Pre-emption: The Twilight Zone Ryan-Walsh argues that Wallace’s retaliatory discharge claim is pre-empted by its LHWCA counterpart, 33 U.S.C. § 948a. 14 The history and purposes of the LHWCA have been described amply enough in the case law to warrant no more than a brief…”
Kirk J. Lesassier v. Chevron Usa, Inc. (1985)
ca5 · cites it 3×
“§ 1333 (b), which itself contains a retaliatory discharge provision, 33 U.S.C. § 948a, appellant could not rely on state law.”
Hebert v. MID SOUTH CONTROLS AND SERV. (1996)
lactapp · cites it 4×
“1985), Mid South argues that because the accident occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf, jurisdiction lies exclusively under the LHWCA, particularly 33 U.S.C. § 948a. In LeSassier , the plaintiff was injured on a fixed platform located on the Outer Continental Shelf off the…”
Newton v. Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. (2018)
ca9
“The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that “no gap” in federal law existed because “Congress provided a specific statutory provision [in the LHWCA] (33 U.S.C. § 948a) to address retaliatory discharges.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.