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U.S. CodeTitle 49Subtitle V— Rail ProgramsPart A— SafetyChapter 203— Safety Appliances

49 U.S.C. § 20301 (2026)

Definition and nonapplication

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1995–2025 118citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 118 opinions since 1995, 31 of them in the last five years.

(a)Definition.—In this chapter, “vehicle” means a car, locomotive, tender, or similar vehicle.(b)Nonapplication.—This chapter does not apply to the following:(1) a train of 4-wheel coal cars.(2) a train of 8-wheel standard logging cars if the height of each car from the top of the rail to the center of the coupling is not more than 25 inches.(3) a locomotive used in hauling a train referred to in clause (2) of this subsection when the locomotive and cars of the train are used only to transport logs.(4) a car, locomotive, or train used on a street railway.(Pub. L. 103–272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 881; Pub. L. 104–287, § 5(52), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3393.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Pub. L. 103–272

Revised

Section

Source (U.S. Code)

Source (Statutes at Large)

20301(a)

45:8 (“trains, locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles”).

 

45:9 (3d sentence).

20301(b)

45:6 (1st sentence proviso).

Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, § 6 (1st sentence proviso), 27 Stat. 532; restated Apr. 1, 1896, ch. 87, 29 Stat. 85.

 

45:8 (words after 16th comma).

Mar. 2, 1903, ch. 976, § 1 (words after 23d comma), 32 Stat. 943.

Subsection (a) is added to avoid repeating the substance of the definition throughout this chapter.

In subsection (b), the words before clause (1) are substituted for “Provided, That nothing in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to” in 45:6 because 45:9, 11, and 16 provide that 45:9 and 11–16 apply to the same vehicles and trains as 45:1–7 apply to. In clause (1), the word “coal” is added for clarity because of the decision of the Supreme Court in Baltimore & Ohio Railway Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325, 333 (1957) and the legislative history of 45:6 (proviso). See 24 Cong. Rec. 1477 (1893). The text of 45:8 (words after last comma) is omitted as unnecessary because of the definition of “railroad” in section 20102 of the revised title.

Pub. L. 104–287

This amends 49:20301(b) to clarify the restatement of 45:8 by section 1 of the Act of July 5, 1994 (Public Law 103–272, 108 Stat. 881).

Editorial NotesAmendments

1996—Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 104–287 added par. (4).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1996 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–287 effective July 5, 1994, see section 8(1) of Pub. L. 104–287, set out as a note under section 5303 of this title.

