49 U.S.C. § 44112

Limitation of liability

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(a)Definitions.—In this section—(1) “lessor” means a person leasing for at least 30 days a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller.(2) “owner” means a person that owns a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller.(3) “secured party” means a person having a security interest in, or security title to, a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller under a conditional sales contract, equipment trust contract, chattel or corporate mortgage, or similar instrument.(b)Liability.—A lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal injury, death, or property loss or damage only when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual possession or operational control of the lessor, owner, or secured party, and the personal injury, death, or property loss or damage occurs because of—(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or(2) the flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine, or propeller.(Pub. L. 103–272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1167; Pub. L. 115–254, div. B, title V, § 514, Oct. 5, 2018, 132 Stat. 3358.)

Historical and Revision Notes

Revised

Section

Source (U.S. Code)

Source (Statutes at Large)

44112

49 App.:1404.

Aug. 23, 1958, Pub. L. 85–726, § 504, 72 Stat. 774; restated July 8, 1959, Pub. L. 86–81, § 2, 73 Stat. 180.

In subsection (a), clauses (1) and (3) are derived from 49 App.:1404 (2d–57th words). Clause (2) is added for clarity. In clause (1), the words “bona fide” are omitted as surplus. In clause (3), the word “nature” is omitted as surplus.

In subsection (b), before clause (1), the words “personal injury, death” are substituted for “any injury to or death of persons”, and the words “on land or water” are substituted for “on the surface of the earth (whether on land or water)”, to eliminate unnecessary words. In clause (2), the words “ascent, descent, or” and “dropping or” are omitted as surplus.

Editorial NotesAmendments

2018—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 115–254, in introductory provisions, struck out “on land or water” before “only when” and inserted “operational” before “control”.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21 cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1999–2025 · leading case: Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70 (Fla. 2011).
Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70 (Fla. 2011). · cites it 15× “Aerolease moved for summary final judgment, contending that a provision of federal law, 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (1994), preempted Florida law.”
Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 723 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 5× “Finally, summary judgment was granted to defendant AMR Leasing Corporation (AMR) on the grounds that a federal statute, 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (1994), impliedly preempted state claims for personal injury against lessors of aircraft.”
Vreeland v. Ferrer, 28 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). · cites it 17× “Aerolease successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that a provision of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44112 , preempts Florida’s dangerous instrumentality law as it relates to owners or lessors of civil aircraft.”
Eagle Jets, LLC v. Atlanta Jet, Inc., 740 S.E.2d 439 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). “Citing 49 USC § 44112 (b) (“Alessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal injury, death, or property loss or damage on land or water only when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual possession or control of the lessor, owner, or secured party.”
Esheva v. Siberia Airlines, 499 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). “" 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (b). Podhurst responds only that this immunity statute will not apply if, as Sibir argues, Russian law governs the claims in this litigation.”
Arthur v. Grimmett, 319 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App. 2009). “Arthur maintains that the judgment improperly imposes individual liability against her.”
Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 309 Ill. App. 3d 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 5× “Finally, summary judgment was granted to defendant AMR Leasing Corporation (AMR) on the grounds that a federal statute, 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (1994), impliedly preempted state claims for personal injury against lessors of aircraft.”
Escobar v. Eur. Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. (D. Haw. 2020). · cites it 5× “Question Of “Operational Control” Is A Question Of Fact For The Jury In The First Trial 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (b) provides that a lessor cannot be liable for personal injury or death on an aircraft it owns unless the lessor “is in the actual possession or operational control” of the…”
Blue Air Training Corp. v. Hadley (D.N.M. 2025). · cites it 5× “Second, Defendant Jones argues that “Plaintiff’s claims against [him] are federally preempted pursuant to 49 U.S.C.A. § 44112 .” Id. In support of his position, Defendant Jones states the following facts, which Plaintiff does not dispute.”
Violeta Escobar v. Nevada Helicopter Leasing, LLC (9th Cir. 2019). · cites it 4× “concluded that Escobar’s state claims were preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 44112 , which at the time limited the liability of an aircraft’s lessors, owners, and secured parties unless the aircraft was “in the actual possession or control of the lessor, owner, or secured party.”
Escobar v. Eur. Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. (D. Haw. 2019). · cites it 4× “Nevada Leasing seeks to have a trial first on the factual questions identified by the Appellate Court to determine whether Nevada Leasing may be held liable pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (b). Nevada Leasing argues that the control issue identified by the Ninth Circuit Court of…”
Blue Air Training Corp. v. Hadley (D.N.M. 2025). · cites it 4× “As noted in this Court’s earlier Memorandum Opinion and Order, 49 U.S.C. § 44112 shields aircraft owners from liability related to property loss or damage unless they had actual possession or “operational control” of the aircraft.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.