Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020 (2026)
Definition
✓ current as of May 2026
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A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A felony, if he or she commits first degree murder as defined by RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a), as now or hereafter amended, and one or more of the following aggravating circumstances exist:
(1) The victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, or firefighter who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the act resulting in death and the victim was known or reasonably should have been known by the person to be such at the time of the killing;
(2) At the time of the act resulting in the death, the person was serving a term of imprisonment, had escaped, or was on authorized or unauthorized leave in or from a state facility or program for the incarceration or treatment of persons adjudicated guilty of crimes;
(3) At the time of the act resulting in death, the person was in custody in a county or county-city jail as a consequence of having been adjudicated guilty of a felony;
(4) The person committed the murder pursuant to an agreement that he or she would receive money or any other thing of value for committing the murder;
(5) The person solicited another person to commit the murder and had paid or had agreed to pay money or any other thing of value for committing the murder;
(6) The person committed the murder to obtain or maintain his or her membership or to advance his or her position in the hierarchy of an organization, association, or identifiable group;
(7) The murder was committed during the course of or as a result of a shooting where the discharge of the firearm, as defined in RCW 9.41.010, is either from a motor vehicle or from the immediate area of a motor vehicle that was used to transport the shooter or the firearm, or both, to the scene of the discharge;
(8) The victim was:
(a) A judge; juror or former juror; prospective, current, or former witness in an adjudicative proceeding; prosecuting attorney; deputy prosecuting attorney; defense attorney; a member of the indeterminate sentence review board; or a probation or parole officer; and
(b) The murder was related to the exercise of official duties performed or to be performed by the victim;
(9) The person committed the murder to conceal the commission of a crime or to protect or conceal the identity of any person committing a crime, including, but specifically not limited to, any attempt to avoid prosecution as a persistent offender as defined in RCW 9.94A.030;
(10) There was more than one victim and the murders were part of a common scheme or plan or the result of a single act of the person;
(11) The murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from one of the following crimes:
(a) Robbery in the first or second degree;
(b) Rape in the first or second degree;
(c) Burglary in the first or second degree or residential burglary;
(d) Kidnapping in the first degree; or
(e) Arson in the first degree;
(12) The victim was regularly employed or self-employed as a newsreporter and the murder was committed to obstruct or hinder the investigative, research, or reporting activities of the victim;
(13) At the time the person committed the murder, there existed a court order, issued in this or any other state, which prohibited the person from either contacting the victim, molesting the victim, or disturbing the peace of the victim, and the person had knowledge of the existence of that order;
(14) At the time the person committed the murder, the person and the victim were "family or household members" or "intimate partners" as defined in RCW 10.99.020, and the person had previously engaged in a pattern or practice of three or more of the following crimes committed upon the victim within a five-year period, regardless of whether a conviction resulted:
(a) Harassment as defined in RCW 9A.46.020; or
(b) Any criminal assault.
[ 2021 c 215 s 120; 2020 c 29 s 12; 2003 c 53 s 96; 1998 c 305 s 1. Prior: 1995 c 129 s 17 (Initiative Measure No. 159); 1994 c 121 s 3; 1981 c 138 s 2.]
Notes:
Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.
Effective date—2020 c 29: See note following RCW 7.77.060.
Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.
Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 204
cases (20 in the last 5 years), 1982–2026 · leading case: State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359 (Wash. 2007).
State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359 (Wash. 2007). “[17] Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the "aggravating circumstances" set forth in RCW 10.95.020: "A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A…”
State v. Yates, 161 Wash. 2d 714 (Wash. 2007). “17 Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the “aggravating circumstances” set forth in RCW 10.95.020: “A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A…”
State v. Hoffman, 804 P.2d 577 (Wash. 1991). “§ 1114 , or aggravated murder in the first degree under RCW 10.95.020 and assault in the first degree under RCW 9A.”
State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1995). “030(1)(a) and RCW 10.95.020 with RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c). We decline to reach Brett's claim under the state constitution because he fails to make any argument thereunder.”
State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722 (Wash. 1986). “020(9)(a)) compared to the killing of a police officer ( see RCW 10.95.020(1))? The "similar cases" chosen for proportionality review could be limited to only those cases with the same characteristics; if more than a very few characteristics are considered, however, no exactly…”
State v. Allen, 431 P.3d 117 (Wash. 2018). “¶ 1 This case asks whether the aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 10.95.020 are "elements" of the offense of aggravated first degree murder for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause.”
