Wash. Rev. Code » Title 10 · Chapter 10.73
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100 (2026)

✓ current as of May 2026
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The time limit specified in RCW 10.73.090 does not apply to a petition or motion that is based solely on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) Newly discovered evidence, if the defendant acted with reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence and filing the petition or motion;
(2) The statute that the defendant was convicted of violating was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant's conduct;
(3) The conviction was barred by double jeopardy under Amendment V of the United States Constitution or Article I, section 9 of the state Constitution;
(4) The defendant pleaded not guilty and the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the conviction;
(5) The sentence imposed was in excess of the court's jurisdiction;
(6) A motion for a modification of conditions of community custody pursuant to RCW 9.94A.703 and 9.94A.709; or
(7) There has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive or procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order entered in a criminal or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government, and either the legislature has expressly provided that the change in the law is to be applied retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a change in the law that lacks express legislative intent regarding retroactive application, determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard.
[ 2024 c 118 s 8; 1989 c 395 s 2.]

Notes:

Application—Effective date—2024 c 118: See notes following RCW 9.94A.704.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 494 cases (172 in the last 5 years), 1992–2026 · leading case: In re the Pers. Restraint of Coats, 267 P.3d 324 (Wash. 2011).
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In re the Pers. Restraint of Coats, 267 P.3d 324 (Wash. 2011). · cites it 33× “090(1), 5 is limited to the six grounds enumerated in RCW 10.73.100. 6 *132 ¶9 Among the peculiar characteristics of personal restraint petitions is the fact that they may be, and usually are, considered first by appellate courts, not by trial courts.”
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Arthur Lewis Dove, 381 P.3d 1280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 32× “090(1) states that no PRP can be filed more than one year after the petitioner’s judgment becomes final unless the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face or unless one of six exceptions in RCW 10.73.100 applies. We hold that the one-year time bar applies to Dove’s PRP…”
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2021). · cites it 18× “BECAUSE THE PETITIONS CLAIM THE AGGRAVATED MURDER STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED, THEY ARE EXEMPT FROM THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR Both petitioners’ sentences became final long ago, and petitioners are generally barred from filing a PRP “more than one year after the judgment…”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Hankerson, 72 P.3d 703 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 27× “090, and at least one of the claims it contains does not fall within an exception in RCW 10.73.100. Petitioner challenges the dismissal, arguing that a reviewing court must evaluate each of the claims raised in a personal restraint petition filed after the one-year limit,…”
In re Pers. Restraint of Frazier, 558 P.3d 451 (Wash. 2024). · cites it 68× “” In contrast to the other exemptions listed in RCW 10.73.100, the newly discovered evidence exemption does not specify whether it applies to convictions, sentences, or both.”
State v. Miller, 371 P.3d 528 (Wash. 2016). · cites it 18× “determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard.”
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 853 P.2d 424 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 28× “090 and RCW 10.73.100. Runyan resubmitted the PRP on April 11, 1991, along with a letter explaining why the PRP was not time barred.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Stoudmire, 5 P.3d 1240 (Wash. 2000). · cites it 18× “The State asserts Stoudmire has submitted a mixed petition in violation of RCW 10.73.100 and that because the petition is also untimely, it is barred from consideration by RCW 10.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Colbert, 380 P.3d 504 (Wash. 2016). · cites it 15× “¶22 But the question here is whether there is sufficient reason to require retroactive application of a significant change in the law under RCW 10.73.100, which creates an exception to the time bar under RCW 10.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Turay, 150 Wash. 2d 71 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 14× “090 applies to this case. RCW 10.73.090(1) provides that “[n]o petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was…”
In Re Turay, 74 P.3d 1194 (Wash. 2003). · cites it 14× “73.090(1) provides that "[n]o petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent…”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Adams, 309 P.3d 451 (Wash. 2013). · cites it 16× “” The time bar may be avoided if the petitioner can establish one of six exceptions listed under RCW 10.73.100. 2 Adams does not argue that his ineffective assistance claims fit one of these enumerated exceptions.”
Show all 494 citing cases →
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(1) — 77 cases
In re Pers. Restraint of Frazier, 558 P.3d 451 (Wash. 2024). “” In contrast to the other exemptions listed in RCW 10.73.100, the newly discovered evidence exemption does not specify whether it applies to convictions, sentences, or both.”
