Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150
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(1) In disposition hearings all relevant and material evidence, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value, even though such evidence may not be admissible in a hearing on the information. The youth or the youth's counsel and the prosecuting attorney shall be afforded an opportunity to examine and controvert written reports so received and to cross-examine individuals making reports when such individuals are reasonably available, but sources of confidential information need not be disclosed. The prosecutor and counsel for the juvenile may submit recommendations for disposition.
(2) For purposes of disposition:
(a) Violations which are current offenses count as misdemeanors;
(b) Violations may not count as part of the offender's criminal history;
(c) In no event may a disposition for a violation include confinement.
(3) Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall:
(a) Consider the facts supporting the allegations of criminal conduct by the respondent;
(b) Consider information and arguments offered by parties and their counsel;
(c) Consider any predisposition reports;
(d) Consult with the respondent's parent, guardian, or custodian on the appropriateness of dispositional options under consideration and afford the respondent and the respondent's parent, guardian, or custodian an opportunity to speak in the respondent's behalf;
(e) Allow the victim or a representative of the victim and an investigative law enforcement officer to speak;
(f) Determine the amount of restitution owing to the victim, if any, or set a hearing for a later date not to exceed one hundred eighty days from the date of the disposition hearing to determine the amount, except that the court may continue the hearing beyond the one hundred eighty days for good cause;
(g) Determine the respondent's offender score;
(h) Consider whether or not any of the following mitigating factors exist:
(i) The respondent's conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury or the respondent did not contemplate that his or her conduct would cause or threaten serious bodily injury;
(ii) The respondent acted under strong and immediate provocation;
(iii) The respondent was suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced his or her culpability for the offense though failing to establish a defense;
(iv) Prior to his or her detection, the respondent compensated or made a good faith attempt to compensate the victim for the injury or loss sustained; and
(v) There has been at least one year between the respondent's current offense and any prior criminal offense;
(i) Consider whether or not any of the following aggravating factors exist:
(i) In the commission of the offense, or in flight therefrom, the respondent inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury to another;
(ii) The offense was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner;
(iii) The victim or victims were particularly vulnerable;
(iv) The respondent has a recent criminal history or has failed to comply with conditions of a recent dispositional order or diversion agreement;
(v) The current offense included a finding of sexual motivation pursuant to RCW 13.40.135;
(vi) The respondent was the leader of a criminal enterprise involving several persons;
(vii) There are other complaints which have resulted in diversion or a finding or plea of guilty but which are not included as criminal history; and
(viii) The standard range disposition is clearly too lenient considering the seriousness of the juvenile's prior adjudications.
(4) The following factors may not be considered in determining the punishment to be imposed:
(a) The sex of the respondent;
(b) The race or color of the respondent or the respondent's family;
(c) The creed or religion of the respondent or the respondent's family;
(d) The economic or social class of the respondent or the respondent's family; and
(e) Factors indicating that the respondent may be or is a dependent child within the meaning of this chapter.
(5) A court may not commit a juvenile to a state institution solely because of the lack of facilities, including treatment facilities, existing in the community.
[ 1998 c 86 s 1; 1997 c 338 s 24; 1995 c 268 s 5; 1992 c 205 s 109; 1990 c 3 s 605; 1981 c 299 s 12; 1979 c 155 s 67; 1977 ex.s. c 291 s 69.]
Notes:
Effective date—1998 c 86: "This act takes effect July 1, 1998." [ 1998 c 86 s 2.]
Finding—Evaluation—Report—1997 c 338: See note following RCW 13.40.0357.
Severability—Effective dates—1997 c 338: See notes following RCW 5.60.060.
Purpose—1995 c 268: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.
Part headings not law—Severability—1992 c 205: See notes following RCW 13.40.010.
Effective date—Application—1990 c 3 ss 601-605: See note following RCW 9.94A.835.
Effective date—Severability—1979 c 155: See notes following RCW 13.04.011.
Effective dates—Severability—1977 ex.s. c 291: See notes following RCW 13.04.005.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 110
cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case: State v. Mollichi
State v. Mollichi (1997)
“The Disposition Hearing of RCW 13.40.150 RCW 13.40.150 provides: (3) Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall: (f) Determine the amount of restitution owing…”
State v. Mollichi (1997)
“The Disposition Hearing of RCW 13.40.150 RCW 13.40.150 provides: (3) Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall: .”