State v. Hacheney, 158 P.3d 1152 (Wash. 2007). “II Analysis Sufficiency of the Evidence/Jury Instruction ¶ 16 RCW 10.95.020 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits premeditated first degree murder and the jury finds one of a statutory list of aggravating circumstances.”
State v. Hacheney, 160 Wash. 2d 503 (Wash. 2007). “II Analysis Sufficiency of the Evidence/Jury Instruction ¶16 RCW 10.95.020 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits premeditated first degree murder and the jury finds one of a statutory list of aggravating circumstances.”
State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1987). “We further said that admissible State's evidence includes any evidence relative to the statutory aggravating factors set forth in RCW 10.95.020, if such evidence would have been admissible at the guilt phase.”
State v. Arndt, 453 P.3d 696 (Wash. 2019). “030(l)(a) and RCW 10.95.020 with the aggravating circumstance of first degree arson under RCW 10.”
State v. Campbell, 691 P.2d 929 (Wash. 1984). “IX PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION If a person is charged with aggravated first degree murder under RCW 10.95.020, [T]he prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of a special sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed when there is…”
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Lord, 868 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1994). “Lord contends that RCW 10.95.020, which defines aggravated murder, violates article 2, section 37 of our constitution because it incorporates the premeditated murder statute by reference, without setting it out in full.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(1) — 18 cases
State v. Hoffman, 804 P.2d 577 (Wash. 1991). “§ 1114 , or aggravated murder in the first degree under RCW 10.95.020 and assault in the first degree under RCW 9A.”
State v. Hughes, 721 P.2d 902 (Wash. 1986).
State v. Allen, 431 P.3d 117 (Wash. 2018). “¶ 1 This case asks whether the aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 10.95.020 are "elements" of the offense of aggravated first degree murder for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause.”
State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722 (Wash. 1986). “020(9)(a)) compared to the killing of a police officer ( see RCW 10.95.020(1))? The "similar cases" chosen for proportionality review could be limited to only those cases with the same characteristics; if more than a very few characteristics are considered, however, no exactly…”
State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 2008).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(10) — 19 cases
State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359 (Wash. 2007). “[17] Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the "aggravating circumstances" set forth in RCW 10.95.020: "A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A…”
State v. Yates, 161 Wash. 2d 714 (Wash. 2007). “17 Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the “aggravating circumstances” set forth in RCW 10.95.020: “A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A…”
State v. Schierman, 415 P.3d 106 (Wash. 2018).
State v. Schierman, 438 P.3d 1063 (Wash. 2015).
State v. Woods, 23 P.3d 1046 (Wash. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(11) — 14 cases
State v. Hacheney, 158 P.3d 1152 (Wash. 2007). “II Analysis Sufficiency of the Evidence/Jury Instruction ¶ 16 RCW 10.95.020 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits premeditated first degree murder and the jury finds one of a statutory list of aggravating circumstances.”
State v. Hacheney, 160 Wash. 2d 503 (Wash. 2007). “II Analysis Sufficiency of the Evidence/Jury Instruction ¶16 RCW 10.95.020 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits premeditated first degree murder and the jury finds one of a statutory list of aggravating circumstances.”
State v. Arndt, 453 P.3d 696 (Wash. 2019). “030(l)(a) and RCW 10.95.020 with the aggravating circumstance of first degree arson under RCW 10.”
State v. Cross, 156 Wash. 2d 580 (Wash. 2006).
State v. Cross, 132 P.3d 80 (Wash. 2006).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(11)(a) — 8 cases
State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359 (Wash. 2007). “[17] Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the "aggravating circumstances" set forth in RCW 10.95.020: "A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A…”
State v. Yates, 161 Wash. 2d 714 (Wash. 2007). “17 Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the “aggravating circumstances” set forth in RCW 10.95.020: “A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A…”
State v. Allen, 147 P.3d 581 (Wash. 2006).
State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977 (Wash. 2000).
State Of Washington, Resp. v. Rodney Willis, App. (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(11)(b) — 2 cases
In Re Woods, 114 P.3d 607 (Wash. 2005).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Woods, 154 Wash. 2d 400 (Wash. 2005).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(11)(c) — 2 cases
State of Washington v. John A. Radavich (Wash. Ct. App. 2022).
