45 U.S.C. § 1
Settlement of disputes]. That no carrier which served the notices of November 2, 1959 , and no labor organizations which received such notices or served the labor organization notices of September 7, 1960 , shall make any change except by agreement, or pursuant to an arbitration award as hereinafter provided, in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions encompassed by any of such notices, or engage in any strike or lockout over any dispute arising from any of such notices. Any action heretofore taken which would be prohibited by the foregoing sentence shall be forthwith rescinded and the status existing immediately prior to such action restored.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 373
cases, 1923–2020 · leading case: Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990).
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990). “531 , 45 U. S. C. § 1 (1982 ed.). PATH moved to dismiss both complaints, asserting that PATH enjoyed New York and New Jersey's sovereign immunity and thus that the Eleventh Amendment deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over the suits.”
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). “7, to show that in drafting the 1916 Act "the committee intended to remedy the inadequacy of the act of May 30, 1908, with reference to `occupational diseases.”
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona Ex Rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). “§ 26 (b), permitting the Commission to order the installation of train stop and control devices, operate of their own force to exclude state regulation of train lengths, has even less support.”
Charles A. Ries, III v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., A/K/A Amtrak Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156 (3rd Cir. 1992). “45 U.S.C. §§ 1 , 2, 4, 11 (Safety Appliance Act); 45 U.”
Keizor v. Sand Springs Ry. Co., 861 P.2d 326 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993). “Appellant brought suit in the District Court of Tulsa County alleging Appellee was strictly liable in damages for the death of her husband, based on 45 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1988), called the “Safety Appliance Act” (SAA), based on the belief that because Appellee owned the track,…”
Max D. Erskine v. Consol. Rail Corp., 814 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1987). “He alleged violations of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.”
Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 395 U.S. 164 (1969). “531 , 45 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. Consequently, I think the question of a railroad's liability to a person injured by a violation of that Act is a federal, not a state, question.”
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 858 A.2d 1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). “Watering Down the Proof of Negligence Yet another strongly plaintiff-friendly departure of the FELA from common law negligence actions is that if the railroad is guilty of any violation of the Safety Appliance Acts, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., or the Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.”
Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957). “531 , 45 U. S. C. § 1 , which requires "power driving-wheel brake[s]" and a "train-brake system," speaks in terms of a "locomotive engine," "engineer," "brakemen" and "train.”
Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432 (Ala. 2001). “; and the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., alleging that negligence on the part of the Terminal Railway had caused him to suffer personal injury while working within the line and scope of his employment with the Terminal Railway.”
Dennis Deans v. Csx Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998). “1991) (looking at earlier version of Safety Appliances Act, 45 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (repealed 1994)); see also Angell v.”
Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953). “531 , 45 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., as the causative factor.”
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