42 U.S.C. § 1981a

Damages in cases of intentional discrimination in employment

Read at: OLRCuscode.house.gov CornellLII GovInfogovinfo.gov JustiaTitle 42 CasesGoogle Scholar
(a) Right of recovery(1) Civil rights

In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e–5, 2000e–16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. 2000e–2, 2000e–3, 2000e–16], and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.

(2) Disability

In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e–5, 2000e–16] (as provided in section 107(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), and section 794a(a)(1) of title 29, respectively) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) under section 791 of title 29 and the regulations implementing section 791 of title 29, or who violated the requirements of section 791 of title 29 or the regulations implementing section 791 of title 29 concerning the provision of a reasonable accommodation, or section 102 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12112), or committed a violation of section 102(b)(5) of the Act, against an individual, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.

(3) Reasonable accommodation and good faith effort

In cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a reasonable accommodation pursuant to section 102(b)(5) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)] or regulations implementing section 791 of title 29, damages may not be awarded under this section where the covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the disability who has informed the covered entity that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual with an equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the business.

(b) Compensatory and punitive damages(1) Determination of punitive damages

A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.

(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages

Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(g)].

(3) LimitationsThe sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party—(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $50,000;(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $100,000; and(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.(4) Construction

Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the scope of, or the relief available under, section 1981 of this title.

(c) Jury trialIf a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section—(1) any party may demand a trial by jury; and(2) the court shall not inform the jury of the limitations described in subsection (b)(3).(d) DefinitionsAs used in this section:(1) Complaining partyThe term “complaining party” means—(A) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection (a)(1), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or proceeding under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); or(B) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection (a)(2), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General, a person who may bring an action or proceeding under section 794a(a)(1) of title 29, or a person who may bring an action or proceeding under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.].(2) Discriminatory practice

The term “discriminatory practice” means the discrimination described in paragraph (1), or the discrimination or the violation described in paragraph (2), of subsection (a).

(R.S. § 1977A, as added Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 102, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1072.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, referred to in subsec. (d)(1)(A), is Pub. L. 88–352, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 241. Title VII of the Act is classified generally to subchapter VI (§ 2000e et seq.) of this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2000a of this title and Tables.