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Stenson, 276 P.3d 286 (Wash. 2012).
State v. Wheeler, 349 P.3d 820 (Wash. 2015).
In Re Domingo, 119 P.3d 816 (Wash. 2006).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Domingo, 155 Wash. 2d 356 (Wash. 2005).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(2) — 30 cases
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2021). “BECAUSE THE PETITIONS CLAIM THE AGGRAVATED MURDER STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED, THEY ARE EXEMPT FROM THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR Both petitioners’ sentences became final long ago, and petitioners are generally barred from filing a PRP “more than one year after the judgment…”
State v. Robinson, 104 Wash. App. 657 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Robinson, 17 P.3d 653 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 853 P.2d 424 (Wash. 2000). “090 and RCW 10.73.100. Runyan resubmitted the PRP on April 11, 1991, along with a letter explaining why the PRP was not time barred.”
In Re Hinton, 100 P.3d 801 (Wash. 2004).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(2)(5) — 1 case
State v. Winston, 19 P.3d 495 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(3) — 25 cases
In re Pers. Restraint of Schorr, 422 P.3d 451 (Wash. 2018).
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 853 P.2d 424 (Wash. 2000). “090 and RCW 10.73.100. Runyan resubmitted the PRP on April 11, 1991, along with a letter explaining why the PRP was not time barred.”
In re Pers. Restraint of Knight, 473 P.3d 663 (Wash. 2020).
In Re Bybee, 175 P.3d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Bybee, 142 Wash. App. 260 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(4) — 32 cases
In re the Pers. Restraint of Bell, 387 P.3d 719 (Wash. 2017).
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 853 P.2d 424 (Wash. 2000). “090 and RCW 10.73.100. Runyan resubmitted the PRP on April 11, 1991, along with a letter explaining why the PRP was not time barred.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wash. 2d 354 (Wash. 2011).
In Re Bybee, 175 P.3d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Bybee, 142 Wash. App. 260 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(4)(6) — 1 case
Blizzard v. Boe (E.D. Wash. 2024).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(5) — 53 cases
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 482 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2021). “BECAUSE THE PETITIONS CLAIM THE AGGRAVATED MURDER STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED, THEY ARE EXEMPT FROM THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR Both petitioners’ sentences became final long ago, and petitioners are generally barred from filing a PRP “more than one year after the judgment…”
In Re Vehlewald, 963 P.2d 903 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Vehlewald, 92 Wash. App. 197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Coats, 267 P.3d 324 (Wash. 2011). “090(1), 5 is limited to the six grounds enumerated in RCW 10.73.100. 6 *132 ¶9 Among the peculiar characteristics of personal restraint petitions is the fact that they may be, and usually are, considered first by appellate courts, not by trial courts.”
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 853 P.2d 424 (Wash. 2000). “090 and RCW 10.73.100. Runyan resubmitted the PRP on April 11, 1991, along with a letter explaining why the PRP was not time barred.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(6) — 205 cases
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Arthur Lewis Dove, 381 P.3d 1280 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). “090(1) states that no PRP can be filed more than one year after the petitioner’s judgment becomes final unless the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face or unless one of six exceptions in RCW 10.73.100 applies. We hold that the one-year time bar applies to Dove’s PRP…”
State v. Miller, 371 P.3d 528 (Wash. 2016). “determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard.”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Colbert, 380 P.3d 504 (Wash. 2016). “¶22 But the question here is whether there is sufficient reason to require retroactive application of a significant change in the law under RCW 10.73.100, which creates an exception to the time bar under RCW 10.”
Pers. Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf, 384 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Stoudmire, 36 P.3d 1005 (Wash. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(7) — 13 cases
State v. Kelly, 561 P.3d 246 (Wash. 2024).
In re Pers. Restraint of Frazier, 558 P.3d 451 (Wash. 2024). “” In contrast to the other exemptions listed in RCW 10.73.100, the newly discovered evidence exemption does not specify whether it applies to convictions, sentences, or both.”
In re Pers. Restraint of Schoenhals (Wash. 2025).
Pers. Restraint Petition of Michael Wayne Arnold (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
In Re The Pers. Restraint Petition Of: Charles Andrew Bukovsky (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100(l) — 2 cases
In re the Pers. Restraint of Turay, 150 Wash. 2d 71 (Wash. 2003). “090 applies to this case. RCW 10.73.090(1) provides that “[n]o petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was…”
In re the Pers. Restraint of Adams, 309 P.3d 451 (Wash. 2013). “” The time bar may be avoided if the petitioner can establish one of six exceptions listed under RCW 10.73.100. 2 Adams does not argue that his ineffective assistance claims fit one of these enumerated exceptions.”
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