The 20 cases that cite 49 U.S.C. § 20301 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENIn re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2016).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 264 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“, and the Safety, Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq. The District Court granted the companies’ motion, holding that Hassell’s claims were preempted by the Locomotive Inspection Act.”
The case’s holding
A court deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may consider only the allegations in the pleading to determine the sufficiency of a claim.
Later courts cite it for
“in deciding motions under rule 12(b)(6), courts may consider 'documents integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint,' or any 'undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.” · 12 citing courts
2
GREENConnie Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2012).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 220 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“, 2 and the *1154 Federal Safety Appliance Act (“FSAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seg. 3 Subsequently, Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment, contending that, in the absence of an identification of the rail car and the alleged faulty handbrake, there was insufficient evidence…”
The case’s holding
Apparent contradictions arising from dialectical misunderstanding rather than purposeful fabrication constitute issues of credibility or weight of evidence rather than grounds for finding a lack of truthfulness.
Later courts cite it for
“where a fact-finder is required to weigh a deponent's credibility, summary judgment is simply improper.” · 12 citing courts
3
GREENDelaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Knoedler Mfrs., Inc., 781 F.3d 656 (3d Cir. 2015).
cites § 20301 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“, the Supreme Court stated that a railroad employee can enforce a violation of the Safety Appliance Acts (“SAAs”), 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq., through the FELA but that a “nonemployee must look for his remedy to a common law action in tort, which is to say that he must sue in a…”
The case’s holding
The Locomotive Inspection Act does not preempt state law claims that redress violations of federal law or enforce voluntarily assumed contractual obligations.
Later courts cite it for
“that violations of federal law can be redressed through state common-law claims.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENAnderson v. BNSF Ry., 2015 MT 240, 354 P.3d 1248.
cites § 20301 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“The same work assignment would be non-negligent if given to an employee without the physical condition at issue. It is the employer’s prior knowledge of the employee’s physical 1 As with any other claim under the FELA, liability in cumulative trauma injury claims may also be…”
The case’s holding
A cumulative occupational injury under FELA accrues only when its accumulated effects manifest, making statute of limitations questions a matter for the jury when factual disputes exist.
Later courts cite it for
“we have repeatedly held that a party need not make a contemporaneous objection if the objection would be redundant of a motion in limine.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENMagna Trust Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 728 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2000).
cites § 20301 2×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“(Illinois Central), alleging a violation of the Safety Appliance Act ( 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et. seq. (1994)). Rusty Jones, an employee of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), suffered fatal injuries when he was crushed between two rail cars while attempting to adjust a coupler on one of…”
The case’s holding
A violation of a motion in limine is not per se reversible error if the trial court sustains the objection and instructs the jury to disregard the improper comments.
Later courts cite it for
“violation of a motion in limine is not per se reversible error” · 5 citing courts
6
GREENIn re West Virginia Asbestos Litig., 592 S.E.2d 818 (W. Va. 2003).
cites § 20301 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“Are state tort law claims against manufacturers of parts or components of trains, locomotives, railcars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad, which is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, preempted by federal law under the Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et…”
The case’s holding
State tort claims against manufacturers of railroad locomotive parts or components are preempted by the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, which occupies the field of railroad safety.
Later courts cite it for
“any other path blocked by an avalanche of adverse authority from other jurisdictions, both state and federal.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENHardlannert v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 928 N.E.2d 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2010).
cites § 20301 4×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“§§51 through 60 (2000)) and the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA) ( 49 U.S.C. §20301 et seq. (2000)) after he sustained a back injury while working on defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company’s switching tracks.”
8
GREENDennis Deans v. CSX Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 168 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“(“CSX”), appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment against him on his claims under the Federal Safety Appliances Act (“FSAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq., and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.”
The case’s holding
Whether a train is in use under the Federal Safety Appliances Act depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the train's location and the injured party's activity.
Later courts cite it for
“where the train was located at the time of the accident and the activity of the injured party.” · 11 citing courts
9
GREENScheiding v. Gen. Motors Corp., 22 Cal. 4th 471 (2000).
cites § 20301 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“) We agree with the Court of Appeal that the foregoing principles govern the viability of plaintiffs' state law causes of action, which are based upon their claim defendant manufactured a defective product by utilizing asbestos in the design of its locomotives.”
The case’s holding
The Federal Locomotive Inspection Act preempts state law products liability claims brought by employees against locomotive manufacturers (Scheiding v. General Motors Corp.).
Later courts cite it for
“napier has long established that congress intended to occupy the field' of locomotive equipment” · 1 citing court
10
GREENRonald Ward v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 901 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2018).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq. In Tipton v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.”
Later courts cite it for
“the choice-of-law issue is waived if a party fails to raise it.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENLittle v. Budd Co., 955 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 2020).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“Alternatively, Budd asserts Little’s tort claims are preempted by the Safety Appliance Act (“SAA”), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20301 to 20306. This assertion, however, is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.”
Later courts cite it for
“absent extraordinary circumstances, arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived.” · 6 citing courts
12
GREENBNSF Ry. Co. v. Seats, Inc., 900 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2018).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“See 49 U.S.C. § 20301 - 06 . The SAAs and the LIA are similar.”
Later courts cite it for
“the lia has the 'purpose and effect of facilitating employee recovery' by conferring on railroads a 'duty to provide safe equipment.” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENGary Miller v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 972 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2020).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“This Court has said, for example, that “[t]he [Federal Safety Appliance Acts, 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq.,] impose[s] [an] absolute dut[y] on railroads to provide required safety equipment on their trains, including safe power braking systems.”
14
GREENCarrillo v. ACF Indus., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1158 (1999).
cites § 20301 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“Neither the federal Safety Appliance Acts (collectively the SAA; see 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq.) nor its regulations (see 49 C.”
The case’s holding
Federal law occupies the field of railroad freight-car safety equipment, preempting state common law tort claims based on design defects in such equipment.
15
GREENMakovy v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 339 F. Supp. 3d 1242 (E.D. Okla. 2018).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“, and the Federal Safety Appliance Act ("FSAA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20301 - 20306. The complaint states that Count One is for strict liability and Count Two is for negligence.”
Later courts cite it for
“must prove that the statutory violation was a causative factor contributing in whole or in part to the accident that caused his injuries.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 20301 1×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“(1986) (“FSAAs”), repealed and transferred, 49 U.S.C. § 20301 ei seq. (1995). The FSAAs, however, do not create an independent cause of action for injured parties.”
The case’s holding
A defendant may not introduce evidence of a plaintiff's collateral source compensation unless the plaintiff's own case makes the existence of such coverage a matter of probative value.
Later courts cite it for
“a plaintiff's collateral sources of compensation cannot be inquired into as part of a defendant's case, because of the danger that the jury may be inclined to find no liability, or to reduce a damage award, when it learns that plaintiff's loss is entirely or partially covered.” · 4 citing courts
17
GREENMagelky v. BNSF Ry. Co., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (D.N.D. 2008).
cites § 20301 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“Magelky alleged that BNSF violated the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et. seq., and was negligent.”
18
GREENDixon v. Union Pac. R.R., 891 N.E.2d 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2008).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“On March 22, 2007, after plaintiff rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the issue of plaintiffs future wage losses, which was denied, and plaintiff moved for “a directed finding” 1 on defendant’s violation of the Safety Appliance Act ( 49 U.S.C. §20301 et seq.…”
The case’s holding
A reviewing court reverses a trial court's ruling on a posttrial motion for a new trial only if the trial court abused its discretion.
Later courts cite it for
“a reviewing court will reverse a trial court's ruling on a posttrial motion for a new trial, only if the trial court abused its discretion.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENNorfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Schumpert, 608 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 20301 1×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“2 49 USC § 20301 et seq. 3 As stated in the FELA, the carrier is liable for injuries or death “resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in…”
20
GREENKelson v. Cent. of Georgia R.R., 505 S.E.2d 803 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 20301 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 20301
“In addition, the complaint claimed that the Central Railroad violated the FSAA, 49 USC § 20301 et seq., by failing to ensure that the boxcar was equipped with statutorily mandated safety equipment which caused, in whole or in part, Kelson’s injuries.”

Show all 118 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199520102025

One bar per year. Tallest: 21 cases in 2021. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
W.D. Okla.23Ill. App. Ct.88th Cir.5Ga. Ct. App.54th Cir.43rd Cir.37th Cir.3D.N.D.3

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 55 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments
(Pub. L. 103–272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 881; Pub. L. 104–287, § 5(52), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3393.)
Amendment years (notes): 1996
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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