Notes of Decisions
City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
· cites it 12× “The first is 34 U.S.C. § 10102 (a)(6), which does not appear in the same statutory subchapter as the Byrne Program.”
City of Los Angeles v. William Barr, 941 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2019).
· cites it 10× “Judge Wardlaw wrote that everything else that the majority wrote about 34 U.S.C. § 10102 (a)(6) was unnecessary to the decision, and dicta.”
City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. United States, 916 F.3d 276 (3rd Cir. 2019).
· cites it 6× “§§ 10151 - 10158 ; second , the provision defining the duties of the AAG for OJP, 34 U.S.C. § 10102 (a) ; and third , for the Certification Condition only, Section 10153(a)(5)(D) of the Byrne JAG statute.”
City of Chicago v. Jefferson B. Sessions III, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018).
· cites it 5× “The district court noted that nothing in the Byrne JAG statute granted express authority to the Attorney General to impose the notice and access conditions, and rejected the Attorney General's claim that a provision in a different subsection, 34 U.S.C. § 10102 , could be…”
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
· cites it 7× “at 3113, codified at 34 U.S.C. § 10102 (a)(6). San Francisco and California offer three generally overlapping arguments to contend that DOJ's conditions on Byrne JAG program funds violate the separation of powers.”
City of S.F. v. Sessions, 372 F. Supp. 3d 928 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
· cites it 7× “§ 10153 (a)(5)(D) and 34 U.S.C. §§ 10102 (a)(2) and (a)(6), asserts that the authority applies to the Byrne JAG program, and contends that the statutes exhibit congressional intent to allow the Assistant Attorney General ("AAG") of the Office of Justice Programs to exercise…”
City of Phila. v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
· cites it 5× “Defendant further contends that the City's ultra vires and separation of powers claims fails because the Challenged Conditions are authorized by the "capacious delegations of authority" contained in 34 U.S.C. §§ 10102 (a)(6) and 10153(a)(5)(D).”
City of Providence v. US Dep't of Just., 954 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2020).
· cites it 3× “We now reach what may be the DOJ's strongest argument: its assertion that it possessed statutory authority to impose the challenged conditions under 34 U.S.C. § 10102 . This statute lays out the duties and functions of the Assistant AG for the OJP.”
State v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 343 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D. Ill. 2018).
· cites it 4× “Defendants point to two potential provisions: 34 U.S.C. § 10102 (a)(6) and 34 U.S.C. § 10153 (a)(5)(D).”
City of Phila. v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 271 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
· cites it 4× “" 34 U.S.C. § 10102 (a)(6). The Attorney General locates an additional source of support for the Certification Condition in the Byrne JAG statute itself, which requires that applications *281 from jurisdictions seeking funding shall include a certification that "the applicant…”
City of Chi. v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855 (E.D. Ill. 2018).
“In so holding, the court rejected the Attorney General's "untenable" contention that 34 U.S.C. § 10102 (a)(6), which sets forth the functions of the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs, provides the Attorney General an expansive, stand-alone grant of…”
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