State v. Rice (1983)
“RCW 13.40.150. For the purposes of disposition, the court may consider a wide variety of matters including aggravating and mitigating factors.”
State v. B.O.J. (2019)
“Under the plain language of the Act, only to the extent that they suggest that "a serious, and clear danger to society" are the statutorily enumerated purposes relevant to the threshold manifest injustice determination.”
State v. Murphy (1983)
“Does RCW 13.40.150 limit the parties who may submit disposition recommendations solely to the prosecution and the defense? 6.”
State v. M.S. (2021)
“Two other reasons compel our conclusion that the aggravating factors are not an exclusive list.”
State v. T.E.C. (2004)
“also argues that the court’s revocation of his SSODA, solely because of a lack of a placement, contravenes RCW 13.40.150(5). RCW 13.40.150(5) provides that “[a] court may not commit a juvenile to a state institution solely because of the lack of facilities, including treatment…”
State v. Sledge (1997)
“12(a), and must be conducted in accordance with RCW 13.40.150. JuCR 7.12(b). Under RCW 13.”
State v. Lawley (1979)
“RCW 13.40.150. Commitment of a juvenile to an institution is still limited to juvenile facilities established pursuant to RCW 72.”
State v. J.V. (2006)
“RCW 13.40.150(1). RCW 13.40.010(2). See also State v.”
State v. Strong (1979)
“RCW 13.40.150. State v. Lawley, 91 Wn.2d 654, 657 , 591 P.”
State v. SH (1994)
“RCW 13.40.150(3)(h)(i). The court's finding that S.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(1) — 25 cases
State v. Rice (1983)
“RCW 13.40.150. For the purposes of disposition, the court may consider a wide variety of matters including aggravating and mitigating factors.”
State v. Murphy (1983)
“Does RCW 13.40.150 limit the parties who may submit disposition recommendations solely to the prosecution and the defense? 6.”
State v. M.S. (2021)
“Two other reasons compel our conclusion that the aggravating factors are not an exclusive list.”
State v. S.S. (1992)
State v. Rhodes (1979)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(2)(h) — 4 cases
State v. Lawley (1979)
“RCW 13.40.150. Commitment of a juvenile to an institution is still limited to juvenile facilities established pursuant to RCW 72.”
State v. Rice (1983)
“RCW 13.40.150. For the purposes of disposition, the court may consider a wide variety of matters including aggravating and mitigating factors.”
State v. Rhodes (1979)
State v. Meade (2005)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3) — 16 cases
State v. Mollichi (1997)
“The Disposition Hearing of RCW 13.40.150 RCW 13.40.150 provides: (3) Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall: (f) Determine the amount of restitution owing…”
State v. Fellers (1984)
State v. J.V. (2006)
“RCW 13.40.150(1). RCW 13.40.010(2). See also State v.”
State v. Gutierrez (1984)
State v. Murphy (1983)
“Does RCW 13.40.150 limit the parties who may submit disposition recommendations solely to the prosecution and the defense? 6.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(a) — 3 cases
State v. M.S. (2021)
“Two other reasons compel our conclusion that the aggravating factors are not an exclusive list.”
State v. Haws (2003)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(b) — 3 cases
State v. T.C. (2000)
State v. TC (2000)
State of Washington v. A.V. (2024)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(c) — 1 case
State v. SP (1988)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(d) — 4 cases
State v. Roberson (2003)
State v. Roberson (2003)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(f) — 11 cases
State v. Mollichi (1997)
“The Disposition Hearing of RCW 13.40.150 RCW 13.40.150 provides: (3) Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall: .”
State v. Mollichi (1997)
“The Disposition Hearing of RCW 13.40.150 RCW 13.40.150 provides: (3) Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall: (f) Determine the amount of restitution owing…”
State v. Martin (1999)
State v. Smith (1983)
State v. Fambrough (1992)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(h) — 15 cases
State v. Schaaf (1987)
State v. B.O.J. (2019)
“Under the plain language of the Act, only to the extent that they suggest that "a serious, and clear danger to society" are the statutorily enumerated purposes relevant to the threshold manifest injustice determination.”
State v. Saenz (2012)
State v. Meade (2005)
State v. K.E. (1999)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(h)(i) — 5 cases
State v. B.O.J. (2019)
“Under the plain language of the Act, only to the extent that they suggest that "a serious, and clear danger to society" are the statutorily enumerated purposes relevant to the threshold manifest injustice determination.”