State of Washington v. Gary Brandon Ault (Wash. Ct. App. 2026).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(11)(d) — 4 cases
State v. Whitaker, 459 P.3d 1074 (Wash. 2020).
State of Washington v. Gustavo Tapia Rodriguez (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
State of Washington v. Fernando Marcos Gutierrez (Wash. Ct. App. 2022).
State of Washington v. Tansy Fay Arwen Mathis (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(11)(e) — 3 cases
State v. Hacheney, 158 P.3d 1152 (Wash. 2007). “II Analysis Sufficiency of the Evidence/Jury Instruction ¶ 16 RCW 10.95.020 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits premeditated first degree murder and the jury finds one of a statutory list of aggravating circumstances.”
State Of Washington v. Shelly Arndt, 426 P.3d 804 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
State Of Washington v. Shelly Arndt (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(14) — 2 cases
State v. Price, 109 P.3d 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
State v. Price, 109 P.3d 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(2) — 6 cases
State v. Campbell, 691 P.2d 929 (Wash. 1984). “IX PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION If a person is charged with aggravated first degree murder under RCW 10.95.020, [T]he prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of a special sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed when there is…”
State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988).
State v. Bergeron, 711 P.2d 1000 (Wash. 1985).
State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1987). “We further said that admissible State's evidence includes any evidence relative to the statutory aggravating factors set forth in RCW 10.95.020, if such evidence would have been admissible at the guilt phase.”
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(4) — 6 cases
State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1987). “We further said that admissible State's evidence includes any evidence relative to the statutory aggravating factors set forth in RCW 10.95.020, if such evidence would have been admissible at the guilt phase.”
State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722 (Wash. 1986). “020(9)(a)) compared to the killing of a police officer ( see RCW 10.95.020(1))? The "similar cases" chosen for proportionality review could be limited to only those cases with the same characteristics; if more than a very few characteristics are considered, however, no exactly…”
State v. Bowerman, 802 P.2d 116 (Wash. 1990).
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
State v. Kron, 821 P.2d 1248 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(5) — 9 cases
Young v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 148 (Ky. 2001).
In Re the Pers. Restraint of Harris, 763 P.2d 823 (Wash. 1988).
State v. Harris, 725 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1986).
State v. Pineda-Pineda, 226 P.3d 164 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Pineda-Pineda, 154 Wash. App. 653 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(6) — 11 cases
State v. Monschke, 133 Wash. App. 313 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Monschke, 135 P.3d 966 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Bluehorse, 159 Wash. App. 410 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
In re the Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 251 P.3d 884 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Bluehorse, 248 P.3d 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(6)(1981) — 1 case
State v. Goldberg, 72 P.3d 1083 (Wash. 2003).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(6)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Campbell, 691 P.2d 929 (Wash. 1984). “IX PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION If a person is charged with aggravated first degree murder under RCW 10.95.020, [T]he prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of a special sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed when there is…”
State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(7) — 28 cases
State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722 (Wash. 1986). “020(9)(a)) compared to the killing of a police officer ( see RCW 10.95.020(1))? The "similar cases" chosen for proportionality review could be limited to only those cases with the same characteristics; if more than a very few characteristics are considered, however, no exactly…”
State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105 (Wash. 1995).
State v. Elmore, 985 P.2d 289 (Wash. 1999).
State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988).
State v. Bartholomew, 654 P.2d 1170 (Wash. 1982).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(8) — 15 cases
State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722 (Wash. 1986). “020(9)(a)) compared to the killing of a police officer ( see RCW 10.95.020(1))? The "similar cases" chosen for proportionality review could be limited to only those cases with the same characteristics; if more than a very few characteristics are considered, however, no exactly…”
State v. Guloy, 705 P.2d 1182 (Wash. 1985).
State v. Kincaid, 692 P.2d 823 (Wash. 1985).
State v. Dictado, 687 P.2d 172 (Wash. 1984).
