Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026

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(1) No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(2) For the purposes of this section, "collateral attack" means any form of postconviction relief other than a direct appeal. "Collateral attack" includes, but is not limited to, a personal restraint petition, a habeas corpus petition, a motion to vacate judgment, a motion to withdraw guilty plea, a motion for a new trial, and a motion to arrest judgment.

(3) For the purposes of this section, a judgment becomes final on the last of the following dates:

(a) The date it is filed with the clerk of the trial court;

(b) The date that an appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction; or

(c) The date that the United States Supreme Court denies a timely petition for certiorari to review a decision affirming the conviction on direct appeal. The filing of a motion to reconsider denial of certiorari does not prevent a judgment from becoming final.

[ 1989 c 395 s 1.]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 873 cases (275 in the last 5 years), 1991–2026 · leading case: In re the Pers. Restraint of Coats, 267 P.3d 324 (Wash. 2011).

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In re the Pers. Restraint of Coats, 267 P.3d 324 (Wash. 2011). · cites it 79× “We take this occasion to review our jurisprudence regarding the statutory one-year time *126 limit for collateral attacks on judgments that are valid on their faces under RCW 10.73.090. We conclude that Coats’s judgment is valid on its face despite the error; that the sentencing…”

Matter of Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 853 P.2d 424 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 58× “These three factually unrelated personal restraint petitions (PRPs) challenge the constitutionality of RCW 10.73.090 et seq. (the statute) which, with certain exceptions, require postconviction petitions for collateral relief to be filed within 1 year after the conviction…”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Turay, 150 Wash. 2d 71 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 40× “This personal restraint petition, his third, was filed in the Court of Appeals well over one *74 year from the time of his commitment, thus raising the issue whether RCW 10.73.090’s one-year time limit for filing a personal restraint petition applies.”

In Re Turay, 74 P.3d 1194 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 39× “This personal restraint petition, his third, was filed in the Court of Appeals well over one year from the time of his commitment, thus raising the issue whether RCW 10.73.090's one-year time limit for filing a personal restraint petition applies.”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Skylstad, 162 P.3d 413 (Wash. 2007). · cites it 30× “RCW 10.73.090 prevents collateral attacks on a *946 judgment and sentence to be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final.”

Pers. Restraint Petition Of Arthur Lewis Dove, 381 P.3d 1280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 20× “090(1) states that no PRP can be filed more than one year after the petitioner’s judgment becomes final unless the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face or unless one of six exceptions in RCW 10.73.100 applies. We hold that the one-year time bar applies to Dove’s PRP…”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Adams, 309 P.3d 451 (Wash. 2013). · cites it 31× “¶1 This case involves a claim under RCW 10.73.090 of facial invalidity in a 2000 judgment and sentence, based on an incorrectly calculated offender score.”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Stoudmire, 5 P.3d 1240 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 25× “100 and that because the petition is also untimely, it is barred from consideration by RCW 10.73.090. The State also alleges that petitioner’s raising of new issues in a successive petition that could have been raised in the earlier one constitutes an abuse of the writ.”

State v. Robinson, 104 Wash. App. 657 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 23× “The Skagit County Superior Court declined to consider the merits of Cynthia Lynn Robinson’s motion to withdraw guilty plea because the motion was filed more than one year after the date of the judgment and sentence, contrary to the time limitation for collateral attacks…”

In Re Bonds, 196 P.3d 672 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 19× “¶ 1 We are asked to determine whether, under the facts of this case, we will recognize equitable tolling as an exception to the time bar provided under RCW 10.73.090 and permit Robert Charles Bonds, Jr.”

In re the Pers. Restraint of Bonds, 165 Wash. 2d 135 (Wash. 2008). · cites it 19× “¶1 — We are asked to determine whether, under the facts of this case, we will recognize equitable tolling as an exception to the time bar provided under RCW 10.73.090 and permit Robert Charles Bonds, Jr.”

State v. Kelly, 561 P.3d 246 (Wash. 2024). · cites it 24× “Kelly was sentenced to 116 months for first degree burglary and lesser amounts for his remaining convictions.”

Show all 873 citing cases →

— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(1) — 488 cases

In re the Pers. Restraint of Coats, 267 P.3d 324 (Wash. 2011). “We take this occasion to review our jurisprudence regarding the statutory one-year time *126 limit for collateral attacks on judgments that are valid on their faces under RCW 10.73.090. We conclude that Coats’s judgment is valid on its face despite the error; that the sentencing…”

Pers. Restraint Petition Of Arthur Lewis Dove, 381 P.3d 1280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “090(1) states that no PRP can be filed more than one year after the petitioner’s judgment becomes final unless the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face or unless one of six exceptions in RCW 10.73.100 applies. We hold that the one-year time bar applies to Dove’s PRP…”

In Re the Pers. Restraint of Carrier, 272 P.3d 209 (Wash. 2012).

State v. Kelly, 561 P.3d 246 (Wash. 2024). “Kelly was sentenced to 116 months for first degree burglary and lesser amounts for his remaining convictions.”

Matter of Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 853 P.2d 424 (Wash. 2000). “These three factually unrelated personal restraint petitions (PRPs) challenge the constitutionality of RCW 10.73.090 et seq. (the statute) which, with certain exceptions, require postconviction petitions for collateral relief to be filed within 1 year after the conviction…”

— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(2) — 96 cases

In re the Pers. Restraint Well, 133 Wash. 2d 433 (Wash. 1997).

Matter of Well, 946 P.2d 750 (Wash. 1997).

In re the Pers. Restraint of Stockwell, 316 P.3d 1007 (Wash. 2014).

State v. Molnar, 497 P.3d 858 (Wash. 2021).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(3) — 33 cases

In re the Pers. Restraint of Skylstad, 162 P.3d 413 (Wash. 2007). “RCW 10.73.090 prevents collateral attacks on a *946 judgment and sentence to be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final.”

In Re Pers. Restraint of VanDelft, 147 P.3d 573 (Wash. 2006).

State v. Davis, 104 P.3d 11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).

Pers. Restraint Petition Of Vincent L Fowler, 442 P.3d 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(3)(a) — 90 cases

Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).

State v. Molnar, 497 P.3d 858 (Wash. 2021).

In Re Domingo, 119 P.3d 816 (Wash. 2006).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(3)(b) — 130 cases

In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2021).

In re the Pers. Restraint of Grasso, 151 Wash. 2d 1 (Wash. 2004).

In Re Pers. Restraint of Grasso, 84 P.3d 859 (Wash. 2004).

In Re Domingo, 119 P.3d 816 (Wash. 2006).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(3)(c) — 8 cases

In re the Pers. Restraint of Benn, 952 P.2d 116 (Wash. 1998).

Shumway v. Payne, 964 P.2d 349 (Wash. 1998).

In re the Pers. Restraint Well, 133 Wash. 2d 433 (Wash. 1997).

Matter of Well, 946 P.2d 750 (Wash. 1997).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(5) — 1 case

Pers. Restraint Petition Of Marcus Jordan Carrillo (Wash. Ct. App. 2021).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(6) — 1 case

In Re Domingo, 119 P.3d 816 (Wash. 2006).

— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(l) — 5 cases

In re the Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 152 Wash. 2d 853 (Wash. 2004).

State v. Miller, 371 P.3d 528 (Wash. 2016).

In re the Pers. Restraint of Yung-Cheng Tsai, 351 P.3d 138 (Wash. 2015).

State v. Miller (Wash. 2016).

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