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, referred to in subsec. (d)(1)(B), is Pub. L. 101–336, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 327. Title I of the Act is classified generally to subchapter I (§ 12111 et seq.) of chapter 126 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 12101 of this title and Tables.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section effective Nov. 21, 1991, except as otherwise provided, see section 402 of Pub. L. 102–166, set out as an Effective Date of 1991 Amendment note under section 1981 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2,582 cases (472 in the last 5 years), 1992–2026 · leading case: Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2001) iowa · cites it 23× “Linda Rae Channon appeals from a district court’s posttrial ruling that imposed caps pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a on compensatory and punitive damages a jury awarded her against her employer United Parcel Service, Inc.”
Carleen Black v. Pan American Laboratories (2011) ca5 · cites it 20× “3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a)(b)(3); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.”
Salveson v. Douglas County (2001) wis · cites it 23× “Salveson brought a lawsuit against Douglas County and Collyard on June 17, 1996, alleging violations and seeking damages under Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. She also raised numerous other claims.”
Kolstad v. American Dental Assn. (1999) scotus · cites it 10× “Courts of Appeals, too, have relied on these liability limits in interpreting 42 U. S. C. § 1981a. See, e. g., Dudley v.”
Jin Ku Kim, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Nash Finch Company, Appellee/cross-Appellant (1997) ca8 · cites it 14× “3d 1431, 1437 (1997) (holding standard of proof for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is the same as that previously established for punitive damages under 42 U.”
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) scotus · cites it 6× “1072 , 42 U. S. C. § 1981a (1994 ed.). Baker is not a party to the case.”
Sheila White, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., Defendant-Appellant/cros (2004) ca6 · cites it 7× “42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b); 2000e-5(g), (k). Although Burlington Northern argues that it made White whole when it granted her back pay, Congress has declared that part of making a Title VII plaintiff whole is compensating her for interest on the back pay, attorney’s fees, and…”
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Boh Bros. Construction Co. (2013) ca5 · cites it 8× “” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). This is a higher standard than the showing necessary for compensatory damages, satisfied in “only a subset of cases involving intentional discrimination.”
West v. Gibson (1999) scotus · cites it 12× “Unlike § 717(b), 42 U. S. C. § 1981a does authorize awards of compensatory damages against the United States.”
Stanley D. Dowd and Richard Brown, Jr. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 286 (2001) ca8 · cites it 11× “§ 1981a(b) provides in relevant part; (3) Limitations The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the…”
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998) scotus · cites it 4× “1072 , 42 U. S. C. § 1981a; see Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.”
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (2007) ca9 · cites it 8× “It is unlikely the Congress that approved both Rule 23(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a intended to put discrimination victims to such a choice.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1) — 5 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1)(2) — 1 case
Dawson v. Burnett (2009) miwd
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(2) — 10 cases
Schmidt v. Solis (2012) dcd
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(3) — 9 cases
Olmsted v. Emmanuel (2001) fladistctapp
Hall v. Claussen (2001) ca10
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(3)(A) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(3)(C) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(3)(D) — 5 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(3)(b) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(4) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(B)(3) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(B)(3)(A) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(C) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) — 70 cases
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (2007) ca9 “It is unlikely the Congress that approved both Rule 23(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a intended to put discrimination victims to such a choice.”
Carleen Black v. Pan American Laboratories (2011) ca5 “3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a)(b)(3); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) — 131 cases
West v. Gibson (1999) scotus “Unlike § 717(b), 42 U. S. C. § 1981a does authorize awards of compensatory damages against the United States.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1995) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) — 119 cases
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) scotus “1072 , 42 U. S. C. § 1981a (1994 ed.). Baker is not a party to the case.”
Lane v. Pena (1996) scotus
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2)(2000) — 1 case
Harris v. Schriro (2009) azd
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2)(3) — 1 case
Nieves v. McDonough (2025) prd
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2)(b) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) — 35 cases
Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) calctapp
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(Z) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(i) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l) — 189 cases
Carleen Black v. Pan American Laboratories (2011) ca5 “3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a)(b)(3); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.”
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) scotus “1072 , 42 U. S. C. § 1981a (1994 ed.). Baker is not a party to the case.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) — 112 cases
Carleen Black v. Pan American Laboratories (2011) ca5 “3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a)(b)(3); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.”
Sheila White, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., Defendant-Appellant/cros (2004) ca6 “42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b); 2000e-5(g), (k). Although Burlington Northern argues that it made White whole when it granted her back pay, Congress has declared that part of making a Title VII plaintiff whole is compensating her for interest on the back pay, attorney’s fees, and…”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) — 418 cases
Kolstad v. American Dental Assn. (1999) scotus “Courts of Appeals, too, have relied on these liability limits in interpreting 42 U. S. C. § 1981a. See, e. g., Dudley v.”
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Boh Bros. Construction Co. (2013) ca5 “” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). This is a higher standard than the showing necessary for compensatory damages, satisfied in “only a subset of cases involving intentional discrimination.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)(2) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) — 94 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) — 445 cases
Salveson v. Douglas County (2001) wis “Salveson brought a lawsuit against Douglas County and Collyard on June 17, 1996, alleging violations and seeking damages under Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. She also raised numerous other claims.”
Parrish v. Sollecito (2003) nysd
Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2001) iowa “Linda Rae Channon appeals from a district court’s posttrial ruling that imposed caps pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a on compensatory and punitive damages a jury awarded her against her employer United Parcel Service, Inc.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A) — 92 cases
Stanley D. Dowd and Richard Brown, Jr. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 286 (2001) ca8 “§ 1981a(b) provides in relevant part; (3) Limitations The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the…”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(B) — 19 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(C) — 26 cases
Carleen Black v. Pan American Laboratories (2011) ca5 “3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a)(b)(3); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) — 190 cases
Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2001) iowa “Linda Rae Channon appeals from a district court’s posttrial ruling that imposed caps pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a on compensatory and punitive damages a jury awarded her against her employer United Parcel Service, Inc.”
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Boh Bros. Construction Co. (2013) ca5 “” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). This is a higher standard than the showing necessary for compensatory damages, satisfied in “only a subset of cases involving intentional discrimination.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D)(2000) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(a) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(c) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4) — 20 cases
Jin Ku Kim, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Nash Finch Company, Appellee/cross-Appellant (1997) ca8 “3d 1431, 1437 (1997) (holding standard of proof for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is the same as that previously established for punitive damages under 42 U.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(8)(A) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(8)(D) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(S) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l) — 377 cases
Sheila White, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., Defendant-Appellant/cros (2004) ca6 “42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b); 2000e-5(g), (k). Although Burlington Northern argues that it made White whole when it granted her back pay, Congress has declared that part of making a Title VII plaintiff whole is compensating her for interest on the back pay, attorney’s fees, and…”
Jin Ku Kim, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Nash Finch Company, Appellee/cross-Appellant (1997) ca8 “3d 1431, 1437 (1997) (holding standard of proof for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is the same as that previously established for punitive damages under 42 U.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l)(1994) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l)(2) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l)(3) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l)(3)(b) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l)(D) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) — 80 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) — 20 cases
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (2007) ca9 “It is unlikely the Congress that approved both Rule 23(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a intended to put discrimination victims to such a choice.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) — 24 cases
Evans v. Avery (1996) ca1
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(l) — 28 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(1) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(1)(A) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(1)(B) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(2) — 2 cases
Jin Ku Kim, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Nash Finch Company, Appellee/cross-Appellant (1997) ca8 “3d 1431, 1437 (1997) (holding standard of proof for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is the same as that previously established for punitive damages under 42 U.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(l) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(l)(A) — 4 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(l)(B) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(e) — 7 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(e)(1) — 6 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(e)(l) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(l) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(l)(2) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(l)(Z) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(l)(l) — 2 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.