State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1987). “We further said that admissible State's evidence includes any evidence relative to the statutory aggravating factors set forth in RCW 10.95.020, if such evidence would have been admissible at the guilt phase.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(8)(a) — 1 case
State of Washington v. Michael Eugene Beauchamp (Wash. Ct. App. 2026).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(9) — 33 cases
State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1995). “030(1)(a) and RCW 10.95.020 with RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c). We decline to reach Brett's claim under the state constitution because he fails to make any argument thereunder.”
State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359 (Wash. 2007). “[17] Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the "aggravating circumstances" set forth in RCW 10.95.020: "A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A…”
State v. Yates, 161 Wash. 2d 714 (Wash. 2007). “17 Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the “aggravating circumstances” set forth in RCW 10.95.020: “A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A…”
Matter of Pers. Restraint of Lord, 868 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1994). “Lord contends that RCW 10.95.020, which defines aggravated murder, violates article 2, section 37 of our constitution because it incorporates the premeditated murder statute by reference, without setting it out in full.”
State v. Irby, 347 P.3d 1103 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(9)(a) — 6 cases
State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1995). “030(1)(a) and RCW 10.95.020 with RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c). We decline to reach Brett's claim under the state constitution because he fails to make any argument thereunder.”
State v. Kwan Fai Mak, 718 P.2d 407 (Wash. 1986).
State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722 (Wash. 1986). “020(9)(a)) compared to the killing of a police officer ( see RCW 10.95.020(1))? The "similar cases" chosen for proportionality review could be limited to only those cases with the same characteristics; if more than a very few characteristics are considered, however, no exactly…”
In Re Brett, 16 P.3d 601 (Wash. 2001).
State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1987). “We further said that admissible State's evidence includes any evidence relative to the statutory aggravating factors set forth in RCW 10.95.020, if such evidence would have been admissible at the guilt phase.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(9)(b) — 6 cases
State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1987). “We further said that admissible State's evidence includes any evidence relative to the statutory aggravating factors set forth in RCW 10.95.020, if such evidence would have been admissible at the guilt phase.”
State v. Campbell, 691 P.2d 929 (Wash. 1984). “IX PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION If a person is charged with aggravated first degree murder under RCW 10.95.020, [T]he prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of a special sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed when there is…”
State v. Kester, 686 P.2d 1081 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
State v. Bingham, 699 P.2d 262 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Elmore, 985 P.2d 289 (Wash. 1999).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(9)(c) — 7 cases
State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1995). “030(1)(a) and RCW 10.95.020 with RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c). We decline to reach Brett's claim under the state constitution because he fails to make any argument thereunder.”
State v. Campbell, 691 P.2d 929 (Wash. 1984). “IX PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION If a person is charged with aggravated first degree murder under RCW 10.95.020, [T]he prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of a special sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed when there is…”
In Re Brett, 16 P.3d 601 (Wash. 2001).
State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988).
State v. Howland, 832 P.2d 1339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(9)(d) — 2 cases
State v. Brett, 892 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1995). “030(1)(a) and RCW 10.95.020 with RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c). We decline to reach Brett's claim under the state constitution because he fails to make any argument thereunder.”
In Re Brett, 16 P.3d 601 (Wash. 2001).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(H) — 1 case
State v. Hacheney, 160 Wash. 2d 503 (Wash. 2007). “II Analysis Sufficiency of the Evidence/Jury Instruction ¶16 RCW 10.95.020 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits premeditated first degree murder and the jury finds one of a statutory list of aggravating circumstances.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(ll) — 1 case
State v. Hacheney, 160 Wash. 2d 503 (Wash. 2007). “II Analysis Sufficiency of the Evidence/Jury Instruction ¶16 RCW 10.95.020 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits premeditated first degree murder and the jury finds one of a statutory list of aggravating circumstances.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(ll)(a) — 4 cases
State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977 (Wash. 2000).
State v. Allen, 147 P.3d 581 (Wash. 2006).
State v. Yates, 161 Wash. 2d 714 (Wash. 2007). “17 Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the “aggravating circumstances” set forth in RCW 10.95.020: “A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A…”
State v. Condon, 343 P.3d 357 (Wash. 2015).
— Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020(ll)(e) — 1 case
State v. Hacheney, 160 Wash. 2d 503 (Wash. 2007). “II Analysis Sufficiency of the Evidence/Jury Instruction ¶16 RCW 10.95.020 provides that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits premeditated first degree murder and the jury finds one of a statutory list of aggravating circumstances.”
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