State v. Bacon (2018)
State v. SH (1994)
“RCW 13.40.150(3)(h)(i). The court's finding that S.”
State v. Roberson (2003)
State v. S.H. (1994)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(h)(i)(ii) — 1 case
State v. EAJ (2003)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(h)(ii) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(h)(iii) — 6 cases
State v. SH (1994)
“RCW 13.40.150(3)(h)(i). The court's finding that S.”
State v. S.H. (1994)
State v. S.S. (1992)
State v. SS (1992)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(h)(v) — 4 cases
State v. J.V. (2006)
“RCW 13.40.150(1). RCW 13.40.010(2). See also State v.”
State v. K.E. (1999)
State v. JV (2006)
State of Washington v. A.V. (2024)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(h)(v)(i) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i) — 13 cases
State v. Duncan (1998)
State v. Melton (1991)
State v. D.L. (2021)
State v. Tai N. (2005)
State v. M.S. (2021)
“Two other reasons compel our conclusion that the aggravating factors are not an exclusive list.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i)(i) — 3 cases
State v. M.S. (2021)
“Two other reasons compel our conclusion that the aggravating factors are not an exclusive list.”
State v. SH (1994)
“RCW 13.40.150(3)(h)(i). The court's finding that S.”
State v. S.H. (1994)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i)(ii) — 7 cases
State v. E.A.J. (2003)
State v. B.O.J. (2019)
“Under the plain language of the Act, only to the extent that they suggest that "a serious, and clear danger to society" are the statutorily enumerated purposes relevant to the threshold manifest injustice determination.”
State v. Ogden (2000)
State v. SH (1994)
“RCW 13.40.150(3)(h)(i). The court's finding that S.”
State v. Ogden (2000)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i)(iii) — 8 cases
State v. SH (1994)
“RCW 13.40.150(3)(h)(i). The court's finding that S.”
State v. T.E.H. (1998)
State v. Jacobsen (1999)
State v. Roberson (2003)
State v. Wall (1986)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i)(iv) — 13 cases
State v. Meade (2005)
State v. Melton (1991)
State v. J.V. (2006)
“RCW 13.40.150(1). RCW 13.40.010(2). See also State v.”
State v. Payne (1991)
State v. S.S. (1992)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i)(v) — 2 cases
State v. A.S. (2003)
State v. Halstien (1992)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i)(vi) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i)(vii) — 2 cases
State v. Meade (2005)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i)(viii) — 2 cases
State v. Meade (2005)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3X1) — 1 case
State v. Mollichi (1997)
“The Disposition Hearing of RCW 13.40.150 RCW 13.40.150 provides: (3) Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall: (f) Determine the amount of restitution owing…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(4) — 8 cases
State v. T.C. (2000)
State v. M.S. (2021)
“Two other reasons compel our conclusion that the aggravating factors are not an exclusive list.”
State v. Haws (2003)
State v. TC (2000)
State v. Haws (2003)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(4)(e) — 4 cases
State of Washington v. F. T. (2018)
State of Washington v. F.T. (2018)
State v. F.T. (2018)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(5) — 6 cases
State v. T.E.C. (2004)
“also argues that the court’s revocation of his SSODA, solely because of a lack of a placement, contravenes RCW 13.40.150(5). RCW 13.40.150(5) provides that “[a] court may not commit a juvenile to a state institution solely because of the lack of facilities, including treatment…”
State v. L.W. (2000)
State v. TEC (2004)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(d) — 1 case
State Of Washington v. C.m. (2016)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(h) — 2 cases
State of Washington v. A.V. (2024)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(h)(i) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(h)(ii) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(h)(iii) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(i) — 1 case
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(i)(ii) — 1 case
State v. Ogden (2000)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(i)(iii) — 1 case
State v. Ogden (2000)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(i)(iv) — 1 case
State v. Meade (2005)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(i)(vii) — 2 cases
State v. B.O.J. (2019)
“Under the plain language of the Act, only to the extent that they suggest that "a serious, and clear danger to society" are the statutorily enumerated purposes relevant to the threshold manifest injustice determination.”
State v. Meade (2005)
— Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(i)(viii) — 1 case
State v. Meade (2005)
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